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No. 75-636 CFX 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
Cert. to CA 5 
(Brown, Ainsworth, Morgan) 
INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 
v. 
UNITED STATES Federal/Civil Timely 
No. 75-672 CFX 
-\\es~~e.~· 
\ T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. art.. \-&- '0 e. 
~J.~sc;e.d., Vo (same) 
~t.~~~UNITED STATES 
1. SUMMARY: These petitions involve the same basic situation 
+...t\~ )S Cl.. 
'ot\teY ~\At(.. 
1 1 j_ involved in Franks v. Boman Transp. Co., No. 74-728, i.e. -t't-' a.o · \T . 
allegations of discrimination against minorities in hiring .. 
for over-the-road ("OTR", or "LD" for "line driver") trucking 
jobs. The instant petitions arise out of a "pattern or practice" 
suit brought by the government under § 707 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6. The major questions presented 
by the two petitioners are: 1) whether ,the McDonnell Douglas 
burden of proof scheme, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802, must be applied in a "pattern or practice" 
suit (or, by implication, in class actions generally); 
2) whether the unions are liable for a facially neutral ....._____ - -
seniority system that perpetuates prior discrimination by -the employer; and 3) whether, under the system of contract 
negotiation used in the trucking industry, the locals are 
indispensable parties in a suit claiming liability for the 
lock-in effect of the seniority provisions of the local and 
area supplements to the national agreement. 
2. FACTS: The decision below dealt with two consolidated 
suits, the first brought against T.I.M.E.-DC, the International 
(IBT~ and a local, alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination 
at T.I.M.E.-DC's Nashville terminal, the second brought against 
T.I.M.E.-DC and IBT charging a pattern or practice on a system-
wide basis. The T.I.M.E.-DC system operates 51 terminals in 
26 states. T.I.M.E.-DC has signed a total of 124 separate 
collective bargaining agreements with 83 individual Teamster 
locals at its various terminals. Each contract consists of 
three basic parts, the National 1.ster Freight Agreement, an --------Area Supplement, and Local Riders or Addenda. The National 
Master and the Area Supplements are negotiated nationally on 
a multi-union, multi-employer basis (the locals give power of attorney). 
The collective bargaining agreements provided for separate 
area and local supplements for each of the four bargainin~ 
units--OTR, city drivers ("CD"), garage workers, and clerical 
~ ,__.,..- '--" ---.....---- --
workers. Although nothing in the collective bargaining 
agreements prohibits the transfer of an employee from one 
unit to another, an employee who transfers maintains his 
company seniority only for fringe benefits (such as vacation 
rights) and is treated for purposes of bidding for jobs 
~,......._..... .......,_......,.....--...... .- ..... ...-. . 
and layoffs as a new employee in the transferee unit • 
.....;;;~~- ... 
The suit, at least in the form it took in the CA, 
involved only the rights of incumbent minority employees 
(in non-OTR jobs) who had been hired during the period during 
which T.I.M.E.-DC was alleged to have been engaged in 
discriminatory assignment , and transfer practices (see Petn App. 
at 29-30 n.33). 
Prior to trial, IBT moved to dismiss on the grounds 
~ of failure to join all the locals as indispensable parties. 
The DC (Woodward) denied the motion (Petn App. 52-55). 
After trial, but prior to the DC's decision, the government 
--
a d T.I.M E.-DC entered into a consent decree in partial resolution 
of the suit. The decree (approved by the DC) admitted no liability .......______ 
but provided for a recruitment campaign, set minimum qualification 
standards, provided for ratio hiring (subject to availability 
of qualified applicants), and provided for certain amounts of 
back pay. 
([) 
The ~C was then left with the issue whether there h~een 
, l. - ,, .... _ m . . 
a pattern ~racti__se and, if so, which employees were "individual 
----------., 
or class discriminatees suffering the present effects of past 
....____ ---------
discrimination." The proof of pattern or practice consisted of 
statistical tables showing the ratio of Blacks to Hhites in 
each Standard Metropolitan Statistica~ Area (SMSA) and in 
each T.I.M.E.-DC terminal city, compared with the ratio of 
Black to White employees at that terminal, and the breakdown 
by race within each job classification (see Petn App. 21-22). 
There was also testimony detailing specific instances of 
discrimination by T.I.M.E.-DC against minority persons seeki ng 
to be hired or transfered into an OTR position (see Petn App. 24). 
I!- _..T.Q,e DC founffiat there had been a "pattem or practice" and 
~ ~at the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining 
~~ agreements, while neutral on their face, operated to perpetuate ,,, ~ i;_' 
~~~ the effect of the prior discriminatory practices by impeding 
f the free transfer of minority employees to the (more desirable) 
OTR jobs (Petn App. 61). 
On the issue of remedies, the government sought relief ..... _ ,_ -
for an "affected class" of somewhat over 300 incumbent employees 
who had been hired at T.I.M.E.-DC terminals that maintained 
OTR domiciles prior to 1969--the approximate date at which T.I.M.E.-DC 
~-:. ~- ... 
actively bagan hiring minority group members as OTRs (the 
"OTR domicile" requirement reduced the number of terminals affected 
from 51 to 20). As the case stood in the CA, former employees 
~,., 
an~es~d applicants were not covered (Petn App. 29-31 n.33) • 
._... .._... ~ .........,.._.. ,.,.. 
The DC separated the "affected class" into three groups: those 
as to whom the evidence showed "severe injury because of the 
pattern and practice of discrimination" (Group A), those 
who "were very possibly the objects of discrimination" (Group 
B), and those as to whom there was no evidence tha t they were 
harmed individually (Group C). The DC created a complex system 
-·-----
of hiring preferences for these three groups, and provided 
that Group A was to have carryover seniority back to July ---
2, 1965 (the effective date of Title VII), Group B was 
to have carryover seniority back to January 14, 1971 (the 
filing of the systemwide pattern or practice suit), and 
Group C was to have no carryover seniority at all. [Note: 
the DC's plan was fairly complex--I suggest that the reader, 
if interested, take a look at theCA's description of the 
plan, Petn App. 11-16.] Thirty employees were given Group A 
status, four were given Group B status, and the rest of the 
three hundred-plus were put in Group C. 
T.I.M.E.-DC, IBT, and the government all appealed. The 
CA affirmed the DC's finding of "pattern or practice" as 
~y,..qe,c.e.,' 
supported by the statistical and testimoniail~n-d ·-not clearly 
erroneous. It held that the locals were not indispensable 
parties because the locals play little if any meaningful role 
in negotiating the contracts, and the IBT adequately represents 
the seniority status of its members. It also agreed with the 
DC that both the employer and the union were liable for a 
C ~~ ;~enior~ sys~e~that =-;erp;;=uates the ~rior discrimi:ation 
~/b[ t~emp{o;:r, 
C J>r The CA parted company with the DC, however, on the is sue 
~-~of remedies, First, it announced adherence to the "rightful .:;!:!._1::;4~ 
~7. place" doctrine as announced in the CAS decisions in Franks '~fJ. < 
~~ v. Bowman Transp. Co. and the RodrigL1ez Trilogy (Nos. 75-651,~ 
75-715, and 75-718, "straight lined" with these petns for 
the March 5 conference). Following Rodri guez, it declared 
that "rightful place" should be determined on the basis of -- ______.....___; 
'VUfr.q-~~ ----- ·;.---
a!c../.f,..-~,.~ ~  ;-( "'P'A-~~ ........... 'I:.J"'"---
~"1 
the person's "qualification date"--the date the person had 
the experience necessary to qualify him for an OTR position. 
~ ~----------~~----~~'---~-----~-~----------------~------The CA then rejected the DC's division of the class into ~~4.( 
" A three groups. It held that individualized proof is not ~,A4,.~ 
required in awarding relief in a "pattern or practice" suit ~ 
(noting that there are similarities and possible differences ~ 
-"'k. ~<I- ---""""-'( between a government "pattern or practice" suit and a private • 
class action, Petn App. 34 n.33 [citing to Rodriguez]). 
The CA stated: "Whatever evidentiary hearings are required 
for individuals can well be postponed to the remedy.'' (Petn 
App. 34). It is not clea;r, however, whether theCA intended 
that the various members of the class be required to prove - .......... ,.., - - -
individualized discriminationo The paragraph following the _______ ...,_ ...~ .... ___ ....... - ..- -
above-quoted sentence reads: 
The result is that we cannot accept the gradations 
of [Groups A, B, and C]. For all we know, at this 
stage some [in Group C] may have suffered discriminations 
even more egregious than those whom the Government 
singled out to be persuasive witnesses to establish 
pattern and practice. All those [in Groups A, B, and C] 
are entitled to be given an opportunity to bid on future 
vacancies in the specified job classifications to which 
they are allowed to transfer by the District Court's 
order on the basis of their seniority and, if they qualify J 
for those jobs, to be permitted to exercise their full 
seniority in such jobs for all purposes, including 
bidding and layoff. (Petn App. 34-35) 
[/J )"~never makes clear (at least to me) ~hether a 
--- member of Group C must show individualized discrimination 
or what such a showing would consist of. Bits and pieces - ---------------~---------------~----of the opinion indicate that such a showing must be made, 
for example, the CA states 111-Je do not think it necessary for 
the trial court to reexamine the findings as to the discrimination 
. ; 
against those in [Groups A and B] and ,the prejudice suffered 
by each," (Petn App. 38) which seems to imply that an examination 
(~e.~ Pe.:r"'- ltpp, lfLf n.lff) 
must be made as to group C. A TheCA's discussion of seniority 
carryover, however, seems to belie that implication. 
In regard to carryover seniority, the CA adopted the ' ~ ..... ~ 
"qualification date" principle announced in Rodriguez and 
stated that CA6's use, in Thornton v. East Texas Motor 
Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (CA6 1974), of a date based on the 
date of application for transfer or of filing an EEOC charge 
ignores the accepted principle that where there has been 
a showing of classwide discriminatory practices coupled 
with a seniority system that tends to freeze or perpetuate 
the effects of that discrimination, a member of the affected 
class need not actuall show that he or she unsuccessfull 
attem te to trans er to tTe exc u ed osltlon. Petn 
App. ded 
is extremely ambiguous on the 
showing of discrimination required (or not required) of 
Group C members, its citation to the Rodriguez Trilogy 
might be taken as adoption of the rule adopted in that case, 
namely, once a pattern or practice of discrimination has 
been shown, a minority employee is entitled to relief unless 
the employer can show that the employee's position is not 
due to discrimination (e.g. there were no vacancies into which 
he could have been hired). See generally the memo on the 
Rodriguez Trilogy. 
The CA here also held that "qualification date" seniority 
carryover for incumbents 
includes full seniority even though it may extend back 
beyond the"effective date" of Title VII since seniority 
provisions that call for the forfeiture of accumulated 
seniority on transfer serve to presently perpetuate the 
effects of pre-~ t~rimination. (Petn App. 36) 
TheCA then discussed and decided ·a series of more 
specific priority problems, only one of which is relevant 
and holding 
to a question presented by the parties. The factsArelevant 
to that issue (priority for vacancies after layoffs) will 
be discussed in the section on contentions. 
Finally, the CA noted that under the three-group plan 
of the DC, those in Group C had been given priority over all 
other employees who have no seniority in the category into 
which the Group C member was transferring [even if the other 
employee had greater company-wide seniority]. TheCA held: 
With all the victims now in one class, the record should 
be developed when necessary to examine the impact of 
such a preference on current non-victim, incumbent 
employees who have been employed by the company longer 
than a particular victim. (Petn App. 44) 
The case was "remanded for further evidentiary and judgmental 
proceedings consistent with this opinion." 
3. CONTENTIONS: T.I.M.E.-DC (No. 75-672) claims: 1) The 
CA erred when it held that racial composition statistics 
/A~1 
~'j-,1/' not only are significant, but "may often be dispositive in 
~ a pattern and practice claim." (Petn App. 23). The SG 
~+responds (correctly) that the CA did not rely only upon 
~ statistics, but rather relied also on the "massive amount 
~ of testimony presented by live witnesses." (Petn App. 24). 
2) TheCA erred when it found T.I.M.E.-DC liable in 
the face of theCA's own recognition that T.I.M.E.-DC was 
making a "laudable good faith effort" to eliminate discrimination. 
(Petn App. 27-28). The SG responds that the "good faith effort" 
was evidenced only begining in 1971 (long after the 1968 filing 
' 
of the suit), the evidence of "good fa,ith effort" was 
unquestionably due in part to the effects of the consent 
decree, and, in any event, the government sought (and 
received) seniority relief only for minorities hired prior 
to March 1971 "at a time when the existence of T.I.M.E.-DC's 
exclusionary practices was clear." (Resp 14-15). 
3) The CA erred in refusing to apply the McDonnell Douglas 
requirements to the government's proof of "pattern or 
l§J?})J;Q.Yi.ng ___ i;!:t~ DC 1 s 
practice ." T.I.M.E.-DC also claims that the CA erred inA 
refusal to credit T.I.M.E.-DC's claims that there were 
no OTR openings at the relevant times, but as far as I can 
tell, that holding was merely approval of a credibility 
finding. TheCA's refusal to apply the McDonnell Douglas 
requirements was based entirely on the similar holding in 
the Rodriguez Trilogy (see memo on the Rodriguez Trilogy)o 
The SG argues that the Court recognized in McDonnell Douglas 
that although the requirements there set out would be useful 
in determining whether discrimination exists in an individual 
case, they are not exclusive, and in a pattern or practice suit 
the courts need not engage in an exhaustive case-by-case analysis 
of each minority employee. The SG points to the Court's 
~ • statement in McDonnell Douglas that statistics may be significant 
~~ showing a pattern or practice of discrimination, 411 U.S. 
~~ at 804-805. 
4) The CA erred in adopting a "qualification date" 
standard for seniority carryover, and theCA's decision is 
in conflict with CA6's decision in Thornton v. East Texas 
. ' ' 
Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (CA6 1974)~ T.I.M.E.-DC 
claims also that the imposition of a blanket "qualification 
date" seniority was an improper overriding of the DG's 
carefully structured decision made in the exercise of the 
DC's proper discretion. In adopting a "qualification date" 
standard, the CA again relied on the Rodriguez Trilogy, 
and I again refer the reader to the memo on those cases. 
The SG responds that CA6 in Thornton was merely refusing 
j 
to override the discretion of the DC, CA6 was wrong, and 
in any event, Thornton has been overruled by a subsequent 
<J~::I~-~~~ &~·cTCLj 
CA6 opinion that cited to the dissent in Thornton in holdingl"' ____ _... 
that where pattern or practice is shown, plant-wide seniority 
should be "available regardless of whether an employee actually 
sought a transfer previously." E.E.O.C. v. Detroit Edison Co., 
Nos. 75-220, 75-221, 75-239, and 75-393 (Dec. 5 conference, 
held for Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.). 
5) The CA erred in its modification of the seniority/return 
rights of laid-off OTR drivers. This question involves the 
of 
issues~when a laid-off OTR driver has "super priority" in 
bidding on a vacancy, and _what priorities exist in "bumping" 
less senior drivers at other terminals. The issues seem to 
me to be relatively fact-specific questions of the shaping 
of an appropriate remedy, and I will not burden an already 
overly long memo with a discussion of the specifics. I refer 
those interested in the issues to Petn App. 40-43 and Petn 
for T.I.M.E.-DC 15-16. I refer those intrigued to the Rodriguez 
Trilogy and the Sabala Pair (more of the "straight-line"), where 
similar issues are considered. 
IBT (No. 75-636). IBT appears to state as a "Question 
Presented" whether a union can be held liable for an otherwise 
neutral seniority system that merely perpetuates an employer's 
independent discrimination. I find no discussion of that 
issue, however, in the "Argument" section. IBT's other 
claims are: 1) The CA erred in applying a "qualification 
date" seniority standard and in refusing to apply the 
requirements of McDonnell Douglas [same issue as raised by 
T.I.M.E.-DC]; 2) The seniority carryover remedy is contrary 
to§ 703(h) [~Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.]; 3) TheCA 
erred in affording relief where there was evidence of good 
faith and effective efforts to remedy discrimination--the 
Act only reaches continuing abuses; 4) The CA erred in holding 
~· that the locals were not indispensable parties. In regard 
to this latter contention, IBT notes that in two cases in 
the Rodriguez Trilogy, the CA held (in identical circumstances) 
that the International was not liable (see footnote 2 in 
Rodriguez footnotes as merely an intracircuit conflict, noting 
in those cases the Southern Conference (the regional body) was 
( WtTio... The. f#e..J) · 
also held liab 1~ and CAS held that the signatures of the locals 
were merely a formality. The SG states that the Southern 
Conference is clearly controlled by the International. The 
SG does not conunent on the Sabala pair, where the issues of 
the liabilities of the International and the local are 
discussed at greater length. 
4. DISCUSSION: The two significant issues that are 
presented in these petitions are 1) whether a McDonnell 
Douglas test must be applied in a "pattern or practice" 
suit; and 2) whether "qualification date" seniority is an 
appropriate form of relief for incumbent discriminatees. 
issues are also involved in the Rodriguez Trilogy. 
Both 
Two perhaps noteworthy differences between this case 
and the Rodriguez Trilogy _are 1) this case does~ present 
the issue whether a prima facie case may be based solely on 
statistical evidence; and 2) this case does involve a square 
v holding that "carryover seniority" may be ordered based on 
a date prior to the effective date of Title VII. The lower 
courts have all assumed that such relief is available, and 
some of the cases so holding were cited with approval during 
the 1972 amendments to Title VII, but this Court has never 
ruled on the question (Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., No. 
74-728, 4th draft at n.l8). Neither petitioner raises the 
issue, however, so if the Court is interested, it would have 
to request specifically that the issue be addressed. 
This case is probably not a "hold for Franks", because 
it concerns the rights of incumbents (in Franks, "class 4" 
discriminatees), a question not addressed in Franks o See 
Franks, 4th draft at 3o 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
T.I.M.E.-DC (Nos. 75-636 and 75-672) 
fYrw.bti. The Rodriguez Trilogy (Nos. 75-651, 75-715, 75-718, and 75-720) 
iow~DM- does The Sabala Pair (Nos. 75-781 and 75-788) 
a#f.4r ~ ,dt{c. 
tle-~cl,., .. dl In my memoranda on these "straight-lined" cases, I indicated 
~o~~+~· that they raised a significant question as to the applicability 
'o~sca.n ~fA· of the McDonnell Douglas standards to the class action form 
of suit. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., No. 74-728, appears to 
decide this point by holding (4th draft at 23-24 and n.32) that -
once the class representatives have proven a discriminatory 
pattern or practice, and a particular form of relief is found ------------------appropriate, the burden shifts to the employer to show that 
individual members of the class who apply for such relief 
were not in fact victims of the discri~ination, and 
the employer has a right to attempt to make such a showing. 
The opinion by Judge Brown in the T.I.M.E.-DC case 
might be read as contemplating some sort of individualized 
evidentiary hearing prior to the granting of relief to 
any individual, see pool memo at 6-7. The DC may therefore 
be able to read the Franks 
and proceed accordingly in 
holding into Judge Brown's opinion 
(~. f.., :?3 \~ "J'"~C~ e. ~('c)\.uf\.'S "f':.,,;_,..,) 
the remand ordered by Judge Brown.~ 
The opinions by Judge Wisdom in the Rodriguez Trilogy 
do not appear to contemplate individualized proof (except on 
the issue of "qualification") prior to the granting of 
individualized relief. Judge Wisdom's remarks (although 
dicta in that the cases were ordered remanded on the relief 
issue) therefore appear in conflict with the Franks holding 
that the employer should be entitled to show that the individual 
seeking relief was not the victim of discrimination. 
The opinion by Judge Wisdom in the Sabala pair would 
appear to be unaffected by the Franks holding, in that the 
DC in Sabala fashioned a remedy (seniority as of first opening 
subsequent to "qualification date") that would seem to preclude 
any of the defenses contemplated by Franks. The employer 
in Sabala might, however, defend against the award of · 
t~e "cross-tenninal transfer"- seniority dates on the grounds 
that although the employee , had indicated a willingness to transfer 
before the DC, he would not in fact have done so at the relevant 
\ 
a
time in the past. To the extent that Sabala precludes such 
defense, it would appear to conflict with Frankso Although 
~
the employer is not a petitioner in the Sabala pair, to the 
extent that the unions may be held liable for back pay on 
remand (a possibility suggested by th~ CA), they would have 
a claim to a similar defense. To the extent the International 
is allowed to assert the rights of its non-discriminatee 
members, it has such a defense in regard to the seniority 
relief as granted. 
From my belated recognition of Franks, I conclude that 
the cases should at least be held for Franks. After Franks 
is handed down, the cases (if deemed not otherwise certworthy) 
might be granted, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration 
in light of Franks. In the alternative, the Court might deny 
the petitions on the grounds that the statements as to relief 
in T.I.M.E.-DC and the Rodriguez Trilogy are mere dicta, and 
the individualized defense issue is not raised in the Sabala 
petitions (although note that it might be implied from the 
"cross-terminal transfer" issue). 
Revised Overview 
With the McDonnell Douglas issue winnowed out, the entire 
II \1. 
set of petitions presents the following major issues (in 
approximate order of importance): statistical 
evidence alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case 
(the lower courts are virtually unanimous in holding that 
statistical evidence alone can be sufficient, but this Court 
has never ruled on the issue); ~ the liability of the unions 
in "lock-in" se~orit? ~ns ; @ the appropriateness of 
F .._.... 
"q~ti-9n dat ( ' car :_.y over~ni~r~ty for incumbents; and 
4) whether carryover seniority can be granted back to a date 
prior to the effective date of Title VII. 
I The first three issues are present.ed in the Rodriguez 
Trilogy, the fourth is presented in T.I.M.E.-DC. The Sabala 
pair present #2 in a slightly better form than it is presented 
in Rodriguez in that the local in Sabala requested merger of 
the rosters (Sabala, however, has the§ 1981 complication). 
There are no real splits among the lower courts on thes e 
questions--they are all still being worked out on rather an 
ad hoc basis. If the Court decides to grant in the absence 
of a split on the grounds of the general importance of the 
questions, I would suggest that the grant be of the first 
three petitions in the Rodriguez Trilogy (i.e. the local, 
the Southern Conference, and East Texas Motor Frieght--the 
petitions arising out of the Rodriguez case itself), and that 
the grant be limited so as to eliminate the "class certification" 
issue. -
Such a grant would mean that the Court would not be able 
to reach the question whether carryover seniority may be _granted 
from a date prior to the effective date of Title VII. The · 
lower courts are unanimous in assuming (generally without 
discussion) that such relief .c an be granted, and some of those 
cases were cited- with approval during the 1972 amendments. 
I have significant doubts about the correctness of the lower 
courts' holdings, but as we get further and further away from 
the effective date of Title VII, the importance of those holdings 
becomes less--because fewer persons are affected by such carryover 
seniority. If the Court wishes to reach the carryover date 
question, then T.I.M.E.-DC would have to be granted, with 
an explicit request that the issue be addressed. Granting 
T.I.M.E.-DC has one advantage in that the SG would be a 
direct party. Its disadvantages (as compared to Rodriguez) 
a~ Government "pattern or practice" suit may have a ~ ? 
different standard of proof than a private class action, and 
T.I.M.E.-DC does not present the issue whether the DC can 
rely solely on statistical evidence. 
I see no need to grant the Sabala pair unless the Court 
is interested in reaching the § 1981 issue. Given the fact 
that Title VII tends to supplant § 1981 in most cases, a 
ruling on § 1981 would not appear to be crucial. 
If the Court contemplates a possible grant, a "call for 
the views of the SG" on the Rodriguez Trilogy and the Sabala 
pair would seem appropriate, with the "call" perhaps delayed 
until after Franks is handed down. 
My apologies to those I have misled on the McDonnell 
Douglas issue. 
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MEMO: 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Gene Corney 
RE: No. 75-636 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS V. U.S. 
No. 75-672 T.I.M.E. -D.C., INC. V. UNITED STATES 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
There are three major parties in this case, and for the sake of 
convenience I will refer to them as follows: T;I.M.E .. -D.C., Inc. 
will be referred to as Time; the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS will be referred to as IBT or the Union; and the United 
States will be referred to as the United States or the Government. 
### INTRODUCTION 
After reading through the briefs and speaking with some 
of the other clerks, this case does not strike me as difficult as 
it first seemed. There are several narrow but nonetheless 
important issues in the case. I will begin with the issues 
raised by petitioner Time, and then proceed to the issues raised 
by IBT, except to the extent that the issues raised by IBT overlap 
with the issues raised by Timeo 
### ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER TIME 
Time challenges the decision of CA5 on a number of grounds. 
I would summarize them as followsa first, both the CA and 
the DC erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to 
establish a showing of a pattern or practice or of discrimination; 
second, assuming arguendo the validity of the DC's findings with 
respect to instances of individual discrimination, the DC acted 
properly in fashioning a remedy of individualized relief for 
the identifiable victims of discrimination, but CA5 erred in 
overturning the remedy selected by the DC; 
.. 




•,' : ~ ', 
third, CA5 erred in the way it structu'red the relief question on 
remand primarily because it did not require application of the 
McDonnell Douglas standards of proof; and finally, Time challenges 
the decision of CA5 ordering a modification of the seniority 
system to speed up the entry of minority drivers into the 
over the road (OTR) job category. 
In discussing these objections, I think it is important to 
keep in mind t hat the opinion of CA5 is not a model of clarity. 
In several crucial respects it is difficult to determine 
exactly what Judge Brown meant. Normally , that would cause 
considerable difficulty on review in this Court. But in this case 
it seems to make things somewhat easier in that the Court, if 
it decided decides to affirm, can indicate what it understands 
the holding of CA5 to be. 
1f1f1f IS STATISTICAL EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE A "PATTERN OR PRACTICE" 
OF DISCRIMINATION IN A PATTERN OR PRACTICE SUIT BROUGHT BY THE 
UNITED STATES? 
It seems to me that this is not a very difficult issue. The 
question is whether the defendants in a pattern or practice suit did 
in fact discriminate in their hiring or promotion practices. As to 
that question, statistical evidence has some probative value. It is 
admittedly rcumsu circumstantial evidence, but I can't see 
why as a legal matter that oesn m a that would mean that a court 
could not rely on statistical evidence in determini~O whether the 
Government has· established a prima facie violation of the relevant 
statutes. Indeed, as the SG notes, the Court has been willing to 
rely on statistical evidence in this fashion in other contexts, such as 
the jury discrimination cases. 
't "' Whether a court ou could rely solely on statistical evidence is 
~c not real~ue::::~-::-ca~=i:y t:~::::-:~ ~, __________________________ _ 
indicates that statistical evidence can be given great weight, and 
perhaps Judge Brown's opinion also implies that the statistical evidence 
can be dispositive. But for present purposes it is important to 
note that both Judge Brown's opinion for CAS and the DC dec is ion 
relied on testimonial evidence in addition to the government's 
statistical data. Certainly the combination of the two should be 
sufficient (assuming fact findings below which are not clearly erroneous) 
to make out a prima facie case of a violation of the statutes. 
Time makes a number of attacks on the evidence in the case. 
In this regard, I 1 would note that I would be hesitant to reverse 
the concurrent fact findings of two lower courts. The legal question--
can statistical evidence play a role: -is important and justifies 
review by this Court. But I don't think the 
--------------------~-----
and discussion 
Court should get too deeply to tb t i cas involved 
in reviewing the evidence itself. In any event, I don 1 t think it 
matters, since Time's attacks on the evidence are not that strong. 
First, Time suggests that its good faith efforts to terminate 
emoloyment discrimination requires reversal of the DC's finding that 
Time did discriminate. Judge Brown responde~ that the r recent 
efforts to bring an end to employment discrimination were 
insufficient to eradicate the effects of the prior discrimination 
on employees who continued to be "locked in" · • e in the 
sense that they did not receive their~rightful place: Moreover, the 
statistics relied on by Time do not rebut the the claim that there 
was pre-1971 discrimination in the hiring of OTR drivers, an important 
observation in light of the fact that relief was sought in this 
case for persons hired after March of 1971. 
Time notes that minority representation in its work force 
Y~ from 7.1% in 1967 to 16.5% in 1972. But this gives no indication 
of the jobs for which the minorities were hired. It is possible that all 
or most were hired in the city classifications, an area to as to which 
there is no claim that hirings were discriminatory. The claim is that 
OTR hiring was discriminatory, and the cited statistics do not indicate 
a growth in percentage employed in that classification. I don't think 
it is necessary to run through the other data presented by Time. My 
own view is that given the statistics and testimony presented on behalf 
of the government, nothing cited by Time in its brief suggests that we 
mould overturn the factual findings of the lower courts. 
Time also gg · suggests, see Brief at d. I , that it was 
error to rely on much of the government's testimonial evidence 
since it related to acts that took place before the effective date of 
Title VII. I see no merit in the argument. The issue here 
is not whether the federal courts had the. power to remedy acts of -
discrimination that took place prior to the e ffecticve date of the 
federal stature statute. Title VII is not retroactive, and in the 
JEmedy section a court should be careful not to grant a remedy for 
pre-Act discrimination. But the fact that the federal DC can't 
remedy the pre-Act discriminatory conduct does not mean that 
t)$~ - 4c..l-
i t cannot consider that cor~d ... c-~ with respect to allegations of a 
d \t.C.t//N\{nJ,~. 0 . l.cl 
pattern or practice c.o.,d"'o-1 l relevant, and as long as the federal 
cov~T is careful not to attempt to remedy the pre-Act conduct, I can 
~e no reason to preclude its admissibility with , with respect to the 
issue of · · the · · existence of a post-Act pattern or 
practice of discrimination. 
On this issue I conclude that there was sufficient evidence 
consisting of statistical data and testimony to support the findings of 
the lower court that Time engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatior 
As to the broader question--can statistical evidence alone ever 
be suffi~ent to make out a prima facie case--I findJl it somewhat 
difficult to talk about the issue in the abstract. In some cases 
the statistical evidence may be so overwhelming, so accurate, and so 
closely tailored to the discrimination issues before the DC 
that it suffices to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. But 
I would not go so far as to say that it suffices for all cases, or 
even that it suffices in general. I imageine the typical Title VII 
~t~c~~r 
and should, include both statistical data and testimonial 
evidence. 
### THE Dcvs ALLOCATION OF RELIEF 
You will recall that the DC divided the plaintiff class into 
three groups (A,B, and C) according to the DCvs perception of the 
"degree of injury" suffered by each class member, and the DC 
awarded different relief with respect to each subclass. The 
DC's determinations in this regard were based on evidence that 
had been offered to prove that the defendants had engaged in a 
pattern or practice of discrimination. 
Time appears to be happy with the remedy ordered by the DCo 
Time, of course, would prefer to have this Court hold that the 
evidence going to individual instances of discrimination was 
~ 
insuffif cient to support the findings of the lower courts, but 
assuming arguendo that there was adequate evidence, 
Time argues that CA5 erred in overturning the DC 's selection of a 
remedy. As far as Time is concerned, the DC did two thingso 
First, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence to conclude 
that a pattern or practice of discrimination existedo Second , 
based on the record evidence, it concluded that only certain class 
-
members had suffered sufficient injury, to justify an award of 
broad relief. Time characterizes the CA5 decision as holding that 
in a pattern or practice suit it is unnecessary to prove that the 
individual was the subject of discrimination. 
This strikes me as a fairly easy issue, and I think Time is 
simply wrong. 
what had been 
CA5 reversed, essentially taking the position that 
ad judie ate d~as the question of "liability"--
was there a pattern or practice of discrimination. From CA5°s 
point of view, the issue of degree of injury suffered by each 
member of the class had not been tried, and could be considered 
in evidentiary hearings as part of the remedy question on remand. 
The SG is quite correct in noting that CA5 took the most appropriate 
approach to this issue. In the first place, there is simply 
nothing to suggest that the Government was attempting before the 
trial court to present proof as to every member of the class. 
Secondly , if the Government had to do that it would , as the SG 
suggests , destroy the class action nature of the pattern or 
........ - ¥;- tv-.... 
practice suit and~form it into a mere aggregation of individual 
.r 
1 
### BURDEN OF PROOF AND SCOPE OF REMEPY 
Time's third attack on the decision below concerns the way 
CA5 structured the relief question on remand, At th~int, the 
decision of CAS is particularly confusing , and I would suggest 
that the Court read the opinion below to say essentially the 
following a 
The Government has established that 'rime engaged i; pattern 
or practice of discrimination with respect to its h1ring for 
OTR jobs. But it does not follow that every member of the class 
is automatically entitled to reliefo Title VII authorizes 
relief only for persons who were actually the victime of 
racial discriminationo The particular class of persons in 
this case obviously includes persons interested in working 
for Time, since they were all employees of Time (as drivers) 
during the alleged discrimination. Moreover, any 
relief awarded will go only to 
~----persons presently interested in working for Time, 
since the seniority benefits go only to those who presently 
seek OTR jobs. CAS apparently was of the view that a court 
could infer that a city driver who shows that he was qualified 
for an OTR job during the alleged discriminatory period and 
who presently seeks an OTR job would have taken an O'rR job 
but for the discrimination. True, proof of actual application 
is to be preferred, but as Judge Brown noted below, the 
existence of the pattern or practice may have deterred 
employees from applying . Of course, the inference that such 
a driver would have taken an OTR job but for the discrimination 
is a rebuttable one. The opinion of CAS can be read to 
contemplate evidentiary hearings on remand as to 
individualized discrimination, and Time would be free on 
remand to show that any given individual . lacked 
the job qualifications, lacked interest, or that there 
were no vacancies during the relevant period which the person 
could have applied for but for the discrimination. 
If the individual makes out ..K prima facie · showing of 
discrimination, and Time fails to rebut the appropriate 
inference, what shall the remedy be? Here, the CAS opinion 
can be read to incorporate the Rodriguez trilogy approach. 
Full carry-over seniority may be excessive, since one 
cannot take an OTR job until one is qualified. On the other 
hand, application date seniority is · inadequate~ 
since it i gnores the fact that the mere existence of a 
pattern or practice of discrimina,tion deters application 
for vacancies for which a minority member is qualified, 
CA5 follows a "qualification date seniority apl?~oach", under 
which the amount of seniority ~epends on when one qualified 
for the positiono ~ualification seniroity date ~8~ieFity 
is neither appropriate nor required in every case, Take for 
example Franks, where the qualification requirements were 
mere formalities--there, full carryover seniority may be 
appropriate. In other cases, as for example the general 
public who have never indicated an interest in working for 
Time, application date seniority may be more appropriat iJ 
For this class of persons, qualification date seniority is 
appropriate. 
On the whole, this seems to me to be a very reasonable approach 
to the pattern or practice problem in the trucking industry. And 
in reading the brief of Time, I don°t find a fundamental challenge 
to the legal bais basis for this approach, Time does argue, as 
noted above, that CA5 instead required awarding relief to all 
class members regardless of whether they were injured by 
discriminationo But as also explained above, Time is simply 
wrong on this point. ,rime also recognizes that the rule in CA5 is 
th<t that the amount of seniority a transferee deserves should be 
determined by the date he would have transfered but for his employer 0 s 
discrimination. Bing v. Railway Expresso In this case, CA5 
focused on qualification date seniority, an alternative 
which other courts of appeals have considered appropriate in certain 
circumstanceso See Navajo Freight Lines (CA9); see especially 
@ 
Detroit Edison Co (CA6)(cert filed, held for instant case) in 
which CA6 found qualification date seniority appropriate despite 
the fact that CA6 had earlier found qualification date seniority 
inappropriate in a different case. Here, on this record, it seems 
$~ 
~ ·~ 
to me that qualification date seniority is a reasonable approach. 
Time's major attack in this area concerns the relevance of 
~I/' 
~McDonnell Douglas, a case with which you are qui? e 
familiar and which we discussed only recently with respect to the 
~Title VII case. McDo~ll Douglas notes in text that a Title VII 
complainant must show "(i fhat he belongs to a racial minority; 
*' (ii) that hefpplied and was qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications 
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from 
persons of complainant 0 s qualifications." 411 u.s., at 802o It 
is also important to note that you dropped a footnote at the end 
4,. 
of the that passage indicating that "The fact~necessarily will 
vary in Title VII caes, and the specification above of the prima 
facie proof required is not necessarily applicable in every 
respect to differing factual situations'," 
How does the proof in the instant case compare wits the 
allocation of proof established in MQDonnell Douglas? Here, -
{[) 
the class member must prove that he is a member of a racial 
minority~at he was qualified for an OTR job, an~at there 
existed during his period of qualification a pattern or practice - -
of discrimination against members of his raceo The pattern or 
practice evidence should also show that job vacancies were filled 
during the discriminatory period by whites. All of this 
gives rise to an inference that the class member would have been 
employed as an OTR driver had it not been for the discrimination . 
It should be obvious that the primary departure from the McDonnell 
Douglas specification is that the class member does not have to 
show that he actually applied for the jobo But that seems to me 
to be a reasonable departure in this type of a suito It certainly 
is not inconsistent with McDonnell Douglas . That case expressly noted 
that a different specification might be established for different 
facts, Here, there is proof of a pattern or pract~ce of discrimination, 
and to me that is a sufficiently different factual 
circumstance to justify the departure from the McDonnell specifica-
tion. 
There is, to be sure, one troubling aspect to the inference 
that anyone exhibiting a present interest 1n an OTR job would have 
transferred if he had had the opportunity when he was initially 
qualified (assuming that respondent- defendant has been u~~hl~ ~ ft,~+ 
Present transfer is accompanied 
by carryover seniority, which is far more attractive than transfer 
to the bottom of the ladder in the OTR category (which is what would 
have happened had it not been for discrimination). It is thus 
probably true that more persons will express a present interest in 
OTR jobs than would have done so in the past if there had been 
no discriminationo ---- I simply don't think there is any way that 
a federal DC can get around the problem, and it doesn°t seem 
to me to present · J: ff:c. lbu ._,.,,.,;, .... _. • .{,-0 
far more narrow equitable relief. 
,f,f,f MODIFICATION OF SENIORITY AGREEMENTS TO "SPEED UP" THE REMDY 
CAS established a preference for individual discriminatees 
awarded carryover seniority over employees from other terminals 
for the purpose of filling vacancies at the discriminatee's home 
terminal. CAS also directed that members of the affected class 
may compete against any line driver on layoff for other than temporary 
vacancies on the basis of carryover seniority. Given Franks, I can 
see no serious problem with theCA's disposition in this regard. 
There are three major areas that deserve to be highlighted. 
First, should - carryover seniority extend back only to the date 
that the discriminatee became qualified for an OTR job, or should it 
extend back to the date the discriminatee joined the company. Although 
there is language in the opinion of CAS that can be read to mean that 
a discriminatee carries over his full company seniority, regardless 
of when he became qualified for OTR, there is also an indication that 
CAS intended to limit carryover seniority to the period after a 
discriminatee became OTR qualified. I suggest that you read the 
opinion as the United States reads it: one carries over only his 
qualification date seniority. [Of course,, in some instances full 
company seniority and qualification date seniority will be the same--
namely, the discriminatee was OTR qualified on the day he was placed 
by Time in a city driver position rather than an OTR position due to 
racial discrimination. ] 
Second, if a discriminatee first qualified for OTR prior to the 
effective date of Title VII, should carryover seniority be allowed 
to cover the full period of qualification or should it be limited to 
the period following the effective date of the Act. My conclusion 
is that the DC properly limited carryover sen~ty by refusing to 
credit a discriminatee for time with the compa~y prior to the effective 
e 
date of Title VII. Franks makes it clear that the ~evant concept 
here is "rightful place" seniority--the position that the 
discriminatee would have held but for the discrimination. If on 
the first day after the r effective date of Title VII a city driver 
requests a transfer and · the request is denied for racially dis-
criminatory reasons, the remedy eventually granted by a federal 
court should put him in the position he would have been in but for 
the discrimination. That position is that he would have gone to 
OTR on the day after the effective date of the Act with no accumulated 
competitive-type seniority, and as the days passed he would begin to 
~cumulate OTR seniority. Thus, the remedy should go back only to 
the date on which he was discriminated against. Since Title VII 
does not make actionable pre-Act instances of discrimination, there 
is no legal justification, in my view, to credit the discriminatee 
with seniority for time served with the company prior to the effective 
date of Title VII. [At this point I should mention an important .... _ _____ ........,~ 
qualification--namely, that the seniority system is not otherwise 
violative of Title VII. The United States challenges this seniority 
system, and attempts to support the liability finding with respect to 
the Union, on the theory that the seniority system "locks in" 
discriminatees and perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. 
I will discuss that argument with respect to IBT, infra. Unless one 
subsrcibes to n ·- this "lock in" : . theory, I can see no 
reason to award pre-Act seniority carryover.] 
The third area of importance is an issue we discussed bri~fly 
prior to argument--how does one determine qualification date. The 
United States was not very helpful on this point at oral argument, 
especially with respect to who would bear the burden of proof. 
Apparently there are certain objective criteria, such as years experience 
driving the tractor trailers, and apparently some city drivers 
get that experience while working for Time. It also seems that some 
discriminatees may have come to Time initially with enough experience 
to meet the qualifications for OTR. In any event, if we do accept 
accept "qualification date seniority" as the appropriate approach, 
the Court opinion will have to provide some specific guidance in this 
"'("' a-e a . 
The Union raises a number issues that are identical to issues 
raised by Time, and my earlier discussion obviously 
apolies to IBT as well as Time. 
Initially, I have some question as to why CAS found it necessary 
to suggest that it found IBT guilty of discrimination. The DC merely 
enjoined the union "from interfering with relief here granted." The 
Union agreed at oral argument that it could be made a party to the 
extent necessary for the DC to award complete relief, and that 
it would have to obey a court order modifying its seniority provisions 
in the collective bargaining agreement to remedy employer 
discrimination. Since the issue of monetary relief has, as noted 
at oral argument, drtpped out of the case, I fail to see an exact 
need to hold the Union liable for engaging in a pattern or practice 
of discrimination. 
I think the answer to that puzzle is to be found in the "lock 
in" theory that was discussed at oral argument and that has been 
( -
adopted, so we are told by the SG, in eight circuits. Under the 
seniority st s system at issue in this case, the employer allows 
transfers from city drivers to OTR, but a transferee must give up 
his competitive-type transfer and start at the bottom of the seniority 
ladder in OTR. [A transferee keeps his benefits-type seniority.] 
Since you may be at the top of the seniority roster in city driving 
fCD( (CD), you will not be terribly anxious to go to the bottom of 
the ladder in OTR. 
As I understand the "lock in" theory suggested by the 
~ 
SG and the CAJs, a seniority system such as that at issue here is 
viewed as perpetuating prior discrimination and thereby keeping 
discriminatees from escaping the effects of discrimination. Despite 
~ 
the su?port the theory has found in the CAJs, I don't buy it. 
Let me take a simple example. Suppose a black applied for an OTR 
job with Time in 1960 and, despite his OTR qualifications, he was 
rejected for racially discriminatory reasons. Time nevertheless 
offers him a CD job, which he accepts. On the day after the effective 
date of Title VII, he reapplies for an OTR job, and the 
employer (Time) is willing to make him the offer. He hesitates to take 
the job, however, because the seniority system will take away 
appro i approximately five years~ of competitive seniority and 
place him at the bottom of the OTR seniority ladder. From the 
viewpoint of theCA's adopting the "lock in" apprJiefih, this penalizes 
job transfer and keeps the victims of prior discrimination from 
.4. 
taking the positio~they would have had but for the discrimination. 
Therefore, it is a present actionable GliseF:Nninato~ violation, and 
the Union is liable for a Title VII violation. As applied to this 
case, the seniority system is a violation of Title VII because it prevents 
city drivers from using their company seniority to move into the OTR 
jobs they would have had but for the employer's discrimination. 
I have two problems with the theory. First, the fact that it 
makes the choice a difficult one does not mean that the seniority 
system prevents the discriminatees from taking the OTR position. In 
that sense, this system is not a barrier to minority employement as 
perhaps was the testing device in Griggs. Second, and more important, 
the ore-Act discrimination on the part of the employer is itself not 
actionable under Title VII, and this seems to me to be simply a way 
to get to that issue by way of a back door. After the effective date 
of the Act this seniority system makes the same choices and options 
available to ~ks and whites; it does not discriminate on the basis 
of race. A black and a white, both of whom have five years CD 
ooniority, must give it up if they go to OTR after the effective date 
of the Act. The fact that the black would have been in OTR for five 
years had it not been for an earlier instance of employer discrimination 
Ov' .f.v a-\ l, t~ , 
is but it is not actionable under Title VII. The "lock in" 
theory makes it so. 
[I was working on this part of the memo when you called, and so the 
Union discussion section is a bit abbreviated. I will add a brief 
suryplement tomorrow ~ discussing some of theCA cases.] 
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The following is a summary of my views on this case, which is 
a "pattern or practice" suit brought by the United States. 
As to proof of pattern or practice, I think the Court should 
hold that the record supports the factual findings of the lower 
courts. It would be useful to have the Court opinion indicate that 
statistical evidence may, in unusual situations, be dispositive of 
the prima facie case, but that in general other evidence should be -----..-
combined with statistical evidence to make out a case. 
As to the issue of remedy, I would interpret the [ambiguous] 
ooinion of CAS to require evidentiary hearings on remand with respect 
to whether identifiable individuals were the subject of actionable 
discrimination. You indicated on page 10 of my bench memo in this 
case that it would of course be proper for the DC to establish 
subclasses. I think that the establishment of subclasses in this case 
was premature. The DC based ._ its subclass determination on the 
nature of evidence that had been presented as to "degree of injury" 
suffered by various members of the class. At the liability stage of 
the case, the United States had not attempted to provide detailed 
information as to each member. Moreover, to the extent that the 
DC's division of the class into subclasses is based on a determination 
of "degree of injury" suffered, it is premature in that the "degree 
of injury" suffered will be the issue in each of the subsequent 
evidentiary hearings, and thus a class member should not be allocated 
to a particular subclass when the subsequent evidence on remand might 
,, .. 
indicate .._. that he had ~ suffered a greater degree of injury 
than one would have initially thought to be the case ~~ on the 
basis of the evidence presented at trial as to pattern or practice. 
Since the DC's assignment of members to particular subclasses limited 
fue relief they could obtain, it seems to ... me premature since the 
evidentiary hearings on remand will be •z .... w focused on which class 
members suffered discrimination warranting what type of relief. 
To uohold the DC's premature subdivision will only give the United 
States an incentive to swamp the DC with individual evidence at the 
first stage--was there a pattern or ~ practice. 
Q I & j. llli:e ciJM!!Cilli!i!iiCcil eRa~ 
The evidentiary hearings as to remedy will focus on the issue 
of "qualification date seniority," and there are obvious problems with -
that concept. It seems to me that the burden of proof with respect 
to whether an employee is OTR qualified and when he became • qualified 
~ should rest with the employee. The employee should, at a minimum, 
be forced to come forward with certain evidence which the employer 
can rebut or negate. But I think there is language in Franks which 
;(b~~u.t; 
lz" 1 , "*1 l h that the employer is to bear that burden in a pattern 
or oractice suit. • Franks .. -~- - -- : --~ stated: "But petitioners 
here have carried their burden of demonstrating the existence of a 
discriminatory hiring pattern and practice ... by the respondents, 
and the burden will be upon respondents to ~ prove that individuals 
who reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination." 
At that point, Justice Brennan drops the following footnote: "Thus 
Bowman may attempt to prove that a given individual . . • was not in 
fact discriminatority refused employment . . • • Evidence of a lack 
of vacancies in OTR positions at the time the individual application 
was filed, or evidence inicating the individual's lack of OTR q•a,.'l •·• 
qualifications--under nondiscriminatory standards actually applied 
by Bowman to individuals who were in fact . hired--would of course be 
relevant." 424 U.S., at 773 n. 32. I think it is yossible to distinguish 
Bowman. 
-
In that case, the class member had applied for a job, and 
~ 
the employer was thus given information as to two major points: 
~the date the individual became interested in the OTR job, and 
~ what the individual thought his qualifications were. For 
the instant case, current CD class members who had applied for OTR 
jobs are, it seems to me, covered by the Bowman language. The employer 
bears the burden of showing that they ~ were not qualified. As to 
those individuals who did not apply--due to the deterrent effect of 
the ~attern and practice--a strong argument can be made that they 
should not be put in a position more favorable than those who did 
ao~ly. Thus, they should have the burden of coming forward with .-e 
evidence indicating when they would have applied, and their qualifications 
at that point in time. The employer would then be free to rebut 
that evidence in the same manner as he could rebut the applic~ions_ 
in Bowman. Except for that difference1 I think Bowman is hard to 
get around. But as a practical matter, that approach to the remedy 
issue seems sufficient. 
There are two other issues in the remedy area. The first 
concerns credits for seniority relative to the period prior to the 
effective date of the Act. Unless the Court goes with the "lock 
in" appr{iefh to attack the seniority system itself, I can see no 
reason to ~t pre-Act seniority carryover. Rightful place 
seniority would make seniority run from the time of the violation, 
which by definition has to be after the effective IK date of the Act 
The final problem concerns a point raised by Just\rce White at 
cral argument. Suppose the class of black CDs currently interested 
in OTR positions number 400, whereas during the period of the 
oattern and practice there were only 200 vacancies. Even if we 
assume that all 400 class members would have applied for those 
oositions but for the discriminatory pattern or practice, we know 
obt._Me.J. 
for a fact that only 200 of them could have • t;- jobs. Moreover, 
~ 
as a practical matter we know that the figure would realisJtically 
be less than 200, since some of the whites actually hired would 
no doubt have been hired under a nondiscriminatory system. Thus, the 
remedy question for the DC is complicateo by the number of actual 
vacancies during the discriminatory period. Should the DC award 
relief to all 400 class members if they each prove that they would 
have applied, that -~e they were qualified, and that they were 
denied jobs for discriminatory ~ reasons? Or should the DC limit 
reyQyf •taa .. .-1 .. 11• to 200 class members? Or should the DC limit 
m~ to something less than 200 class memebers--namely, its estimate 
of how many b~s would have been hired in a nondiscriminatory system. 
Perhaps we don't have to address that issue at all. But it is 
rather difficult. At a minimum, a strong argument can be made that 
relief should not exceed of the violation; thus only 200 
members can get relief. On the other hand, deciding which 200 
members should get relief is complicated, and the DC would have to 
determine who was available for w~ vacancies. And to limit relief 
to less than 200 is even more complicated, since the DC would have 
~ o'+a~A&J 
to decid~ot only how many blacks would have a•~s jobs, but also 
~ 
It which vacancies would have been filled by G'hites and which by 
blacks. 
or whether it is instead lawful under section 70J(h) . 
The other issue that I mentioned in my bench memo was whether 
the seniority system itself was a ~ ~violation of Title VII 
~ ~ 
because it perpetuates the effects of prior racial discrimination 
It seems to me to be clear in light of § 703(h~ that where an employer 
engages in pre-Act refusals to hire on the basis of race, and after 
the effective date of the Act begins to hire blacks, the fact that 
fue ·seniority system puts them at the bottom of the ladder is not 
------~---------------------------------------------------
enough to make the seniority system discriminatory. See the Justice ........ 
Department statement cited in the legislative history discussion of 
section 703(h) in Franks, 424 U.S. at 760 n.l6: 
"Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the 
time it takes effect. If, for example, .. a collective bargaining 
----- - ---
contract provides that in the • event of layoffs, those who were 
hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not be 
affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even in the 
case where owing to .., ..... discrimination prior to the effective 
date of the Ill title, white workers had more . ., seniority than 
Negroes."~In other words, if a black applies for a job prior to the 
effective date of the Act and is denied the job for racially discrim-
inatory reasons, and then reapplies and gets the job after the effective 
date of the Act, the failure~f the sen~y ~stem to credit hi~ 
LfoJ4.-14c.f- ~ .. .,. .. ,..d_; 
with the time between the pre-Act refusal to hire and the is 
not in itself a violation of Title VII. The only difference between 
that ~ hypothetical and the instant case is that here the discriminatee 
worked for the same company that discriminatorily denied him the 
job [namely the ••z•D OTR job]. He worked in one department--city 
driving--rather than the department he wanted--OTR driving. In 
the hypothetical, it is possible that the discriminatee worked in 
the interim for another company. Thus, the only & difference between 
the two cases is that in one the discriminatee worked (in a less 
preferable) job for the company which discriminated ~ against himl 
tl.. 
17 • .,.whereas in the other the discriminatee probably worked for + 
d:ffe~~~ 
~company. I can't _...see a significant analytical differ nee 
between the two cases, and to the extent that Congress discussed 
one aspect of the problem, I would expect that discussion to control 
here as well. Of course, if you want to come out against the 
legality of the seniority system as applied to this class, you could 
always argue--and I sa .... *t expect that ~ some • members of the 
Court will--that Congress simply did not treat the issue of departmental 
seniority. 
There is a second aspect to this issue--namely, the 1972 amendments. 
By the time of ~ those amendments at least two courts had treated 
the issue It of the ger ~ illegality of certain seniority systems, 
and had-- declared the systems illegal. The SG argues, see Brief 
at 50-51, that the Conference Report makes it clear that Congress 
r"\ endor;sed the interpretation that the courts had (in general) 
given to Title VII except to the extent that a contrary ; sn· J i 
I 
intention is indicated in the 1972 amendments. Thus, so the argument 
runs, since some courts had found unlawful seniority systems which 
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination, there is no reason 
to interpret section 703(h) to deny protection to a gene~tion of 
incumbent minority workers who have worked under a discriminatory 
system. I must say that there is some merit to that approach, and 
much is to be said in favor of the result it reaches in helping to 
avoid "freezing out" of relief a whole generation of blacks. But I 
also think it is possible to distinguish the cases that had been 
decided prior to the 1972 amendments, especially with respect to 
the likelihood that the seniority systems at issue were intended to 
discriminate against blacks, 
In any event, the issue is one of congressional intent. On the 
~----------------------~ 
one hand, one ask~ether--without morei;pecific showing--Congress 
~ ------..) 
could have intended to "freeze out" of relief a whole generation of 
-------------'---------------------------~---------- ------~(jj 
asks~whether--again without blacks. On the other hand, one ..._ ----
a more specific showing--Congress ... intended to drastically alter 
pre-existing seniority rights in a MIAI?M t j~the manner accomplished 
by CAS. Although I think an argument can be made 
either way on a principled basis, I think it is 
otl~ ~ 
more mutuiu is tlra~dopted by CAS--namely, 
that the seniority system is itself a violation of the Act. 
Of course, if the system under at.tac k was not a bona fide 
seniority system, section 703(h) would offer no protectin and the 
system would be subject to Title VII challenges. 
January 11, 1977 
7S-636 International Brotherhood v. U.S. 
7S-672 T.I.M.E.-DC v. U.S. 
This memorandum is dictated, after argument, to record -
in summary and imprecise terms my tentative reactions on the 
principal issues. 
1. Proof of "pattern or practice". The DC, relying on 
both statistical and testimonial evidence, found a pattern 
of discrimination. CAS affirmed. I would not disturb this 
finding. TIME argues that undue reliance was placed upon 
statistical evidence, and in Rodriguez CAS held that such 
evidence alone is sufficient to shift the burden of proof. 
I would not accept that view as a general proposition. 
Statistical evidence may well be relevant, and possibly even 
controlling. As a general rule, more than mere statistical 
evidence should be required. Subject to enunciating general 
principles this issue can be left primarily to the District 
Courts. 
2. The remedy. This presents several difficult issues. 
(i) The plaintiff's class. The DC divided the 
general class into three subclasses according to the 
"degree of injury" suffered, with different relief 
accorded each subclass. CAS reversed, holding - in effect -
the division into subclasses was premature; that 
/,U"tU./ <{;..-fv/~~~-:::~:v) 
one broad classA inc1udihg all employees (not including 
applicants or former employees) of the three categories 
of discriminatees (city drivers, garagemen, and clerks). 
I am not at rest on this issue. Subclasses are 
permitted under Rule 23. I do not "buy" the SG's 
argument that the class action nature of this suit would 
be destroyed by any premature fragmentation of the 
class. I am inclined to think that the ultimate 
res olution, and perhaps quite fairly, would be furthered 
subclasses. But I do not view 
this as a major issue. 
(ii) Issues at the remedy stage. Regardless of 
2. 
how one reads the ambiguous opinion of CAS, two questions 
must be answered by the DC on remand with respect to each 
member of the class who applies for an OTR job: (a) 
was he the victim of the pattern of discrimination 
(i.e. was he a discriminatee?); and (b) was he qualified 
for the job on his "qualification date" (see below)? 
(iii) Burden of proof. As to (a) above, the 
Company should have the opportunity (but with the burden 
of proof) to show an absence of discrimination with 
respect to a particular member of the class. As to 
(b)above, the burden of proving qualification date and 
fitness for the job should be on the employee. 
(iv) Qualification date seniority. CAS, going 
back to its decision in Bing, is committed to the 
determination of commencement of seniority as of a 
"qualification date". Having read what CAS has said 
about this, I remain unenlightened as to exactly what 
this concept really is, and particularly as to how 
it can be applied fairly and consistently. 
Stated generally (as I am dictating this at home 
without the briefs, I am being quite general), the 
concept is that seniority should run from the date on 
which a discriminatee was qualified for OTR driving. 
In this case (as in many others) we are looking back 
a decade and a half. There may be a few clear 
3. 
situations (~·&·,a city driver with years of prior 
satisfactory OTR experience), but in the great majority 
of cases relatively uneducated people who have driven 
light equipment within the city, served in garages or 
as clerks, have little or no competency to drive safely · 
over. the - road equipment, to make the inevitable emergency 
repairs, to find their way to deliver truck loads in 
the great metropolitan centers, and otherwise to perform 
their duties. The only way to avoid serious injustice 
(resulting from the displacement of the seniority of 
other employees) is to place the burden of proof on ... 
employees to establish their qualification date. 
'---~----------~ 
Even after this is done, there, would have to be a 
determination of when a vacancy was available for a 
particular employee - as "bumping" is not authorized. 
4. 
I have not addressed the argument that the employee 
~~ t:!JT/? ~ 
should have applied (as in McD6nnell Douglas). I am 
inclined to believe that in a "class action pattern 
case", this element of McDonnell is inapplicable. 
3. Pre-1965 Relief. Despite apparent holdings of 
Courts of Appeals, I am not inclined to allow seniority -
at the expense of other employees - for service prior to 
the effective date of Title VII. 
4. Union Liability. Although I think the Union was a 
necessary party to assure full implementation of injunctive 
relief, I am not fully persuaded that it was a party to the 
discrimination merely by virtue of the collective bargaining 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~npuutt Qicmt ttf Utt ~niult ~mtt.&' 
Jfa,g~ingtttn. ~. ~· 2llp>!~ 
May 4, 1977 
/ 
Re: 75~636 and 75-672 - International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. United States, et al. 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 5/4/77 Rider, T.I.M.E. P. 21 • 
Add a footnote to the sentence quoting McDonnel~·Douglas 
in the text substantially as follows: 
We also noted in McDonnell-Douglas that: 
"There are societal as well as personal 
interests on both sides of the Lemployer-
employee] equation. The broad, overriding, 
interest, shared by employer-employee, and 
consumer is efficient and trustworthy work-
manship assured through fair and racially 
neutral employment and personnel decisions. 
In the implementation of such decisions, it 
is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates 
no racial discrimination, subtle or other-
wise." Id., at 801. 
Note to Justice Stewart: We tend to lose sight, I think, 
of what really must be the overriding purpose of any 
legislation: namely, the ultimate public interest. 
That interest is served by nondiscriminatory employment 
px& practices, but it is disserved if - in the application 
of Title VII, incompetent or inefficient employees displace 
persons¥ who are better qualified to serve the public. 
This sort of balance has to be a rough one. But it seems 
to me that our cases tend to overlook the ultimate public 




This latest draft in the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters case makes all but two of your suggested changes. 
FIRST: On page 32 of your copy you suggested the 
addition of the word "purposefully." This change was not made. 
I called PS's clerks to find out why. They noted that on 
the facts of the case before us the Government was trying to 
make out a "pattern or practice" suit by showing disparate 
~reatment, and whene~ they (i.e., the majority opinion) 
refers to the very case before us they use the word purposef ul. 
PS's clerks note that there may be other cases in which the 
Government will try to establish a "pattern or practice suit" 
based on discriminatory impac~, in other words a Griggs type 
case on a pattern or practice basis. In such a suit, purpose 
~uld not have to be shown, and they did not want to suggest that 
it had to be shown. The statement on page 32 is general and 
does not refer to T.I.M.E. directly. 
It may well be that PS discussed this with you, and I 
think it is reasonable to leave out the word purposefully at 
that point. 
SECOND: The suggested addition on page 42 of your copy 
was not made. PS's clerks thought that PS had discussed this 
with you. PS feels that this point does not directly fit 
in that footnote. I see no reason to press for its addition 
given th~act that PS made your suggested textual changes on p. 41. 
lfp/ss 5/5/77 Rider A, n. 21 (T. I.M.E.) 
Add a footnote to the sentence quoting McDonnell-Douglas in 
the text substantially as follows: 
We also noted in McDonnell-Douglas that: 
"Thereaare societal as well as personal interests 
on both sides of the [employer-employee] equation. 
The broad overriding, interest, shared by employer, 
employee~nand consumer: is efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship assured through fair and racially 
neutral employment and personnel decisions. In 
the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly 
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimina-
tion, subtle or otherwise." Id., at 801. 
Note to Justice Stewart: 
Wettendtto lose sight, I think, of what really must be 
the overriding purpose of any legislation: namely, the 
ultimate public interest. That interest is served by non-
discriminatory employment practices, but it is disserved if -
in the application of Title VII, incompetent or inefficient 
employees are employed or displace employees who are better 
qualified to serve the public. The balance has to be a 
rough one, but it seems to me that our cases tend to overlook 
the ultimate public interest. It cannot hurt to mention this 
from time to time. 







To : Tne Chief Just1ce 
~~: EJust~~'t.e ~r~e n 
Mr . J stic shall 
Mr . c B aukmun 
Mr . ust i ce Powel l 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
Mr . Just i ce Stevens 
1st DRAFT Erom: Kr. Justice Stewart 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATiSoulated: _M._~ ........ Y~~---r.19~7~7 _ 
Nos. 75-636 AND 75-672 Beoiroulated: ________ __ 
International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Petitioner, 
75-636 v. 
United States et al. 
T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., 
Petitioner, 
75-672 v. 
United States et al. 
On Writs of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
[April -, 1977] ~ 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 0 
These cases bring here several important questions under ~~ 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as /_....,_ , L _ _ 1 
amended, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V). ~ ""-"' /7/~ 
The issues grow out of alleged unlawful employment practices __ . 
1 
J 
engaged in by an employer and a union. The employer is ~~
a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations, ~. f. 
and the union represents a large group of its employees. The ~ ~ 
District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the em- ./ 
ployer had violated Title VII by engaging in a pattern and 
practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and 
Spanish-surnamed Americans, and that the union had violated H ~-. -6 J _ /. 
the Act by agreeing with the employer to create and maintain ' .,~, '~fA.FU1 ., 
a seniority system that perpetuated the effects of past racial 9~ /) <:" 
and ethnic discrimination. In addition to the basic questions 1--; J • 
presented by these two rulings, other subsidiary issues _., /. _ 
must be resolved if violations of Title VII occurred-issues r~ 
concerning the nature of the relief to which aggrieved in- I 1 _ . 




75-636 & 75-672-0PINION 
2 TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES 
I 
The United States brought an action in a Tennessee federal 
court against the petitioner T. I. M. E.-D. C. (the company) 
pursuant to § 707 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-6 (a).1 The complaint charged that the 
company had followed discriminatory hiring, assignment, 
and promotion policies against Negroes at its terminal in 
Nashville, Tenn. 2 The Government brought a second ac-
tion against the company almost three years later in a 
federal district court in Texas, charging a pattern and 
1 At the time of suit the statute provided as follows: 
"(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe 
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of 
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this sub-
ehapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended 
to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney 
Grneral may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the 
llnited Stat'es by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his 
absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining 
to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including an 
application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or 
other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or 
practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights 
herein described." 
Section 707 was amended by § 5 of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 107, 42 U.S. C. §2000e-6 (c) (Supp. V), to give 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, rather than the Attorney 
General, the authority to bring "pattern or practice" suits under that 
~rction agmnst private-sector employers. In 1974, an order was entered in 
this action substituting the EEOC for the United States but retaining the 
Umted States as a party for purposes of jurisdiction, appealability, and 
related matters. See 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-6 (d) (Supp. V). 
2 The named defendant in this suit was T . I. M. E. Freight, Inc., a 
predecessor ofT. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., is a nation-
wide system produced by 10 mergers over a 17-year period. See United 
States v. T. I. M. E.-D . C., Inc., 517 F . 2d 299, 304, and n. 6 (CA5) . It 
rnrrrntly ha" 51 trrminals and operates in 26 States and ~hree Canadia,u 
, lfOVI!lCE'.'=:. 
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TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES 3 
practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and 
Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's trans-
portation system. The petitioner International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters (the union) was joined as a defendant in that 
suit. The two actions were consolidated for trial in the 
Northern District of Texas. 
The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company 
had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against 
minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. Those Negroes and 
Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired, the Govern-
ment alleged, were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as 
servicemen or local city drivers, and were thereafter discrim-
inated against with respect to promotions and transfers.3 In 
this connection the complaint also challenged the seniority 
system established by the collective-bargaining agreements 
between the employer and the union. The Government 
sought a general injunctive remedy and specific "make whole" 
relief for all individual discriminatees, which would allow 
them an opportunity to transfer to line-driver jobs with full 
company seniority for all purposes. 
The cases went to trial 4 and the District Court found that 
8 Line drivers, also known as over-the-road drivers, engage in long-
distance hauling between company terminals. They compose a separate 
ba rgaining unit at T . I. M. E .-D. C. Other distinct bargaining units 
include servicemen, who service trucks, unhook tractors and trailers, and 
perform similar tasks; and city operations, composed of dockmen, hostlers, 
and city drivers who pick up and deliver freight within the immediate 
area of a particular terminal. All of these employees were represented by 
the petitioner International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
4 Following the receipt of evidence, but before decision, the Government 
and the company consented to the entry of a Decree in Partial Resolution 
of Suit. The consent decree did not constitute an adjudication on the 
meri ts. The company agreed, however, to undertake a minority recruiting 
program; to accept applications from all Negroes and Spanish-surnamed 
Americans who mquired about employment, whether or not vacancies 
ex1stcd, and to keep such applications on file and notify applicants of job 
openings; to keep spPcific employment and recruiting records open to 
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the Government had shown "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies 
were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in 
violation of Title VII .... " 5 The court further found that 
the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining 
contracts between the company and the union violated Title 
VII because it "operate[d] to impede the free transfer of 
minority groups into ana within the company." Both the 
company and the union were enjoined from committing 
further violations of Title VII. 
inspection by the Government and to submit quarterly reports to the 
District. Court; and to adhere to certain uniform employment qualifications 
respecting hiring and promotion to line driver and other jobs. 
The decree further provided that future job vacancies at any T. I. M. E.-
D. C. terminal would be -filled first "[b]y tho8e persons who may be found 
by the Court, if any, to be individual or class discriminatees suffering the 
present effects of past discrimination because of race or national origin 
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Any remaining 
vacancies could be filled by "any other persons," but the company obligated 
Jtself to hire one Negro or Spanish-surnamed person for every white person 
hired at any terminal until the percentage of minority workers at that 
terminal equaled the percentage of minority group members in the popula-
tion of the metropolitan area surrounding the terminal. Finally, the 
rompany agreed to pay $89,500 in full settlement of any backpay obliga-
tions. Of this sum, individual paymehts not exceeding $1,500 were to be 
paid to "alleged individual and class discriminatees" identified by the 
Government. 
The Decree in Partial Resolution of Suit narrowed the scope of the 
litigation, but the District Court still had to determine whet.her unlawful 
discrimination had occurred. If so, the Court had to identify the actual 
discriminatees entit.Ied to fill future job vacancies under the decree. The 
validity of the collective-bargaining contract's seniority system also re-
mained for decision, as did the question whether any discriminatees should 
be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroactive seniority. 
6 The District Court's Memorandum Decision in United States v. 
T. I . M. E.-D. C. , Inc., C1v . No. 5-868 (Oct. 19, 1972), is not offioially 
;reported. It is unofficially reported at 6 FEP Cases 690 and 6 EPfi 
. S979. 
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With respect to individual relief the court accepted the 
Government's basic contention that the "affected class" of 
discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed in-
cumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations 
or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver 
operation.6 All of these employees, whether hired before or 
a._fter the effective date of Title VII, thereby became entitled 
to preference over all other wpljcants wit.b respect to consid-
eration for future vacancies in line-driver job§.7 Finding that 
members of the affected class had been injured in different de-
grees, the court created three subclasses. Thirty persons who 
had produced "the most convincing evidence of discrimination 
and harm" were found to have suffered "severe injury." The 
court ordered that they be offered the opportunity to fill line-
driver jobs with competitive seniority dating back to July 2, 
1965, the effective date of Title VII.8 A second subclass in-
cluded four persons who were "very possibly the objects of 
discrimination" and who "were likely harmed," but as to 
whom there had been no specific evidence of discrimination 
and injury. The court decreed that these persons were en-
titled to fill vacancies in line-driving jobs with competitive 
seniority as of January 14, 1971, the date on which the Gov-
ernment had filed its systemwide lawsuit. Finally, there were 
over 300 remaining members of the affected class as to whom 
there was "no evidence to show that these individuals were 
either harmed or not harmed individually." The court or-
dered that they be considered for line-driver jobs u ahead of" 
6 The Government did not seek relief for Negroes and Spanish-surnamed 
Americans hired at a particular terminal after the date on which that 
terminal first employed a minority group member as a line driver. 
7 See supra, at 3-4, n. 4. 
s If an employee in this class had joined the company after July 2, 1965, 
thf:'n the date of his initial employment rather than the effective date of 
Title VII was to determine his competitive seniority. 
9 As with the other subclasses, there were a few individuals in the third 
.group who were found to have been discriminated against with respect to·· 
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any applicants from the general public but behind the two 
other subclasses. Those in the third subclass received no 
retroactive seniority; their competitive seniority as line drivers 
would begin with the date they were hired as line drivers. 
The court further decreed that the right of any class member 
to fill a line~driver vacancy was subject to the prior recall 
rights of laid~off line drivers, which under the collective-bar-
gaining agreements then in effect extended for three years.10 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the 
basic conclusions of the District Court: that the company had 
engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination 
.and that the seniority system in the collective-bargaining 
agreements violated Title VII as applied to victims of prior 
discrimination. United States v. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., 
517 F. 2d 299. The appellate court held, however, that the 
relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate. Reject-
ing the District Court's attempt to trisect the affected class, 
the Court of Appeals held that all Negro and Spanish-sur-
named incumbent emplOyees wer:r-entitled to bid for future 
line-driver jobs on the basis of tlieir com an seniorit , and 
that once a c ass member had filled a JO , e cou use his\ 
full company seniority-even if it predated the effective date 'i} 
of Title VII-for all purposes, including bidding and layoff. 
This award of retroactive seniority was to be limited only by 
a "qualification date" formula, under which seniority could not 
be awarded for periods prior to the date when ( 1) a line-driv-
jobs other than line driver. There is no need to discuss them separately 
in this opinion. 
10 This provision of the decree was qualified in one significant respect. 
Under the Southern Conference Area OVJer~the-Road Supplemental Agree-
ment between the employer and the union, line drivers employed at 
terminals in certain southern States work under a "modified" seniority 
::;ystem. Under the modified system an employee's seniority is not confined 
strictly to his home terminal. If he is laid off at his home terminal he can 
move to another terminal covered by the Agreement and retain his 
Repiority1 either by filling a vacancy at the Qther terminal or by "bumping'' 
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ing position was vacant,11 and (2) the class member met (or 
would have met, given the opportunity) the qualifications 
for employment as a line driver. 12 Finally, the Court of 
Appeals modified that part of the District Court's decree 
that had subjected the rights of class members to fill 
future vacancies to the recall rights of laid-off employees. 
Holding that the three-year priority in favor of laid-off work-
ers "would unduly impede the eradication of past discrimina-
tion," id., at 322, the Court of Appeals ordered that class 
members be allowed to compete for vacancies with laid-off 
employees on the basis of t-he class members' retroactive senior-
ity. Laid-off line drivers would retain their prior recall rights 
with respect only to "purely temporary" vacancies. lbid.13 
a junior line driver out of his job if there is no vacancy. The modified 
system also requires that any new vacancy at a covered terminal be offered 
to laid-off line drivers at all other covered terminals before it is filled by 
any other person. The District Court's final decree, as amended slightly 
by the Court of Appeals, 517 F. 2d, at 323, altered this system by requiring 
that any vacancy be offered to all members of all three subclasses 
before it may be filled by laid-off line drivers from other terminals. 
11 Although the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case did not 
specifically mention the requirement that a vacancy exist, it is clear 
from earlier and later opinions of that court that this requirement is a 
part of the Fifth Circuit's "qualification date" formula. See, e. g., 
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F. 2d 40, 63 n. 29 (CA5), 
rev'd on other grounds, ante, at -, cited in United States v. T. I. M. E.-
D. C., 517 F. 2d, at 318 n. 35; Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529 
F. 2d 721, 731-734 (CA5 1976). 
12 For example, if a class member began his tenure with the company 
on January 1, 1966, at which time he was qualified as a line driver and a 
line-driving vacancy existed, his competitive seniority upon becoming a 
line driver would date back to January 1, 1966. If he became qualified 
or if a vacancy opened up only at a later date, then that later date would 
be used. 
1 3 The Court of Appeals also approved (with slight modification) the 
part of the District Court's order that allowed class members to filt 
vacancies at a particular terminal ahead of line drivers laid off at other 
terminals. Sre supra, at 6-7, n. 10, 
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The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District 
Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply 
these remedial principles. We granted both the company's 
and the union's petitions for certiorari to consider the sig-
nificant questions presented under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 425 u. s. 990. 
II 
In this Court the company and the union contend that 
· their conduct did not violate Tftle VII in any respect, as-
serting first that the evidence introduced at trial was insuf-
ficient to show that the company engaged in a "pattern or 
practice" of employment 'discrimination. · The union further 
contends that the seniority system contained in the collective-
bargaining agreements in no way violated Title VII. If these 
contentions are correct, it is unnecessary, of course, to reach 
any of the issues concerning remedies that so occupied the 
attention of the Court of Appeals. 
A 
Consideration of the question whether the company en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory hiring prac~ 
t ices involves controlling legal principles that are relatively 
clear. The Government's theory of d1scnmination was sifuply 
that the company, in violation of § 703 (a) of Title VII/~ 
14 Section 703 (a) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a ) (1970 ed. and 
Supp. V), provides: 
" (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's· 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
"(2 ) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
rmployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
~t utus as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex. 
or nrttional ori(J'in;" 
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~gularly treated Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans 
less favorably than white persons. The disparity in treatment 
allegedly involved the refusal to recruit, hire, transfer, or 
promote minority group members on an equal basis with 
white people, particularly with respect to line-driving posi-
tions. The q!tjmate factual issues are thus sim.ply w~er 
there was a pattern or ractice of such dis arate tre tment 
an , 1f so, whetl:ier e ifferences were "racially premised." 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 805 n. 18.1 5 
As the plaintiff, the Government bore the initial burden of 
making out a prima facie case of discrimination. Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425; McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802. And, because it alleged a 
15 "Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most 
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some 
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it 
can in some situations e m erre . rom t e mer 
t rea ment , ee, e. g. , Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropo'litan Housing 
lfev. Corp ., - U. S. -, - . Undoubtedly disparate treatment was 
the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII . 
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) 
("What the bill does ... is simply to make it an illegal practice to use 
race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and 
women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as 
Catholic citizens, not as protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as 
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States"). 
ims of dis arate treatment may be distinguished from claims that 
stress "dis arate 1m act ." e latter involve em loyment practices th 
are facially neutral in their treatment o 1 erent groups ut t at in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified bt 
busmess necessity. See infra, at 22 . Proof of discriminatory motive, we 
have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory. Compare, e. g., 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co ., 401 U. S. 424, 430-432, with McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802-806. See generally Schlei & Gross-
man, Employment Discrimination Law 1- 12 (1976); Blumrosen, Strangers 
in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co . and the Concept of Employment 
Discrimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1972). Either theory may, of course, 
· QP applied to a part icular set of facts. · 
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systemwide pattern or practice of resistance to the full en~ 
joyment of Title VII rights, the Government ultimately had 
to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or "acci~ 
dental" or sporadic discriminatory acts. It had to establish I 
by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination 
as the n 's standard operating pr~ure-the regular 
rather than the unusual prac 1ce. 
We agree with the Distnct Court and the Court of Appeals 
that the Government carried its burden of proof. As of 
March 31, 1971, shortly after the Government filed its com~ 
plaint alleging systemwide discrimination, the company had 
6,472 employees. Of these, 314 (5%) were Negroes and 257 
( 4%) were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Of the 1,828 line 
drivers, however, there were only 8 (0.4%) Negroes and 5 
(0.3%) Spanish-surnamed persons, and all of the Negroes 
had been hired after the litigation had commenced. With one 
exception-a man who worked as a line driver at the Chicago 
terminal from 1950 to 1959-the company and its predecessors 
I did not employ a Negro on a regular basis as a line driver until 1969. And, as the Government showed, even in 1971 there 
were terminals in areas of substantial Negro population where 
16 The "pattern or practice" language in § 707 (a) of Title VII, supra, 
at 2 n. 1, was not intended as a term of art, and the words reflect only 
their usual meaning. Senator Humphrey explained: 
" [A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of 
rights consist::; of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but 
is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature. There would be a pattern 
or practice if, for example, a number of companies or persons in the same 
industry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants 
practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its 
system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited 
by the statute. 
"The point is that single, inoignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by 
a ~ingle business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice .... "' 
110 Cong. Rrc. 14270 (1964) . 
This interpretation of ".pattern or 12ractice" aJ?pears throughout th~ 
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all of the company's line drivers were white.17 A great major ... 
ity of the N~groes (83%) and Spanish-surnamed Americans 
(78%) who did work for the company held the lower-paying 
city operations and serviceman jobs,t8 whereas only 39% of 
the nonminority employees held jobs in those categories. 
The Government bolstered its statistical evidence with the 
testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific in .. 
stances of discrimination. Upon the basis of this testimony 
the Distnct Court found that "[n] umerous qualified black 
and Spanish-surnamed American applicants who sought line-
driving jobs at the company over the years had their requests 
ignored, were given false or misleading information about re-
quirements, opportunities, and application procedures, or were 
legislative history of § 707 (a), and is consistent with the understanding of 
the identical words as used in similar federal legislation. See id., at 12946 
(remarks of Sen. Magnuson) (referring to§ 206 (a) of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 206 (a)); id., at i3081 (remarks of Sen. Case); id., 
at 14239 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 15895 (remarks of Rep. 
Celler). See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F. 2d 
418, 438, 441 (CA5); United States v. ironworkers Local86, 443 F . 2d 544, 
552 (CA9); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F. 2d 221, 
227 (CA5); United States v. Mayton, 335 F. 2d 153, 158-159 (CA5). 
11 In Atlanta., for instance, Negroes composed 22.35% of the population 
in the surrounding metropolitan area and 51.31% of the population in the 
city proper. The company's Atlanta terminal employed 57 line drivers. 
All were white. In Los Angeles, 10.84% of the greater metropolitan 
population and 17.88% of the city population were Negro. But at the 
company's two Los Angeles terminals there was not a single Negro among 
the 37 4 line drivers. The proof showed similar disparities in San Francisco, 
Denver, Nashville, Chicago, Dallas, and at several other terminals. 
18 Although line-driver jobs pay more than other jobs, and the District 
f'ourt found them to be "considered the most desirable of the driving-jobs/' 
it is by no means clear that all employees, even driver emplo)"ees, would 
prefer to be line drivers. See infra, at 41-42, and n. 51. Of course, Title 
VII provides for equal opportunity to compete for any job, whether it is 
thought better or worse than another. See, e. g., United States v. Hayes 
lnternat'l Corp., 456 F. 2d 112, 118 (CA5); United States v. National 
1md Co., 438 F . 2d 935,939 (CA8). 
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not considered and hired on the same basis that whites were 
considered and hired." Minority employees who wanted to 
transfer to line-driver jobs met with similar difficulties.19 
The company's principal response to this evidence is that 
statistics can never in and of themselves prove the existence 
of a pattern or practice of discrimination, or even establish 
a prima facie case shifting to the employer the burden of re-
butting the inference raised by the figures. But, as even our 
brief summary of the evidence shows, this was not a case in 
which the Government relied on "statistics ·alone." · The in-
dividuals wTiOtestifiea about tlieir personal experiences with 
the company brought the cold numbers convincingly to life. 
In any event, our cases make it unmistakably clear that 
"[s] tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve 
an important role" in cases in which the existance of discrim· 
ination is a disputed issue. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educa-
tional Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620. See also McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 805. Cf. Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 241-242. We have repeatedly ap-
proved the use of statistical proo to establish a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination · ·Jury selection cases, see, e. g., 
19 Two examples are illustr ive: 
George Taylor, a Negr , worked for the company as a city driver in 
Los Angeles, beginning te in 1966. In 1968, after hearing that a white 
c1ty driver had tran erred to a line-driver job, he told the terminal 
manager that he al would like to consider line driving. The manager 
replied that there would be "a lot of problems on the road ... with 
different people, Caucasian, et oetera," and stated "I don't feel the 
company is rea y for this right now. . . . Give us a little time. It will 
eome around, ou know." Mr. Taylor made similar requests some months 
later and go similar responses. He was never offered a line-driving job 
or an appli ation. 
Feliber Trujillo worked as a dockman at the company's Denver 
termina When he applied for a line-driver job in 1967, he was told by a 
person el officer that he bad one strike against him. He asked what that 
wa.'-1 d was told: "You're a Chicano, and as far as we know, there isn't 
~- \;h rrpo <l_rivet in the system.'' · 
I 71 ' , 
vrh.-~-t u{ ~ ~~ 
/<&&+:e. 1--o 
1-t~ &(~ ~ 
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Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 
U. S. 475; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. Statistics are 
equally competent in proving employment discrimination.20 
20 Petitioners argue that statistics, at least those comparing the racial 
eomposition of an employer's work force to the composition of the popula-
tion at large, should never be given decisive weight in a Title VII case 
because to do so would conflict with § 703 (j) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000 (e)-2 (j). That section provides: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require 
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any ... group 
because of the race . . . or national. origin of such . . . group on account 
of an imbalance which may exil;lt. with respect to the total number or 
percentage of any race . . . or national origin employed by any em-
ployer . . . with the total number or percentage of persons of such 
race .. . or national origin in any community, State, section, or other . 
area, or in the available work force in any community, state, section, or 
other area." 
The argument fails in this case because the statistical evidence was not 
offered or used to support an erroneous theory that Title VII requires an , 
r mployer's work force to be racially balanced. Statistics showing racial or 
rthnic' imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such 
1mbidance Is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent 
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring 
practices will in time result. in a work force more or less representative of 
the -racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from 
which employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity 
between the composition of a work force and that of the general popula-
tion thus may be significant even though § 703 (j) makes clear that Title 
VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general popula-
tion. See, e. g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local36, 416 F. 2d 
123, 127 n. 7. Considerations such as small sample size may, of course, 
detract from the value of such evidence, see, e. g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. 
Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-621, and evidence showing 
that the figures for the general population might not accurately reflect the 
pool of qualified job applicants would also be relevant. Ibid. See gen-
erally Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, 1161-1193 
(1976) . 
"Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have 
frequently relied upon statistical evidence to prove a violation. . . . In 
many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of raci~ statistics . 
7 
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tion only that statistics are not irrefutable; \ 
1 
1 . J ~ 
me in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evi· ~- r -
,dence heir usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. See, e. g., Hester v. Southern R. Co., 497 
F. 2d 1374, 1379'--1381 (CA5). 
In addition to its general protest against the use of statistics 
in Title VII/ cases,tthe company cla.ims that in this case the 
statistics revealing racial imbalance are misleading because 
they fail to take into account the company's particular busi· 
ness situation as of the effective date of Title VII. The com· 
pany concedes that its line drivers were virtually all white in 
July 1965, but it claims that thereafter business conditions 
were such that its work force dropped. Its argument is that 
low personnel turnover, rather than post-Act discrimination, 
accounts for more recent statistical disparities. It points to 
substantial minority hiring in later years, especially after 1971, 
as showing that any pre-Act patterns of discrimination were 
broken. 
The argument would be a forceful one if this were an em·~ 
ployer who, at the time of suit, had done virtually no new 
hiring since the effective date of Title VII. But it is not. 
Although the company's total number of employees apparently 
dropped somewhat during the late 1960's, the record shows 
that many line drivers continued to be hired throughout this 
period, and that almost all of them were white.21 To be sure, 
to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer or union 
involved .. .. " United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544, 551 
(CA9). See also, e. g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F. 2d 
211, 225 n. 34 (CA5); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 
F. 2d 1377, 1382 (CA4); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 
F. 2d 418, 442 (CA5); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel . Co., 433 F. 2d 
421, 426 (CA8); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc ., 431 F. 2d 245, 
247 (CAlO) . 
zl Between July 2, 1965, and January 1, 1969, hundreds of line drivers 
were hired syst('mwide, either · from the outside or from the ranks of 
f'mployees filling other jobs within the company. None was a Negro. 
fJovernm~nt Exit 2.04... 
\ 
• 
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there were improvements in the company's hiring practices. 
The Court of Appeals commented that "T. I. M. E.-D. C.'s 
recent minority hiring progress stands as a laudable good faith 
effort to eradicate the effects of past discrimination in the area 
of hiring and initial assignment." 22 517 F. 2d, at 316. But 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals found upon sub-
stantial evidence that the com any had en a ed in a course 
of discrimination that continued well after the effective ate 
of Title vn~e com'Pany's later changes in its recent hir-
ing and promotion policies could be little comfort to the vic-
tims of the earlier ~t-Act discrimination, and could not 
erase its previous illegal conduct or its obligation to afford 
relief to those who suffered because of it. Cf. Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 413-423.23 
22 For example, in 1971 the company hired 116 new line drivers, of 
whom 16 were Negro or Spanish-surnamed Americans. Minority em-
ployees composed 7.1% of the company's systemwide work force in 1967 
and 10.5% in 1972. Minority hiring increased greatly in 1972 and 1973, 
presumably due at least in part to the existence of the consent decree. 
See 517 F. 2d, at 316 n. 31. 
2 3 The company's narrower attacks upon the statisHcal evidenc~tha.t 
there was no precise delineation of the areas referred to in the general 
population statistics, that the Government did not demonstrate that 
minority populations were located close to terminals or that transportation 
was available, that the statistics failed to show what portion of the 
minority population was suited by age, health, or other qualifications to 
hold trucking jobs, etc.-are equally lacking in force. At best, these 
attacks go only to the accuracy of the comparison between the composition 
of the company's work force at various terminals and the general popula-
tion of the surrounding communities. They detract little from the Govern-
ment's further showing that Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans who 
were hired were overwhelmingly excluded from line-driver jobs. Such 
employees were willing to work, had access to the terminal, were healthy 
and of working age, and often were at least sufficiently qualified to hold 
city-driver jobs. Yet they became line drivers with far less frequency 
than whites. Sf'e, e. g., Pre-trial Stipulatjon 14, summarized at 517 F. 2d, 
at 312 n. 24 (of 2,919 whites who held driving jobs in 1971, 1,802 (62%) 
wert~ line driver::; and 1,117 (:38%) were city drivers; of 180 Negroes and 
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals, o e basis 
of substantial evidence, held that the Governme had proved 
a prima facie case of s stematic and 
discrimmation, continuing we eyon t e effective date of 
'Title VII. The company's attempts to rebut that conclusion 
were held to be inadequate. 24 For the reasons we have sum-
marized, there is no warrant for this Court to disturb the find-
ings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals on this 
basic issue. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 408-409; 
Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U. S. 267, 268; United States v. Dick-
inson, 331 U. S. 745, 751; United States v. Commercial Credit 
Co., 286 U. S. 63, 67; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 
Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14; Baker v. Schofield, 243 U. S. 114, 118; 
Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 24. 
;o;panish-surnamed Americans who held driving · jobs, 13 (7%) were line 
olrivers and 167 (93%) were City drivers). 
In any event, fine tuning of the statistics could not have obscured the 
gl11ring absence of minority line drivers . As the Court of Appeals re-
marked, the company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination 
came not from a misuse of statistics but from "the inexorable zero:" 517 
F. 2d, at 315. 
24 The company's evidence, apart from the showing of recent changes in 
hiring and promotion policies, consisted mainly of general statements that 
1t hired only the best qualified applicants. But "affirmations of good 
faith in making individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie 
case of sys.tematic exclusion." Alexander v: Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632. 
The company also attempted to show that all of the witnesses who 
testified to specific instances of discrimination either were not discriminated 
against or suffered no injury. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that 
the trial judge was not bound to accept this testimony and that it com-
mitted no error by relying inst,ead on the other overpowering evidence in 
the case. 517 F. 2d, at 315. The Court of Appeals was also correct in 
the view that proof that specific individuals were not harmed by the 
<'ompany's discriminatory conduct was appropriately left to proceedings to 
det rrminP individual relief. In a suit brought by the Government under 
§ 707 (a) of the Act the District Court's initial concern is in deciding 
whPt 11l'r the Government has proved that the defendant has engaged in .!\> 
111\ttPrn or practic~ of discriminatory conduct. See infra, at 32-35. 
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B 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals also found 
that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargain-
mg agreements between the company and the union operated 
to violate Title VII of the Act. 
For purposes of ulating benefits, such as vacations, pen-
sions, and other fringe ene s, an em loyee's seniority under 
this system runs from the date he joins the company, and 
takes into account his total service in all jobs and bargaining 
units. For com,.Eetitive purp~s, however, such as deter-
mining the oraer in whiCTi empfoyees may bid for particular 
jobs, are laid off, or are recalled from layoff, it~ bargaining-
unit senioilil;: that contr_ols. Thus, a line driver's seniority, 
for purp";'ses orbidding for particular runs 25 and protection 
against layoff, takes into account only the length of time he 
has been a line driver at a particular terminal.26 The prac- I 
tical effect is that a city driver or serviceman who transfers 
to a line-driver job must forfeit all the competitive seniority 
he has accumulated in his previous bargaining unit and start 
at the bottom of the line-drivers' "board." 
The vice of this arrangement, as found by the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals, was that it "locked" minority 
workers into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior discrimina-
tion by discouraging transfers to jobs as line drivers. While 
the disincentive applied to all workers, including whites, it 
was Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who, those courts 
found, suffered the most because many of them had been 
denied the equal opportunity to become line drivers when they 
2~ Certain long-distance runs, for a. variety of reasons, are more desirable 
rhan others. The best runs are chosen by the line drivers at the top of 
rhf' "board"-a list of drivers arranged in order of their bargaining-unit 
4Cll!OrJty . 
~n Both bargaining-unit seniority and company seniority rights are 
~('nerally limit•cd to service at one particular terminal, except as modified 
f)\' thC' Southern Conference Area Over-the-Road Supplemental Agreement • 
.-;('<' ~u wn. at 6- 7, n. 10. 
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were initially hired, whereas whites either had not sought or 
were refused line-driver positions for reasons unrelated to their 
race or national origin. 
The linchpin of the theory embraced by the District Court 
· and the Court of Appeals was that a discrimina.tee who must 
forfeit his competitive seniority in order finally to obtain a 
line-driver job will never be able to "catch up" to the seniority 
level of his contemporary who was not subject to discrimina-
tion.27 Accordingly, this continued, built-in disadvantage to 
the prior discriminatee who transfers to a line-driver job was 
held to constitute a continuing violation of Title VII, for 
which both the employer and the union who jointly created 
and maintain the seniority system were liable. 
The union, while acknowledging tha.t the seniority sys-
tem may in some sense perpetuate the effects of prior discrim-
ination , asserts that the system is immunized from a finding 
of illegality by reason of § 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (h), which provides in part: 
uNotwithstanding any other provision of this subchap-
ter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for· 
an employer to apply different standards of compensation, 
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system, . . . 
provided that such differences are not the result of an in-
tention to discriminate because of race ... or national 
. . " ongm ..• . 
27 An example would be a Negro who was QWilified to be a line driver 
in 1958 but who, because of his race, was assigned instead a job as a city 
dn ver, and is allowed to become a line driver only in 1971 . Because he · 
loses his competi tive seniority when he transfers jobs, he is forever junior 
to white line drivers, hired between 1958 and 1970. The whites, rather 
tha n the Negro, will henceforth enjoy the preferable runs and the greater 
protection against layoff. Alt hough the original discrimination occurred 
111 1958-before the effective date of Title VII-the seniority system 
nrlf'rat~ to carry the ~ffects of the earlier discrimination into the present. 
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It argues that the seniority system in this case is "bona 
fide" within the meaning of § 703 (h) when judged in light 
of its history, intent, application, and all of the circumstances 
under which it was created and is maintained. More spe-
cifically, the union cla.ims that the central purpose of 
§ 703 (h) is to ensure that mere perpetuation of pre-Act dis-
crimination is not unlawful under Title VII. And, whether 
or not § 703 (h) immunizes the perpetuation of post-Act dis-
crimination , the union claims that the seniority system in 
this case has no such effect. Its position in this Court, 
as has been its position throughout this litigation, is that 
the seniority system presents no hurdle to post-Act discrim-
inatees who seek retroactive seniority to the date they would 
have become line drivers but for the company's discrimina-
tion. Indeed, the union asserts that under its collective-bar-
gaining agreements the union will itself take up the cause of 
the post-Act victim and attempt, through grievance procedures, 
to gain for him full "make whole" relief, including appropri-
ate seniority. 
The Government responds that a seniority system that per-
petuates the effects of prior discrimination-pre- or post-Act-
can never be "bona fide" under § 703 (h); at a minimum Title 
VII prohibits those applications of a seniority system that 
perpetuate the effects on incumbent employees of prior dis-
criminatory job assignments. 
The issues thus joined are open ones in this Court.28 We 
~wa -
·28 Concededly, the view that § 703 (h) does not immunize seniority 
'Ystems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination has much 
support. It was apparently first adopted in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc. , 
279 F . Supp. 505 (ED Va. ) . The court there held that "a departmental 
~eniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona 
fide seniority system." ld., at 517 (first emphasis added) . The Quarles 
view has ~ince enjoyed wholesale adoption in the Courts of Appeals. See, 
~; g., Local 189, United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F. 2d 980, 
987-988 (CA5); Umted States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 
F. 2d 123, 133-134, n. 20 (CAS) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp ., 
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considered§ 703 (h) in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
supra, but there decided only that § 703 (h) does not bar the 
award of retroactive seniority to job applicants who seek relief 
from an employer's post-Act hiring discrimination. We stated 
that "the thrust of [ § 703 (h)] is directed toward defining what 
is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in in~ 
stances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system 
is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination oc-
curring prior to the effective date of the Act." 424 U. S., at 
761. Beyond noting the general purpose of the statute, how- I 
ever, we did not undertake the task of statutory construction 
required in this case. 
(1) 
Because the company discriminated both before and after 
the enactment of Title VII, the seniority system is said to 
have operated to perpetuate the effects of both pre- and post-
Act discrimination. Post-Act discriminatees, however, may 
obtain full "make whol~' relie't,"incillai;g retroactive seniority 
under Franks v. Bowman, supra, without attacking the legal-
ity of the seniority system as applied to them. Franks made 
clear and the union acknowledges that retroactive seniority 
may be awarded as relief from an employer's discriminatory 
hiring and assignment policies even if the seniority system 
agreement itself makes no provision for such relief. 29 424 
446 F . 2d 652, 658-659 (CA2) ; United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R . 
Co., 471 F . 2d 582, 587-588 (CA4). Insofar as the result in Quarles and 
in the cases that followed it depended upon findings that the seniority 
systems were themselves " racially discriminatory" or had their "genesis in 
racial discnmination," 279 F . Supp., at 517, the decisions can be viewed 
as resting upon the proposition that a seniority system that perpetuates· 
the effects of pre-Act discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to 
discriminate entered into its very adoption. 
20 Article 38 of the National Master Freight Agreement between 
T I. M. E.-D. C. and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in effect 
as of the date of the systemwide lawsuit provided : 
"The Emplo:r"Cr and the Union agree not to discriminate against any 
i.nd.ividual with respect. to h.is hirin~, com~nsation, terms or cond.itiQnS of: 
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U.S., at 778-779. Here the Government has proved that the 
company engaged in a post-Act pattern of discriminatory 
hiring, assignment, transfer, and promotion policies. Any 
Negro or Spanish-surnamed American injured by those policies 
may receive all appropriate relief as a direct remedy for this 
discrimination. ao 
(2) 
What remains for review is the judgment that the seniority 
system unlawfully perpetuated the effects,of pre-Act discrim~ 
ination. We must decide, in short, whether § 703 (h) vali-
dates otherwise bona fide seniority systems that afford no con~ 
structive seniority to victims discriminated against prior to 
the effective date of Title VII, and it is to that issue that we 
now turn. 
The primary purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality 
of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrim-
inatory practices and devices which have fostered racially 
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority 
citizens." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 800. 
See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417-418; 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. , 415 U.S. 36, 44; Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., supra, at 429-431. To achieve this purpose, 
Congress "proscribe[d] not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in opera-
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, nor will they limit, segregate or classify employees in any 
way to deprive any individual employee of employment opportunities 
because of his race, color, religion , sex, or national origin." 
Any discrimination by the company would apparently be a grievable 
breach of this provision of the contract. 
30 To the extent. that the legality of the seniority system insofar as it 
perpetuatrs post-Act di~rriminnt.ion r.emains at issue in this case, our hold-
ing today in United Air Lines v. Evans, post, at -, is dispositive. Evmns 
hold;; that under § 7m (h) the application of a bona fide seniority system 
to a post-Act discriminatee does not constitute a separate violation of 
'fit le vn. 
This foo~ofe wi f 
he, tUt pi i fit , 
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tion." Griggs, 401 U. S., at 431. Thus, the Court has re~ 
peatedly held that Title VII may be violated by policies or 
practices that are neutral on their fs;,ce and in intent but that 
nonetheless discriminate in ef'fect against a particular group. 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,- U.S.-,-; Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 246-247; Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, supra, at 422, 425; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
supra, at 802 n. 14; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra. 
One species of practices "fair in form but discriminatory 
in operation" are those that perpetuate the effects of prior 
discrimination.31 As the Court held in Griggs, supra: "Under 
the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if 
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices." 401 U. S., at 430. 
Were it not for§ 703 (h), the seniority system in this case 
would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale. The heart of 
the system is its allocation of the choicest jobs, the greatest 
protection against layoffs, and other advantages to those 
employees who have been line drivers for the longest time. 
Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrim-
ination, the line drivers with the longest tenure are without 
exception white, the advantages of the seniority system flow 
disproportionately to them and away from Negro and Span-
ish-surnamed employees who might by now have enjoyed 
those advantages had not the employer discriminated before 
81 Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5), provides 
an apt illustration. There a union had a policy of excluding persons not 
related to present members by blood or marriage. When in 1966 suit was 
brought to challenge this policy, all of the union's members were white, 
largely as a result of pre-Act, intentional racial discrimination. The court 
observed: "While the nepotism requirement is applicable to black and 
white alike and is not on its face discriminatory, in a completely white 
union the present effect of its continued application is to forever deny to 
""egroes and Mexican-Americans any real opportunity for membership!1 
~07 F . 2d.! at 10.)4, 
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the passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution of 
advantages does in a very real sense "operate to 'freeze' the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 
Ibid. But both the literal terms of § 703 (h) and the legisla-
tive history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered 
this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a 
measure of immunity to them. 
Throughout the initial consideration of H. R. 7152, later 
enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, critics of the bill 
charged that it would destroy existing seniority rights. 82 The 
consistent response of Title VII's congressional proponents 
and of the Justice Department was that seniority rights would 
not be affected, even where the employer had discriminated 
prior to the Act.33 An interpretative memorandum placed in 
the Congressional Record by Senators Clark and Case stated: 
"Title VII would have no effect on established seniority 
rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective. 
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating 
in the past and as a result has an all-white working 
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's ob-
ligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-
discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or in-
deed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, 
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes: 
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the 
expense of the white workers hired earlier." 110 Cong. 
Rec. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added).84 
32 E. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 65-66, 71 (1963) 
(minority report); 110 Cong. Rec. 486-488 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill); 
id., at 2726 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id., at 7091 (remarks of Sen. 
Stennis). · 
33 In addit ion to the material cited in Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., at 
759-762, see 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., 
'at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6564 (remarks of 8en. 
Kuchel) . 
34 Senators Clark and Case were the "bipartisan captains" responsible 
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A Justice Department statement concerning Title VII, placed 
in t~e Congressional Record by Senator Clark, voiced the same 
'conclusion: 
"Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights exist~ 
ing at the time it takes effect. If, for example, a collec-
tive bargaining contract provides that in the event of 
layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, 
such a provision would not be affected in the least by 
Title VII. This would be true even in the case where 
owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the 
title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes." 
ld., at 7207 (emphasis added).85 
While these statements were made before § 703 (h) was 
added to Title VII, they are authoritative indicators of that 
section's purpose. Section 703 (h) was enacted as part of the 
Mansfield-Dirksen compromise substitute bill that cleared the 
for Title VII during the Senate debate. Bipartisan captains were selected 
for each title of the Civil Rights Act by the leading proponents of the Act 
in both parties. They were responsible for explaining their title in detail, 
defending it, and leading discussion on it. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6528 (1964) 
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 
.B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431,444-445 (1966). 
35 The full text of the statement is set out in Franks v. Bowman, 424 
U. S., at 760 n. 16. Senator Clark also introduced a set of answers to 
questions propounded by Senator Dirksen, which included the following 
exchange : 
"Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, 
when that management. function is governed by a labor contract calling for 
promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, 
labor cont racts call for 'last hired, first fired.' If the last hired are Negroes, 
is the employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired 
and the remaining employees are white? 
" Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill . If under· 
a 'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired,' 
he can still be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last 
hired' and not because of his race.'' 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 ( 1964) . S~ 
fra,nk~, ~upra1 at 760 n, 16. 
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way for the passage of Title VII.36 The drafters of the com-
promise bill stated that one of its principal goals was to resolve 
the ambiguities in the House-passed version of H. R. 7152. 
See, e. g., id., at 11935-11937 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); id., 
at 12707 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). As the debates in-
dicate, one of those ambiguities concerned Title VII's impact 
on existing collectively bargained seniority rights. It is ap-
parent that § 703 (h) was drafted with an eye toward meet-
ing the earlier criticism on this issue with an explicit provision 
embodying the understanding and assurances of the Act's pro-
ponents : namely, that Title VII would not outlaw such 
differences in treatment among employees as flowed from a 
bona fide seniority system that allowed for full exercise of 
seniority accumulated before the effective date of the Act. 
It is inconceivable that§ 703 (h), as part of a compromise bill, 
was intended to vitiate the earlier representations of the Act's 
supporters by increasing Title VII's impact on seniority sys-
tems. The statement of Senator Humphrey, noted in Franks, 
supra, at 761, confirms that the addition of § 703 (h) "merely 
clarifies {Title VII's] present intent and effect." 110 Cong. 
Rec. 12723 (1964). 
In sum, the unmistakable purpose of§ 703 (h) was to make I 
clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority 
system would not be unlawful under Title VII. As the legis-
lative history shows, this was the intended result even where 
the employer's pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites hav-
ing greater existing seniority rights than Negroes. Although 
a seniority system inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of 
pre-Act discrimination in such cases, the congressiqnal judg-
ment was that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing 
seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested 
seniority rights of employees simply because their employer 
had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act. 
:w See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., a.t 761; Vass, Title VII: Legislative 
'Histo ry, 7 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431 1 435 (1966). 
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To be sure, § 703 (h) does not immunize all seniority sys .. 
terns. It refers only to "bona fide" systems, and a proviso 
requires that any differences in treatment not be "the result 
of an intention to discriminate because of race ... or national 
origin .. .. " But our reading of the legislative history com-
pels us to reject the Government's broad argument that no 
seniority system that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimina-
tion can be "bona fide." To accept the argument would re-
quire us to hold that a seniority system becomes illegal simply 
because it allows the full exercise of the pre-Act seniority 
rights of employees of a company that discriminated before 
T itle VII was enacted. It would place an affirmative obliga-
tion on the parties to the seniority agreement to subordinate 
those rights in favor of the Claims of pre-Act discriminatees 
without seniority. The consequence would be a perversion of 
the congressional purpose. We cannot accept the invitation to 
disembowel § 703 (h) by reading the word "bona fide" as the 
Government would have us do.37 Accordingly, we hold that 
an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not be-
come unlawful under Title VII simply because it may per-
petuate pre-Act discrimination. Congress did not intend to 
make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to 
continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of pre-
Act discriminatees. 
That conclusion is inescapable even in a case, such as this 
37 For the same reason, we reject the contention that the proviso in 
§ 703 (h) , which bars differences in treatment resulting from "an intention 
to disrriminate," applies to any application of a. seniority system that may 
perpetuate past di~crimination. In this regard the language of the Justice 
Department memorandum introduced at the legislative hearings, see supra, 
ilt 24, is especia.!ly pertinent: "It is perfectly clear that when a worker is 
laid off or denied a chance for promotion because he is 'low man on the 
totem pole' he is not bcmg discriminated against because of his race .... 
Any differences in t reatment based on established seniority rights would" 
not br based on race and would not be forbidden by the title." 110 Cong; .. 
Hre. 7207 (1964) . 
~'-4 ... ...., 
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one, where the pre-Act discriminatees are incumbent employ-
ees who accumulated seniority in other bargaining units. Al-
though there seems to be no explicit reference in the legislative 
history to pre-Act discriminatees already employed in less 
desirable jobs, there can be no rational basis for distinguishing 
their claims from those of persons initially denied any job but 
hired later with less seniority than they might have had in the 
absence of pre-Act discrimination.38 We rejected any such 
distinction in Franks, finding that it had "no support any-
where in Title VII or its legislative history," 424 U. S., at 
768. As discussed above, Congress in 1964 made clear that 
a seniority system is not unlawful because it honors em-
ployees' existing rights, even where the employer has en-
gaged in pre-Act discriminatory hiring or promotion practices. 
It would be as contrary to that mandate to forbid the exercise 
of seniority rights with respect to discriminatees who held 
inferior jobs as with respect to later-hired minority employees 
who previously were denied any job. If anything, the latter 
group is the more disadvantaged. As in Franks," '[i]t would 
indeed be surprising if Congress gave a remedy for the one 
[group] which it denied for the other.'" !d., quoting Phelps 
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187.311 
38 That Title VII did not proscribe the denial of fictional seniority to 
pre-Act discriminatees who got no job was recognized even in Quarles v. 
Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (ED Va.), and its progeny. 
Quarles stressed the fact that the references in the legislative history were 
to employment seniority rather than departmental seniority. 279 F. 
Snpp., at 516. In Local 189, United 'Paperwor"kers v. United States, 416 
F . 2d 980 ( CA5), another leading case in this area, the court observed: 
"No doubt, Congress, to prevent 'reverse discrimination' meant to protect 
certain seniority rights that could not have existed but for previous racial 
discrimination . For example a Negro who had been rejected ·by an 
employer on racial grounds before passage of the Act could not, after· being 
hirt>d, claim to outrank whites who had been hired before him but after 
his original rt>jPction, ewn though the Negro might have ·had senior status 
but for the past discrimination." 416 F. 2d, at 994. 
80 In addition, there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended in 
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(3) 
The seniori!l_ system in thls case is entirely bona fide. It 
ttpplies equJly to all races and etiinic groups. To the ex .. 
tent that it "locks" employees into nonline-driver jobs, it 
does so for all. The city drivers and servicemen who are dis .. 
couraged from transferring to line-driver jobs are not all 
Negroes or Spanish-surnamed Americans; to the contrary, the 
overwhelming majority are white. The placing of line drivers 
in a separate bargaining unit from other employees is rational, 
in accord with the industry practice, and consistent with 
NLRB precedents!0 It is conceded that the seniority system 
· did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and that it 
was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal 
purpose. In these circumstances, the single fact that the 
system extends no retroactive seniority to pre-Act discrimi-
natees does not make it unlawful. 
Because the seniority system was protected by § 703 (h), 
the union's conduct in agreeing to and maintaining the system 
1964 to extend less protection to legitimate departmental seniority systems 
than to plant-wide seniority systems. Then as now, seniority was measured 
in a number of ways, including length of time with the employer, in a 
particular plant, in a department, in a job, or in a line of progression. 
See Aaron, Reflectjons on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority 
ltight.s, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1534 (1962); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority 
and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach too 
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1602' 
(1969). The legislative history contains no suggestion that any one system 
was preferred. 
40 See Georgia Highway E:tpress, 150 N. L. R. B. 1649, 1651: "The 
l3oard has long held that local drivers and over-the-road drivers constitute· 
separate appropriate units where they are shown to be clearly defined, 
homogeneous, and functionaJly distinct groups with separate interests which 
can effectively be represented separately for bargaining purposes. . . . In 
view of the different duties and functions, separate supervision, and different 
bases of payment, it is clear that the over-the-road drivers have divergent 
interests from those of the employees in the [city operations] unit ... and 
r;hould. not be \ncluded in that unit." 
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did not violate Title VII. On remand, the District Court's 
injunction against the union must be vacated.41 
III 
Our conclusion that the seniority system does not violate 
Title VII will necessarily affect the remedy granted to 
individual employees on remand of this litiga.tion to the 
District Court. Those employees who suffered only pre-Act 
discrimination are not entitled to relief, and no person may 
be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than the effec-
tive date of the Act. Several other questions relating to the 
appropriate measure of individual relief remain, however, for 
our consideration. 
The petitioners argue generally that the trial court did 
not err in tailoring the remedy to the "degree of injury" suf-
fered by each individual employee, and that the Court of 
Appeals' "qualifica.tion date" formula sweeps with too broad 
a brush by granting a remedy to employees who were not 
shown to be actual victims of unlawful discrimination. Spe-
cifically, the petitioners assert that no employee should be en-
titled to relief until the Government demonstrates that he was 
an actual victim of the company's discriminatory practices; 
that no employee who did not apply for a ·line-driver job 
should be granted retroactive competitive seniority; and that 
no employee should be elevated to a line-driver job ahead 
of any current line driver on layoff status. We consider each 
of these contentions separately. 
A 
The petitioners' first contention IS m substance that the 
Government's burden of proof in a pattern or practice case 
.tl The union will properly remain in this litigation as a defendant so 
that full relief may be awarded the victims of the employer's post-Ad 
discrimination . Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19 (a) . See EEOC v. Mac,.-
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must be equivalent to that outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green, supra. Since the Government introduced specific evi~ 
dence of company discrimination against only some 40 employ~ 
ees, they argue that the District Court properly refused to 
award retroactive seniority to the remainder of the class of 
minority incumbent employees. 
In McDonnell Douglas the Court considered "the order 
and allocation of proof in a private non~class action challeng~ 
ing employment discrimination." 411 U. S., at 800. We 
held that an individual Title VII complainant must carry the 
initial burden of proof by establishing a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination. On the specific facts there involved, 
we concluded that this burden was met by showing that a 
qualified applicant, who was a member of a racial minority 
group, had unsuccessfully sought a job for which there was 
a vacancy and for which the employer continued thereafter 
to seek applicants with similar qualifications. This initial 
showing justified the inference that the minority applicant 
was denied an employment opportunity for reasons prohibited 
by Title VII, and therefore shifted the burden to the employer 
to rebut that inference by offering some legitimate, nondis~ 
criminatory reason for the rejection. Id., at 802. 
The company and union seize upon the McDonnell Douglas 
pattern as the only means of establishing a prima facie case of 
individual discrimination. Our decision in that case, how~ 
ever, did not purport to crea.te an inflexible formulation. We 
expressly noted that "the fa,cts will necessarily vary in Title 
VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof 
required from '[a plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in 
every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U. S. , at 
802 n. 13. The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies not in 
its specification of the discrete elements of proof there re-
quired, but in its recognition of the general principle tha,t any 
Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering 
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment 
7 
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decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under 
the Act.42 
In Franks v. Bowman the Court applied this principle in 
the context of a class action. The Franks plaintiffs proved, 
to the satisfaction of a district court, that Bowman Transpor-
tation Company "had engaged in a pattern of racial discrim-
ination in various company policies, including hiring, trans-
fer, and discharge of employees." 424 U. S., at 751. Despite 
this showing, the trial court denied seniority relief to certain 
members of the class of discriminatees because not every in-
dividual had shown that he was qualified for the job qe_sought 
and tha.t a vacancy had been available. We held tha.t the 
trial court had erred in placing this burden on the individual 
plaintiffs. By "demonstrating the existence of a discrimina-
tory hiring pattern and practice" the plaintiffs had made out a 
prima facie case of discrimination against the individual class 
members; the burden theEJ2re slti!,_ted to the emplo,TI)r ".!:,o 
prove that individuals wh rea) 1 were not in fact victims 
of prevwus hiring d1scrim ation." 4 . S., at 772. The 
Fran rs case t 1us 1 ustrates another means by which a Title 
VII plaintiff's initial burden of proof can be met. The class 
there alleged a broad-based policy of employment discrimina-
tion; upon proof of that allegation there were reasonable 
grounds to infer that individual hiring decisions were made in 
" 2 The McDonnell Douglas case involved an individual complainant 
seeking to prove one instance of unlawful discrimination. An employ'6r's 
isolated decision to reject. an applicant who belongs to a racial minority 
does not. show that. the rejection was racially based. Although the 
McDonne'll Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimina-
tion, it does demand that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at. least 
t hat his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate 
reasons on whieh an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an 
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in l 
the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is 
>Ufficient, ab~ent other ~xplanation, to crea.te an inference that the decision 
WH~ a di;;crhninatory one. 
l 
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pursuit of the discriminatory policy and to require the em .. 
ployer to come forth with evidence dispelling that inference!3 
Although not all class actions will necessarily follow the 
Franks model, the nature of a pattern or practice suit ~rings 
it sauarel~thln Q.'!!:, holdW:g in Franks. The plaintiff in a 
pattern or practice action is the Government, and its initial 
burden is to demonstrate that ·unlawful discrimination has 
been a regular procedure or p6licy,[followed by an employer 
or group of employers. See pp. 9-10, and n. 16, supra. At the 
initial, "liability" stage of a pa.ttern or practice suit the Gov-
ernment is not required to offer evidence that each person for 
whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the em-
ployer's ·discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a 
prima facie case that such a policy existed. · The burden then 
-shifts to the employer to defeat the prima ·facie showin of a 
pattern or practice y emons ra mg at e overnment's 
proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. An employer might 
~ 3 The holding in Franks 'that proof of a discriminatory pattern and prac~ ( 
tice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of"individual relief is consist-
ent with the manner in which presumptions are created generally. Pre-
sumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial 
evalua.tions of probabilities and to conform with a pa.rty's superior access 
to the proof. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 
§§ 337, 343 (E. Cleary ed. 1972); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 Va. L. Rev. 
· 51, 61 (1961). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209, 
These factors were present in Franks. Although the prima. facie case did 
not conclusively demonstrate that all of the employer's decisions were part 
of the proven discriminatory pattern and practice, it did create a greater 
hkelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall pattern. 
I Moreover, the finding of a pattern or practice changed the position of the ·employer to that of a proven wrongdoer. Finally, the employer was in the 
best position to show why any individual employee was denied an employ-
ment opportunity. Insofar as the reasons related to available vacancies 
or the employer's evaluation of the applicants' qualifications, the com-
pany's records were the most relevant items of proof. If the refusal to 
hire was based on other factors, the employer and its agents knew best 
what thot;e factors were and the extent to which ther influenced the 
qf'rision-making proces..-:. 
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show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern i& 
a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act 
discrimination, or that during the period it is alleged to have 
pursued a discriminatory policy it made too few employment 
decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in a 
regular practice of discrimination.44 
If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from 
the Government's prima facie case, a trial court may then 
conclude tha,t a violation has occurred and determine the ap-
propriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the 
Government, a court's finding of a pattern or practice justifies 
an award of prospective relief. Such relief might take the 
form of an injunctive order against continuation of the dis-
criminatory practice, an order that the employer keep records 
of its future employment decisions and file periodic reports 
with the court, or any other order "necessary to ensure the 
full enjoyment of the rights" protected by Title Vll.4 5 
When the Government seeks individual relief for the victims J 
of the discrim"i'illitory practice, a district court must usually 
conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the 
H The employer's defen~e must, of course, be designed to meet the prima 
facie case of the Government. We do not mean to suggest that there are 
any particular limits on the type of evidence an employer may use. The 
point Js t.hat at the liability stage of a pattern o'r practice trial the focus 
often will not be on individual hiring decisions, hut on a pattern of 
discriminatory decisionmaking. While a pattern 'might he demonstrated 
by examining the discrete decisions of which it is composed, the Govern-
ment's suits have more commonly involved proof of the expected result 
of a regularly followed discrimina ory policy. In such cases the employer's 
burden is to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for the apparently 
discriminatory result. See n. 20, and cases cited therein, supra. 
45 The federal courts have freely exerCised their broad equitable discre-
tion to devise prospective relief designed to assure that employers found 
•o be in violation of § 707 (a) eliminate their discriminatory practices and 
the effects therefrom. See, e. g., cases cited in n. 48, infra. In this case 
prospective relief was incorporated In the parties' consent decree. See 
"l.pra, at :~-4 : n. 4. 
~~ 
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trial to determine the scope of individual relief. The peti.. e• ~ '.J-
tioners' contention in this case is that if the Government has- ( 
not, in the course of proving a pattern or practice, already 
brought forth specific evidence that each individual was dis-
criminatorily denied an employment opportunity, it must 
carry that burden at the second, "remedial" sta.ge of trial. 
That basic contention was rejected in the Franks case. As 
was true of the particular facts in Franks, and as is typical of 
Title VII pattern or practice suits, the question of individual 
relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer 
has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination .. 
The force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage 
of the trial. The employer cannot, therefore, claim that there 
is no reason to believe that its individual employment deci-
sions were discriminatorily based; it has already been shown to 
v-1~ 
~~ .... ~ 
have maintained a policy of discriminatory decisionmaking. _ 
The proof of the pattern or practice supports m iijference· 
that any particular employment decision, during the period 
which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in 
pursuit of that policy. The Government need only show that 
an individual alleged discriminatee unsuccessfully a lied for 
a job 4 0 and was a likely victim of the roven ISCrtmination. 
As in Franks, the bur en t en rests on the employer to emon-
strate that the individual applicant was denied an employ-
ment opportunity for lawful reasons. See 424 U. S., at 773· 
u. 32. 
In Part II-A, supra, we have held that the District Court. 
and Court of Appeals were not in error in finding that the 
Government had proved a systemwide pattern and practice 
of racial and ethnic discrimination on the part of the company. 
On remand, therefore, every post-Act applicant 47 for a line-
10 Nonapplicants are discussed in Part III-B, infra. 
17 Employees who initially applied for line-driver jobs and were hired in 
··>ther jobs before the effective date of the Act, and who did not later apply 
tor transfer to line-driver jobs, are part of the grout> of nonapplicant&; 
rlisrn~srd in fm, 
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driver position will be presumptively entitled to relief, subject 
to a showing by the company that its earlier refusal to place 
the applicant in a line-driver job was not based on its policy 
of discrimination.'8 
B 
The Court of Appeals' 11qualification date" formula for re-
lief did not distinguish between incumbent employees who 
had applied for line-driver jobs and those who had not. The 
appellate court held that where there has been a showing of 
classwide discriminatory practices coupled with a seniority 
system that perpetuates the effects of that discrimination, an 
individual member of the class need not show that he unsuc-
cessfully applied for the position from which the class had 
been excluded. In support of its award of relief to all non-
applicants, the Court suggested that 11as a practical matter ... 
a member of the affected class may well have concluded that 
an application for transfer to an all White position such as 
fline driver] was not worth the candle." 517 F. 2d, a.t 320. 
The company contends that a grant of retroactive seniority 
to these nonapplicants is inconsistent with the make-whole 
purpose of a Title VII remedy and impermissibly will require 
the company to give preferential treatment to employees 
solely because of their race. The thrust of the company's 
contention is that unless a minority-group employee actually 
applied for a line-driver job, either for initial hire or for 
transfer, he has suffered no injury from whatever discrimina-
tion might have been involved in the refusal of such jobs to 
those who actually applied for them. 
The Government argues in response that there should be 
uo 11immutable rule" that nonapplicants are nonvictims, and 
contends that a determination whether nonapplicants have 
•$ Any nondiscriminatory justification offered by the company will be 
:-ubject to further evidence by the Government that the purported reason 
lm an applicant '~; rejection was in fa.ct a pretext for unlawful ctiscrimina.-
'!vll }lfDcmnell /)ouglaRs v. Green, supra, at 804-806. 
\ 
\ 
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euft'ered from unlawful discrimination will necessarily vary 
depending on the circumstances of each particular case. The 
Government further asserts that under the specific facts of 
'this case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that all 
qualified nonapplicants were likely victims and were therefore 
presumptively entitled to relief. 
The question whether seniority relief may be awarded to 
nonapplicants was left open by our decision in Franks, since 
the class at issue in that case was limited to "identifiable 
applicants who were denied employment ... after the effec-
tive date of ... Title VII." 424 U. S., at 750. We now 
decide tha.t an incumbent employee's failure to apply for a job-
lS not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive seniority. ,.-, ? 
We further hold that evidentiary hearings will be required m ~ 
this case to · · licants an o ortunity to 
treated as applican sand therefore are presumptively entitled 
to seniority relief. 
(1) 
Analysis of this problem must begin with the premise that 
the scope of a district court's remedial powers under Title VII 
IS determined by the purposes of the Act. Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
supra, and again in Albemarle, the Court noted that a primary 
objective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal em-
ployment opportunity and to remove the barriers that have 
operated to favor white male employees over othe1r employees. 
401 U. S., at 429'-430; 422 U. S., at 417. The prospect of 
retroactive relief for victims of discrimination serves this 
purpose by providing the "'spur or catalyst which causes 
employers and unions to self-examine and to seM-evaluate 
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so 
far as possible. the last vestiges' " of their disc:riminatory 
practices. Albemarle, supra, at 417-418. An equally impor-
rant purpose of the Act is "to make persons whole :for injuries 
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$Uffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'! 
ld., at 418. In determining the specific remedies to be 
afforded, a district court is "to fashion such relief as the par-
ticular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitu-
tion." Franks v. Bowman, supra, at 764. 
Thus, the Court has held that the purpose of Congress in 
vesting broad equitable powers in Title VII courts was "to 
make possible the 'fashion [ing] [of] the most complete relief 
possible,' " and that the district courts have "not merely the 
power but the duty to rendet a decree which will so far as 
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as 
well as bar like discrimination in the future." Albemarle, 
supra, at 421, 418. More specifically, in Franks we decided 
that a court must ordinarily award a seniority remedy unless 
there exist reasons for denying relief "'which if applied gen:. 
erally, would not frustrate the central purposes of eradicating 
discrimination and making persons whole for injuries suf-
fered.' " 424 U. S., at 771, quoting Albemarle, supra, at 421. 
Measured against these standards, the company's assertion ~ 
that a person who has not actually applied for a job can 
never be awarded seniority relief cannot prevail. The effects 
of and the injuries suffered from discriminatory employment 
practices are not always confined to those who were expressly 
denied a requested employment opportunity. A consistently 
enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job applica-
tions from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to sub-
ject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain 
rejection. 
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimina-
tion by a sign reading "Whites Only" on the hiring-office door, 
his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the 
sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. The same 
message can be commumcated to potential applicants more 
subtly but just as clearly by an empioyer's actual practices--
by his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual appli::. 
?7 
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'oimts, by the manner in which he publicizes v~cancies, his re-
bf!uitment, techniques, his responses to casual or tentative 
inquires, and even by the racial or ethnic composition of that 
part of his workforce from which he has discriminatorily 
excluded members of minority groups.40 When a person)s 
desire for a job is not translated into a formal i on 
solely because of his unwillingness to engage in futlie esture 
he is as much a victim of discrimination as is e who goes 
6 • ~ . 
through the motions of submitting an ,application. ' 
l . -. 
In cases decided uhdet the National Labor Relations Act, 
the model for Title VII's remedial provisions, Albemarle; 
mpra, at 419; Franks, supra, at 769, the National Labor Rela-
~~IJM, a.*' 419';" PrtJ1¥1Je8, 8ttprtt;, at 769, tse "NatieR!M I.ab9P ll.ila .. 
tions Board, and the courts in enforcing its orders, have rec~ 
ognized that the failure to submit a futile application doe~ 
:not bar an award of relief to a person claiming that he was 
C!enied employment because of union affiliation or activitY. 
In NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp. , 316 U. S. 
105, this Court enforced an order of the Board directing an 
employer to hire, with retroactive benefits, former employees 
who had not applied for newly available jobs because of the 
employer's well-known policy of refusing to hire union mem-
49 The far-ranging effects of subtle discriminatory .Practices have not. 
escaped the scrutiny of the federal courts, which have not hesitated to 
provide relief from practices designed to discourage job applications from 
minority-group m~mbers. See, e. g., Franks _v. J.1owman Transportation 
Co., 495 F. 2d 398, 418-419 (CA5) (public recruitment and adver-
t ising), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U. S. 747; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 
F . 2d 315 (CA8) (recruitment) ; United States v. Jacksonville Terminal 
Co., 451 F. 2d 418, 458 (CA5) (posting of job vacancies and job quali-
fication requirements) ; United States v . Local No. 8, JAB, S, 0 , & 
R. 1., 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1238, 1245-1246 (WD Wash.) (dissemina-
tion of information), aff'd, 443 F . 2d 544 (CA9) . While these mea-
sures may hf' cffrctiw m preventing the deterrence of future applicant~-, 
they rtfford -no· rrlief to those persons who in the past desired- jobs but 
were ititiirtidated and discouraged by employment discriminatioh. 
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hers. See In re Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26 
N. L. R. B. 1182, 1208, 1231. Similarly, when an application 
would have been no more than a vain gesture in light of em-
ployer discrimination, the Courts of Appeals ha.ve enforced 
Board orders reinstating striking workers despite the failure 
of individual strikers to apply for reinstatement when the 
strike ended. E. g., NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, 
Inc., 323 F. 2d 956 (CA2); NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp., 
303 F. 2d 64 (CA6); Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., v. 
NLRB, 119 F. 2d 903 (CAS). See also Piasecki Aircraft Corp. 
v. NLRB , 280 F. 2d 575 (CA3); NLRB v. Anchor Rome MiUs, 
228 F. 2d 775 (CA5); NLRB v. Lummus Co., 210 F. 2d 377 
(CA5). Consistent with the NLRA model, several Courts of 
Appeals have held in Title VII cases that a nonapplicant can 
be a victim of unlawful discrimination entitled to make-whole 
relief when an applica.tion would have been a useless act serv-
ing only to confirm a discriminatee's knowledge that the job 
he wanted was unavailable to him. Acha v. Beame, 531 F. 2d 
648, 656 (CA2); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F. 2d 
226. 231- 233 (CA4); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F. 2d 
441 , 451 (CA5); United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 
F. 2d 354, 369 (CA8). ~ 
The denial of Title VII relief on the ground that the claim-, 
ant had not formally applied for the job could exclude from A V ~ ..... ~ 
the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms ~-----
of discrimination. Victims of gross and pervasive discrimina-
tion could be denied relief precisely because the unlawful prac-
tices had been so successful as totally to deter job applica-
tions from members of minority groups. A per se prohibition 
of relief to nonapplicants could thus put beyond the reach 
of equity the most invidious effects of employment discrimina-
tion- those that extend to the very hope of self-realization. 
Such a pe'r se limitation on the equitable powers granted to 
courts by Title VII would be manifestly inconsistent with the 
"historic purpose of equitr to 'secur[e] comvlete justice'" and' 
-
. ' 
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with the duty of courts in Title VII cases " 'to rende 
which will so far as possible eliminate the · riminatory 
effects of the past.' " Albemarle Paper Co. . Moody, supra, 
at 418. 
(2) 
To conclude that a person's failure to submit an application ~ 
for a job does not inevitably and forever foreclose his entitle-
ment to seniority relief under Title VII is a far cry, however, 
from holding that nonapplicants are always entitled to such 
relief. A nonagplicant must show that he was a potential 
victim ofunlawftii diScrimination. Because he is necessarily 
cl~mg ihatlle=was deterred from applying for the job by the 
employer's discriminatory practices, his is the not always easy 
burden to prove that he would have applied for a 
it not been for those practices. Cf. M t. Healthy City School 
District Board of Education v. Doyle, - U. S. - , - . 
When this burden is met, the nonapplicant is in a position 
analogous to that of an applicant and is entitled to the 
presumption discussed in Part III-A, supra. 
The Government contends that the evidence it presented 
in this case at the liability stage of the trial identified all non-
applicants as victims of unlawful discrimination "with a fair 
degree of speeific~ourt of Appeals' deter-
mination at qualifled nonapplicant"iare presumptively en-
titled to a award of seniority should ac rdingly be affirmed. 
In suppor of this contention the vernment cites its proof 
of an exten an practice of discrimination as evi-
dence that an application from a minority employee for a 
line-driver job would have been a vain and useless act. It 
/ urther argues that since the class of nonapplicant discrimi-
natees is limited to incumbent employees, it is likely that 
every class member was aware of the futility of seeking a line-
driver job and was therefore deterred from filing both an ini-
tial and a followup application.50 
.5o ThP l.itnitatiqn to incumbent employees is also said tQ serve the sa~ 
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We cannot agree. While the scope and duration of the t~? 
company's discriminatory policy can leave little doubt that 0 
the futility of seeking line-driver jobs was communicated to 
ihe company's minority employees, that in itself is insufficient. 
The known prospect of discriminatory rejection shows only 
that employees who wanted line-driving jobs may have been 
deterred from applying for them. It does not show which of 
the nonapplicants actually wanted such jobs. There are dif· 
ferences between city and line-driving jobs,.51 for example, but 
~Y of the latter is not so self-evident as to warrant 
a conclusion that all employee~ would prefer to be line drivers 
if given a free choice.52 Indeed, a substantial number of white 
function that actual job applications serve in a case like Franks: providing 
a means of distinguishing members of the excluded minority group from 
minority members of the public at large. While it is true that incuril• 
bency in this case and actual applications in Franks both serve to narrow 
what might otherwise be an impossible task, the status of nonincumbent 
applicant and nonapplicant incumbent differ substantially. The refused 
applicants in Franks had been denied an opportunity they clearly sought, 
and the only issue-to be resolved was wlietnert he aenial was pursuant to 
a proven discriminatory practice. Resolution of the nonapplicant's claim, 
however, requires two distinct determinations: that he would have applied 
but for discrimination and that he would have been discriminatorily 
rejected had he applied. The mere fact of incumbency does not resolve 
the fir~:~t i:ssue, although it may tend to support a. nonapplicant's claim to 
the extent that it shows he was willing o wor as a nver, t at e was 
fa miliar with the tasks of line drivers, etc. An incumbent's claim that he 
would have applied for a line-driver job would certainly be more super-
fici ally plausible than a similar claim by a member of the general public 
who may never have worked in the truckin · tr or heard d 
T. I. M. E.-D. C. prior to suit. We have in this case no occasion to 
er w e er or m what Circumstances nonincumbent nonapphcants 
f the employees for whom the Government soug 
'!riving jobs, nearly one-third held city-driver positions. 
'"2 The company's line drivers generally earned more annually than its 
dty drivers, but the difference varied from under $1,000 to more than $5,000 
'•!~>pending on the terminal and the year. In 1971 city drivers at t~ 
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'city drivers who were not subjected to the company's dis-
criminatory practices were apparently content to retain their 
city jobs.63 
In order to fill this evidentiary gap, the Government argues 
that a nonapplicant's current willingness to transfer into a 
line-driver position confirms his past desire for the job. An 
employee's response to the court-ordered notice of his entitle-
·california. terminals, "LOS" and San Francisco, earned substantially more 
than the line drivers at those terminals. In addition to earnings, line 
drivers have the advantage of not being required to load and unload their 
trucks. City drivers, however, have regular working hours, are not 
required to spend extended periods away from home and family, and do 
not face the hazards of long-distance driving at high speeds. As the Gov-
ernment acknowledged at argument, the jobs are in some sense "parallel"-
some may prefer one job and some may prefer another. 
The District Court found generally that line-driver jobs "are considered \ 
the most desirable of the 'driving jobs." That finding is not challenged 
here, and we see no reason to disturb it. We observe only that the 
· differences between city and line driving were not such that it can be said ~ • ~ 
with confidence that all minority employees free from the threat of dis~ i21:!~ --. 
criminatory treatment· would have chosen to give up cit.y for line driving/ • 
63 In addition to the futility of application, the Court of Appeals seems to 
have relied on the minority employees' accumulated seniority in nonline- ~ ~ 
driver positions in concluding that nonapplicants had been unlawfully de- l) ' ~ 
terred from applying. See 517 F. 2d, at 318,320. The Government adopts 
that theory here, argui~g that a nonappli.cant who has accrued time at the c~. ""' 
company would be unhkely to have a.pphed for transfer because he would ~ v-~ 
have had to forfeit all of his competitive seniority and the job security /} ~ • • jJ _ • 
that went with it. In view of our conclusion in Part II-B, supra, this 
argument detracts from ra:ther than supports a nona.pplicant's entit.lement 
to relief. To the extent. that an incumbent was deterred from applying by h-1 ~-' 
his desire to retain his competitive seniority, he simply did not want a - { I 
line-driver job requiring him to start at the bottom of the "board." Those J-t' 7--D~ 
nonapplicru1ts who did not apply for transfer because t.hey were unwilling 1 (...L.L -
to give up their previously acquired seniority suffered only from a lawful ~... 
dE'terrent imposed on all E'mployees regardlE'SS of race or ethnicity. The 
nonapplicant's remedy in such cases is limited solely to the relief, if any, 
to which hE' may be entitled because of the discrimina.tion he encountered 
tt,t. a tim_e wh~n he wanted to take a, starting line-driver job. 
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ment to relief 54 demonstrates, according to this argument, that 
the employee would have sought a line-driver job when he 
first became qualified to fill one, but for his knowledge of the 
company's discriminatory policy. 
This assumption falls short of satisfying the appropriate 
burden of proof. An employee who transfers into a line-
driver unit is normally placed at the bottom of the seniority 
"board." He is thus in jeopardy of being laid off and must, 
at best, suffer through an initial period of bidding on only the 
least desirable runs. See supra, at 15-16, and n. 25. Non-
applicants who chose to accept the appellate court's post hoc 
invitation, however, would enter the line-driving unit with 
retroactive seniority dating from the time they were first 
qualified. A willingness to accept the job security and bid-
ding power afforded by retroactive seniority says little about 
what choice an employee would have made had he previously 
been given the opportunity freely to choose a starting line-
driver job. While it may be true that many of the nonappli-
cant employees desired and would have applied for line-driver 
jobs but for their knowledge of the company's policy of dis-
crimination, the Government must carry its burden of proof, 
with respect to each specific individual, at the remedial hear-
ings to be conducted by the District Court on remand.55 
c 
The task remaining for the District Court on remand will 
not be a simple one. Initially, the court will have to 
M The District Court's final order required that the company notify each 
minority employee of the relief he was entitled to claim. The employee was 
then required to indicate, within 60 days, his willingness to accept the relief. 
Under the decision of the Court of Appeals, the relief would be qualifica-
tion date seniority. 
1ss While the most convincing proof would be some overt act such as a t~ 
pre-Act application for a line-driver job, the District Court may find ' 
evidence of an employee's informal inquiry, expression of interest, or even 
•mexpressed desire credible and convincing. The question is a factual one 
\01: rletennination by the trial judge. 
-
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make a substantial number of individual determina.tions in 
deciding which of the minority employees were actual victims 
of the company's discriminatory practices. After the victims 
have been identified, the cour.t must, as nea.rly as possible, 
" 'recreate the conditions and relationships. that would have 
been had there been no' " unlawful discrimination. Franks v. 
Bowman, supra, 424 U.S., at 71:)9. This process of recreating 
the past will necessarily involve a degree of approximation and 
impreCisiOn. Because the . .class of victims may include some 
who did not apply for line-driver jobs as well as those who 
did, and because more than orie minority employee may have 
been denied each line-driver vacancy, the court will be required 
to balance the equities of each minority employee's situation 
in allocating the limited number of vacancies that were 
discriminatorily refused to class members. 
Moreover, after the victims have been identified and their 
rightful place determined, the District Court will again be 
faced with the delicate task of..._a.djusting the remedial interests 
o discriminatees and the le · 'mate x ctations of other 
emp o~ In t e prejudgment consent decree, see supra, at 
~' the company and the Government agreed that 
minority employees would assume line-driver positions that 
have been discriminatorily denied to them by exercising a first-
l)riority rightJto/job vacancies at the company's terminals. 
The decree did not determine what constituted a vacancy, but 
in its final order the trial court defined "vacancy" to exclude 
any position that became available while there were laid-off 
employees awaiting an opportunity to return to work. 
Employees on layoff were given a preference to fill whatever 
openings might occur at their terminals during a three-year 
period after they were laid off.51' The Court of Appeals 
GG Paragraph 9 (a.) of the trial court's final order provided: 
"A 'vacancy' a,: used in this Order, shall include any opening which ·is 
caused by th<> tram;f<>r or promotion to a position outside the bargaining-
mit, d,eath,, re::;i$na.tion or fin~! discharge of an inc~Amb~vtl or by an 
75--636 & 15-672-0PfNfON 
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES 
re.iected the preference and held that all but "purely tempo-
rary" vacancies were to be filled according to an employee's 
seniority, whether as a member of the class discriminated 
Increase in operations or business 'where, ordinarily, additional employees 
would be put to work. A vacancy shall not exist where there are laid 
off employees on the seniority roster where the opening occurs. Such laid 
off employees shall have a preference to fill such laid off positions when 
these again become open without competition from the individuals granted 
telief in this case. 
11However, if such layoff continues for three consecutive years the position 
will be deemed as 'vacant' with the right of all concerned to compete for' 
the position, using their respective seniority dates, including those provided 
for in this Order." 
The trial court's use of a three-year recall right is apparently derived 
from provisions in t.he collective-bargaining agreements. Article 5 of the 
National Master Freight Agreement ("NMFA") establishes the seniority· 
rights of employees covered by the Agreement. Under Art. 5, "[s]eniority 
rights for employees shall prevail . . . . Seniority shall be broken by· 
discharge, voluntary quit, [or] more than a three (3) year layoff." § 1. 
As is evident, the three-year layoff provision in the Master Agreement 
determines only when an .employee shall lose dll of his accumulated· 
seniority; it does not determine either the order of layoff or the order of 
recall. Subject to other terms of t.he Master Agreement, NMFA Art. 2, 
§ 2, "the extent to which seniority shall be applied as well as the methods 
and procedures of such application" are left to the Supplemental Agree-
ments. /d. , § 1. The Southern Conference Area Over-the-Road Supple-
mental Agreement, covering line drivers in the Southern Conference, also 
provides for a complete loss of seniority rights after a three-year layoff, 
Art. 42, § 1, and further provides that in the event of a reduction in force· 
"the last employee hired shall be laid off first and when the force is again 
increased, the employees are to be returned to work in the reverse order 
in which they were laid off," id., § 3. This order of layoff and recall, 
however, is limited by the Master Agreement in at least two situations 
involving an influx of employees from outside a terminal. NMFA Art. 5, 
§ 3 (a) ( 1) (merger with a solvent company), § 5 (b) (2) (branch closing· 
with transfer of operations to another branch). In these cases the Master 
Agreement provides for "dovetailing" the seniority rights of active and 
laid-off employees a.t. the two facilities involved. Ibid.; see also NMF A 
Art. 15 (honoring Military Selective Service Act of 1967). The Mastt'r 
A~reem~t also· reco(Di'U that "cqpestions of accrual, :i.m.ten~retation ,11m:· 
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against or as an incumbent line driver on layoff. 517 F. 2d., 
at 321-323. 
As their final contention concerning the remedy, the com-
pany and the union argue that the trial court correctly made 
that adjustment by granting a preference to laid-off employees, 
and that the Court of Appeals erred in disturbing it. The 
petitioners therefore urge the reinstatement of that part of 
the trial court's final order pertaining to the rate at which 
victims will assume their rightful places in the line-driver 
hierarchy. ~ 7 
Although not directly controlled by the Act,"8 the extent to 
a.pplication of seniority rights may arise which are not covered by the 
•general rules set forth;'' and provides a procedure for resolution of unfore-
i'een seniority problems. NMFA Art . 5, § 7. Presumably § 7 applies to 
persons claiming discriminatory denial of jobs and seniority in violation of 
Art. 38, which prohibits racial discrimination as well as classification of 
employees so as to deprive them of employment opportunities on account 
of race. See supra, at 2I n. 29. The District Court apparently did not 
consider these provisions when it determined the recall rights of employees 
on layoff. 
57 In their briefs the petitioners also challenge the trial court's modifica-
tion of the interterminal transfer rights of line drivers in the Southern 
'Conference. See supra, at 6-7, n. 10. This question was not presented in 
either petition for certiorari and therefore is not properly before us. 
Rules of the Supreme Court. 23.1 (c). Our disposition of the claim that 
is presented, however, will permit the trial court to reconsider any part 
of the balance it struck in dea.ling with this issue. 
:58 The petitioners argue that to permit a victim of discrimination to ·use 
hi:; rightful place seniority to bid on a line-driver job 'before the recall of 
all employees on layoff, would amount to a racial or ethnic preference in 
violation of § 703 (j) of the Act. Section 703 (j) provides no support for 
this argument.. It provides only that Title VII does not require an 
rmployer to grant preferential treatment to any racial group in order to 
rectify an imbalance between the racial composition of the employer's 
workforce and the racial make-up of the population at large. See supra, 
at 13 n. 20. To allow ident.ifiable victims of unlawful discrimination to 
participate in a layoff recall is not the kind of "preference" prohibited by I 
§ 703 (j). If a discriminatee is ultimately allowed to secure a position 
h~fore a laid-off line driver1 a questiqn we do nqt pow decide1 he will do 
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which the legitimate expectations of nonvictim employees 
should determine when victims are restored to their rightful 
place is limited by basic principles of equity. In devising and 
implementing remedies under Title VII, no less than in for-
mulating any equitable decree, a court must draw on the 
"qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity 
the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between 
the public interest and private needs as well as between com-
peting private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 
329-330. Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 
195--196, modifying and remanding, In re Phelps Dodge Corp., 
19 N. L. R. B. 547, 600; Franks v. Bowman, supra, at 798-799. 
Especially when immediate implementation of an equitable 
remedy threatens to impinge upon the expectations of inno-
cent parties, the courts must "look to the practical realities 
and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing 
mterests," in order to determine the "special blend of what is 
necessary, wha.t is fair, and what is workable." Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201, 200 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.). 
Because of the limited fa.cts now in the record, we decline 
to strike the balance in this Court. The District Court did 
not explain why it subordinated the interests of class members 
to the contractual recall expectation of other employees on 
layoff. When it made that determination, however, it was 
considering a class of more than 400 minority employees, all 
of whom had been granted some preference in filling line-
driver vacancies. The overwhelm1ng majority of these were 
in the District Court's subclass three, composed to those 
employees with respect to whom neither the Government nor 
the company had presented any specific evidence on the ques-
tiOn of unlawful discrimination. 'Thus, when the court consid-
ered the problem of what constituted a line-driver "vacancy" 
~o becau:se of the bidding power inherent in his rightful place seniority, 1 { · 
and not· because of a preference based on race. See Franks v. Bowman, 
~·t p ra at. 792 (PowELL, .J., concurring in pa.rt and dissenting in part) , 
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to be offered to class members, it ma.y have been influenced 
by the relatively small number of proven victims and the 
large number of minority employees about whom it had no 
information. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals rede-
fined "vacancy" in the context of what it believed to be a class 
of more than 400 employees who had actually suffered from 
discrimination at the behest of both the company and the 
union, and its determination may well have been influenced 
by that understanding. For the reasons discussed in this 
opinion, neither court's concept was completely valid. 
After the evidentiary hearings to be conducted on remand, 
both the size and the composition of the class of minority 
employees entitled to relief will be altered substantially. 
Until those hearings have been conducted and both the num-
ber of identifiable victims and the consequent extent of neces-
sary relief have been determined, it is not possible to evaluate 
abstra.ct cla.ims concerning the equitable bala.nce that should 
be struck between the statutory rights of victims and the 
contractual rights of nonvictim employees. That determina-
tion is best left, in the first instance, to the sound equitable 
discretion of the trial court. 50 See Franks v. Bowman, supra, 
at 779; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 416. We 
observe only that when the court exercises its discretion in 
dealing with the problem of laid-off employees in light of the 
facts developed at the hearings on remand, it should clearly 
state its reasons so that meaningful review may be had on 
appeal. See Franks v. Bowman, supra, at 774; Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, a.t421 n.14. 
For all the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the 
~" Other factors, surh as the number of victims, the number of non-
y ictnn rmployees affected and the alternatives available to them, and the 
economic circumstances of the industry may also be relevant in the exer-
i' ise of the District Court 's discretion. See Franks v. Bowman, supr~ 
+24 U S., llt. 796 n. 17 (PowELL, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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Court of Appeals is va-cated, and the case is remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
) 
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Nos. 75-636 AND 75-672 
International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Petitioner, 
75-636 v. 
United States et al. 
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Petitioner, 
75-672 v. 
United States et al. 
On Writs of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
?~~ 
[May-, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 1 
These cases bring here several important questions under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. ( 1970 ed. and Supp. V). ~ 
The issues grow out of alleged unlawful employment practices ~II'[ h /.., ~ J 
engaged in by an employer and a union. The employer is II r ,...._..,.,., 
a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations, c-Z ~_.._, L. ~ 
and the union represents a large group of its employees. The - ~-----, 
District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the em-
ployer had violated Title VII by engaging in a pattern and 
practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and 
Spanish-surnamed Americans, and that the union had violated 
the Act by agreeing with the employer to create and maintain 
a seniority system that perpetuated the effects of past racial 
and ethnic discrimination. In addition to the basic questions 
presented by these two rulings, other subsidiary issues 
must be resolved if violations of Title VII occurred-issues 
concerning the nature of the relief to which aggrieved in .. 
dividuals may be entitled. 
·-
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I 
The United States brougl).t an action in a Tennessee federal 
court against the petitioner T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc. (the com-
pany) pursuant to§ 707 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-6 (a).1 ·The complaint charged that the 
company had fopowed discriminatory hiring, assignment, 
and promotion po~icies against Negroes at its terminal in 
Nashville, Tenn.2 The Government brought a second ac-
tion against the company almost three years later in a 
federal district court in Texas, charging a pattern and 
1 At the time of suit the statute provided as follows: 
" (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe 
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of 
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this sub-
chapter, and that t.he pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended 
to deny the full exercise of the rights herein d('Scribed, the Attorney 
General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the 
Pnited States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his 
absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining 
to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including an 
application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or 
other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or 
prnct.ice, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights 
herein described." 
Section 707 was amended by § 5 of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 107, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-6 (c) (Supp. V), to give 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, rather than the Attorney 
General, the aut.hority to bring "pa.ttern or practice" suits under that 
o:rction against private-sector employers. In 1974, an order was entered in 
this action substituting the EEOC for the United States but. retaining the 
United States as a part~· for purposes of jurisdiction, appealability, and 
relat.rd matters. See 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-6 (d) (Supp. V). 
2 The named defendant. in this suit was T . I. M. E. Freight, Inc., a 
predecessor of T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., is a nation-
wide ;;~·stem produced by 10 mergers over a 17-year period. See United 
States v. T. I. M. E.-D. C .. Inc .. 517 F. 2d 299, 304, and n. 6 (CA5). It 
eurrently ha,; 51 terminals and operates in 26 States and three Canadian 
provinces. 
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practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and 
Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's trans-
portation system. The petitioner International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters (the union) was joined as a defendant in that 
suit. The two actions were consolidated for trial in the 
Northern District of Texas. 
The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company 
had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against 
minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. Those Negroes and 
Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired, the Govern-
ment alleged, were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as 
servicemen or local city drivers, and were thereafter discrim-
inated against with respect to promotions and transfers.3 In 
this connection the complaint also challenged the seniority 
system established by the collective-bargaining agreements 
between the employer and the union. The Government 
sought a general injunctive remedy and specific "make whole" 
relief for all individual discriminatees, which would allow 
them an opportunity to transfer to line-driver jobs with full 
company seniority for all purposes. 
The cases went to trial 4 and the District Court found that 
3 Line drivers , also known as over-the-road drivers, engage in long-
distance hauling between company t.erminals. They compose a separate 
bargaining unit at T . I. M. E.-D. C. Other distinct bargaining units 
includr servicemen, who service trucks, unhook tractors and trailers, and 
perform similar tasks; and city operations, composed· of dockmen, hostlers, 
and city drivers who pick up and deliver freight wit.hin the immediate 
area of a pa.rticular terminal. Air of these employees were represented by 
tlie petitioner International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
4 Following the receipt of evidence, but before decision, the Government 
and t.he company consented tD the entry of a Decree in Partial Resolution 
of Suit. The consent decree did not constitute an adjudication on the 
merits. Tho company agrred; however, to undertake a minority recruiting 
program : to accept applications from all Negroes and Spanish-surnamed 
Amrricans who inquired about employment, whether or not vacancies· 
'<'Xist('d; and to keep such applications on file and notify applicants of job 
'Op('nings > to keep specific employment and recruiting records open ttl 
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the Government had shown "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies 
were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in 
violation of Title VII .... " 5 The court further found that 
the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining 
contracts between the company and the union violated Title 
VII because it "operate[d] to impede the free transfer of 
minority groups into and within the company." Both the 
company and the union were enjoined from committing 
further violations of Title VII. 
inspection by the Government and to submit quarterly reports to th~ 
District Court; and to adhere to certain uniform employment qualifications 
rt>spccting hiring and promotion to line driver and other jobs. 
The decree further provided that future job vaca.ncies at any T. I. M. E.-
D. C. terminal would be filled first "[b] y those persons who may be found 
by the Court, if any, to be individual or class discriminatees suffering the 
presmt effects of past discrimination because of race or national origin 
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Any remaining 
vacancies could be filled by "any other persons," but the company obligated 
itself to hire on,e Negro or Spanish-surnamed person for every white person 
hired at any terminal until the percentage of minority workers at that 
terminal equaled the percentage of minority group members in the popula-
tion of the metropolitan area surrounding the terminal. Finally, the 
company agreed to pay $89,500 in full settlement of any backpay obliga-
tions. Of this sum, individual payments not exceeding $1,500 were to be 
paid to "alleged individual and class discrim.inatees" identified by the 
Government. 
The Decree in Partial Resolution of Suit narrowed the scope of the 
litigation, but the District Court still had to determine whet.her unlawful 
discrimination had occurred. If so, the Court had to identify the actual 
discriminatees entitled to fill future job vacancies under the decree. The 
validity of the collective-bargaining contract's seniority system also re-
mained for decision, as did the question whether any discriminatees should 
be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroactive seniority. 
6 The District Court's Memornndum Decision in United States v. 
T. I . M. E.-D. C., Inc., Civ. No. 5-868 (Oct. 19, 1972), is not officially 
reported. It is unofficially reported at 6 FEP Cases 690 and 6 EPD 
, 8979. 
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With respect to individual relief the court accepted the 
Government's basic contention that the "affected class" of 
discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed in-
cumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations 
or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver 
operation.6 All of these employees, whether hired before or 
after the effective date of Title VII, thereby became entitled 
to preference over all other applicants with respect to consid-
eration for future vacancies in line-driver jobs.7 Finding that 
members of the affected class had been injured in different de-
grees, the court created three subclasses. Thirty persons who 
had produced "the most convit1cing evidence of discrimination 
and harm" were found to hav~ suffered "severe injury." The 
court ordered that they be offered the opportunity to fill line-
driver jobs with competitive seniority dating back to July 2, 
1965, the effective date of Title VII.8 A second subclass in-
cluded four persons who were "very possibly the objects of 
discrimination" and who "were likely harmed," but as ta 
whom there had been no specific evidence of discrimination 
and injury. The court decreed that these persons were en-
titled to fill vacancies in line-driving jobs with competitive 
seniority as of January 14, 1971, the date on which the Gov-
ernment had filed its systemwide lawsuit. Finally, there were 
over 300 remaining members of the affected class as to whom 
there was "no evidence to show that these individuals were 
either harmed or not harmed individually." . 'The court or-
dered that they be considered for line-driver jobs 0 ahead of 
6 The Government did not seek relief for Negroes and Spanish-surnamed 
Americans hired at a particular terminal after the date on which that 
t rrminal first employed a minority group ·member as a 'line driver. 
7 See supra, at 3-4, n. 4. 
8 If an employee in this class had joined the company after 'July 2, 1965, 
then the date of his initial employment rather than the effective date o'f 
Title Vli was to determine his competitive seniority. 
9 As with the other subclasses, there were a few individuals in the third 
·group w® were found to J1ave been tliscriminated against with respect to 
• 
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any applicants from the general public but behind the twe 
other subclasses. Those in the 'thira subclass received no 
retroactive seniority; t~eir competitive seniority as line drivers 
would begin with the date they were hired as line drivers. 
·The court further decreed that the"right of any class member 
to fill a line-driver vacancy was subject to the ·prior recall 
rights of laid-off line drivers, which under the collective-bar .. 
gaining agreements then in effect extended for three years.10 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the 
basic conclusions of the District Court: that the company had 
engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination 
and that the seniority system in the collective-bargaining 
agreements violated Title V11 as applied to victims of prior 
discrimination. United States v. T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., 
517 F. 2d 299. The appe11ate court held, however, that the 
relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate. Reject-
ing the District Court's attempt to trisect the affected class, 
the Court of Appeals held that all Negro and Spanish-sur-
named incumbent employee8 were entitled to bid for future 
line-driver 'jobs on the basis of their company seniority, and 
that once a class member had filled a job, he could use his 
full company seniority-even if it predated the effective date 
of Title V1I-for all purposes, including bidding and layoff. 
'This award of retroactive seniority was to be limited only by 
a "qualification date" formula, under which seniority could not 
be awarded for periods prior to the date when ( 1) a line-driv-
jobs other than line driver. 'There is no need to discuss them separately 
in this opinion. 
10 This provision of the decree was qualified in one significant respect. 
Under the Southern Conference Area O~r-the-Road Supplemental Agree-
ment between the employer and the union, line drivers employed at 
trrminals in certain southern States work under a "modified" seniority 
system. Under the modified sy~tem an employee's seniority is not confined 
strictly to his home terminal. If he is laid off at his home terminal he can 
move to another terminal covered by the Agreement. and retain his 
-seniority, dther by filling a vacancy at the other terminal or by "bumping•• 
75-636 & 75-672-0PINION 
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES 7 
ing position was vacant,11 and (2) the class member met (or 
would have met, given the opportunity) the qualifications 
for employment as a line driver.12 Finally, the Court of 
Appeals modified that part of the District Court's decree 
that had subjected the rights of class members to fill 
future vacancies to the recall rights of laid-off employees. 
Holding that the three-year priority in favor of laid-off work-
'ers "would unduly impede the eradication of past discrimin~ 
tion," id., at 322, the Court of Appeals ordered that class 
members be allowed to compete for vacancies with laid-off 
employees on the basis of t.he class members' retroactive senior~ 
ity. Laid-off line drivers would retain their prior recall rights 
with respect only to "purely temporary" vacancies. 1bid.13 
a junior line driver out of his job if there is no vacancy. The modified 
system also requires that any new vacancy at a covered terminal be offered 
to laid-off line drivers at all other covered temiinals ·before it is filled 'by 
any other pe~on. The District Court's final decree, as amended slightly 
by the Court of Appeals, 517 F. 2d, at 323, altered this system by requiring 
that any vacancy be offered to all members of all three subclasses 
before it may be filled ' by laid -<iff line drivers from other terminals. 
11 Although the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case did not 
specifically mention the requirement that a vacancy exist, it is clear 
from earlier and later opinions of that court that this requirement is a 
pal't of the Fifth Circuit's "qualification date" formula. See, e. g., 
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F. 2d 40, 63 n. 29 (CA5), 
rev'd on other grounds, ante, at -, cited in United States v. T. I . M. E.-
D . C., 517 F. 2d, at 318 n. 35; Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529 
F. 2d 721,731-734 (CA5 1976). 
12 For example, if a class member btlgan his tenure with the company 
on January 1, 1966, at which time he was qualified as a line driver and a 
line-driving vacancy existed, his competitive seniority upon becoming a 
line driver would date back to January 1, 1966. If he became qualified 
or if a va{)ancy opened up only at a later date, then that later date would 
be used. 
u The Court of Appeals also approved (with slight modification) the 
part of the District Court's order that allowed class members to fill 
vacancies at a particular terminal ahead of line drivers laid off at other 
t erminals. See supra, at 6-7, n. 10. 
I 
I 
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The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District 
Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply 
these remedial principles. We granted both the company's 
and the union's petitions for certiorari to consider the sig-
nificant questions presented under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 425 u. s. 990. 
II 
In this Court the company and the union contend that 
their conduct did not violate Title VII in any respect, as-
serting first that the evidence introduced at trial was insuf-
ficient to show that the company engaged in a "pattern or 
practice" of employment discrimination. The union further 
contends that the seniority system contained in the collective-
bargaining agreements in no way violated Title VII. If these 
contentions are correct, it is unnecessary, of course, to reach 
any of the issues concerning remedies that so occupied the 
attention of the Court of Appeals. 
A 
Consideration of the question whether the company en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory hiring prac-
tices involves controlling legal principles that are relatively 
clear. The Government's theory of discrimination was simply 
that the company, in violation of § 703 (a) of Title VII,14 
regularly and purposefully ,treated Negroes and Spanish-
14 Section 703 (a) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1970 ed. and 
Supp. V), provides: 
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
"(2) to 1imit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
Pmployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
~t a.tus as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin." 
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surnamed Americans less favorably than white persons. The 
disparity in treatment allegedly involved the refusal to recruit, 
hire, transfer, or promote minority group members on an equal 
basis with white people, particular,ly with respect to line-
driving positions. The ultimate factual issues a.re thus simply 
whether there was a pattern or practice of such disparate treat-
ment and, if so, whether the differences were "racially 
premised." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
805 n. 18.15 
As the plaintiff, the Government bore the initial burden of 
making out a prima facie case of discrimination. Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425; McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802. And, because it alleged a 
15 "Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most 
Msily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some 
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it 
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in 
treatment. See, e. g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropo'litan Housing 
Dev. Corp., - U. S. -, -. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was 
the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII. 
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) 
("What the bill does . . . is simply to make it an illegal practice to use 
race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and 
women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as 
Catholic citizens, not as protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as 
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States"). 
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that 
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that 
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by 
business necessity. See infra, at 22. Proof of discriminatory motive, we 
have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory . Compare, e. g., 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-432, with McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802-806. See generally Schlei & Gross-
man, Employment Discrimination Law 1-12 (1976); Blumrosen, Strangers 
in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment 
Discrimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1972). Either theory may, of course, 
be applied to a particular set of facts. 
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~ystemwide pattern or practice of resistance to the full en. 
joyment of Title VII rights, the Government ultimately had 
to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or "acci~ 
dental" or sporadic discriminatory acts. It had to establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination 
was the company's standard operating procedure-the regular 
rather than the unusual practice.16 
We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
that the Government carried its burden of proof. As of 
March 31, 1971, shortly after the Government filed its com-
plaint alleging systemwide discrimination, the company had 
6,472 employees. Of these, 314 (5%) were Negroes and 257 
( 4%) were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Of the 1,828 line 
drivers, however, there were only 8 (0.4%) Negroes and 5 
(0.3%) Spanish-surnamed persons, and all of the Negroes 
had been hired after the litigation had commenced. With one 
exception-a man who worked as a line driver at the Chicago 
terminal from 1950 to 1959-the company and its predecessors 
did not employ a Negro on a regular basis as a line driver until 
1969. And, as the Government showed, even in 1971 there 
were terminals in areas of substantial Negro population where 
16 The "pattern or practice" language in § 7Cfl (a) of Title VII, supra, 
at 2 n. 1, was not intended as a term of art, and the words reflect only 
their usual meaning. Senator Humphrey explained: 
" [A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of 
rights consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but 
is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature. There would be a pattern 
or practice if, for example, a number of companies or persons in the same 
industry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants 
practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its 
system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited 
by the statute. 
"The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by 
a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice ... :•· 
IlO Cong. Rec. 14270 (1964) . 
Thi!'l interpretation of "pattern or practice" appears thro~hout the 
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ttll of the company's line drivers were white.17 A great major. 
jty of the Negroes (83%) and Spanish-surnamed Americans 
(78%) who did work for the company held the lower-paying 
city operations and serviceman jobs/8 whereas only 39% of 
the nonminority employees held jobs in those categories. 
The Government bolstered its statistical evidence with the 
testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific in· 
stances of discrimination. Upon the basis of this testimony 
the District Court found that "[n] umerous qualified black 
and Spanish-surnamed American applicants who sought line• 
driving jobs at the company over the years had their requests 
ignored, were given false or misieading information about re· 
quirements, opportunities, and application procedures, or were 
iegislative history of § 707 (a), and is consistent with the Understanding of 
the identical words as used in similar federal legislation. See id., at 12946 
(remarks of Sen. Magnuson) (referring to § 206 (a.) of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 206 (a)); id., at i3081 (remarks of Sen. Case); id., 
nt 14239 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 15895 (remarks of Rep. 
Celler). See also United States v. iacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F. 2d 
418, 438, 441 (CA5); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544, 
552 (CA9); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F. 2d 221, 
227 (CA5); United States v. Mayton, 335 F. 2d 153, i58-i59 (CA5). 
17 In Atlanta, for instance, Negroes composed 22.35% of the population 
in the surrounding metropolitan area and 51.31% of the population in the 
cit~' proper. The company;s Atianta terminal employed 57 line drivers. 
All were white. In Los Angeies, i0.84% of the greater metropolitan 
population and 17.88% of the city population were Negro. But at the 
company's two Los Angeles terminals there was not a single Negro among 
the 374 line drivers. The proof showed similar disparities in San Francisco, 
Denver, Nashville, Chicago, Dallas, and at several other terminals. 
18 Although line-driver jobs pa.y more than other jobs, and the District 
Court found them to be "considered the most desirable of the driving-jobs," 
It is by no means clear that all employees, even driver employees, would 
'prefer to be line drivers. See infra, at 41-42, and n. 51. Of course, Title 
VII provides for equal opportunity to compete for any job, whether it is 
thought better or worse than another. See, e. g., United State& v, Hayes 
internat'l Corp., 456 F. 2d 112, 118 (CA5); United States v, N(Jtional 
Ln1.d Co ,J 438 F . 2d 935, 939 (CA8). 
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not considered and hired on the same basis that whites were 
considered and hired." Minority employees who wanted to 
transfer to line-driver jobs met with similar difficulties.19 
The company's principal response to this evidence is that 
statistics can never in and of themselves prove the existence 
of a pattern or practice of discrimination, or even establish 
a prima facie case shifting to the employer the burden of re-
butting the inference raised by the figures. But, as even our 
brief summary of the evidence shows, this was not a case in 
which the Government relied on "statistics alone." The in-
dividuals who testified about their personal experiences with 
the company brought the cold numbers convincingly to life. 
In any event, our cases make it unmist~tkably clear that 
" [ s] tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve 
an important role" in cases in which the existance of discrim-
ination is a disputed issue. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educa-
t'ional Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620. See also McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 805. Cf. Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 241-242. We have repeatedly ap-
proved the use of statistical proof, where it reached proportions 
comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima facie 
1 9 Two examples are illustrative: 
George Taylor, a Negro, worked for the company as a city driver in 
Los Angeles, beginning late in 1966. In 1968, after hearing that a white 
city driver had transferred to a line-driver job, he told the terminal 
manager that he also would like to consider line driving. The manager 
replied tha.t there would be "a lot of problems on the road ... with 
different people, Caucasian, et cetera," and stated "I don't feel the 
company is ready for this right now. . . . Give us a little time. It will 
come around, you know." Mr. Taylor made similar requests some months 
later and got similar responses. He was never offered a line-driving job 
or an application. 
Feliberto Trujillo worked as a dockman at the company's Denver 
t rrmina.l. When he applied for a line-driver job in 1967, he was told by~ 
personnel officer that he had one strike against him. He asked what that 
was and was told: "You're a Chicano, and a& far as we knowt there i!ln~ 
•. Chirano driver in the syst•em,'' 
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case of racial discrimination in jury selection cases, see, e. g., 
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 
U. S. 475 ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. Statistics are 
equally competent in proving employment discrimination.20 
to Petitioners argue that statistics, at least those comparing the racial 
composition of an employer's work force to the composition of the popula-
tion at large, should never be given decisive weight in a Title VII case 
bf:'cause to do so would conflict with § 703 (j) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000 (e) - 2 (j) . That section provides: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require 
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any ... group 
ll<'c:mse of the raoo . .. or national origin of such ... group on account 
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or 
peref:'ntage of any race .. . or national origin employed by any em-
ployer . . . with the total number or percentage of persons of such 
race . .. or national origin in any community, State, section, or other 
arra, or in the available work force in any community, state, section, or 
other area." 
The argument fails in this case because the statistical evidence was not 
offered or used to support an erroneous theory that Title VII requires an 
employer's work force to be racially balanced. Statistics showing racial or 
ethnic imbrdance are probative in a case such as this one only because such 
imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination ; absent 
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring 
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of 
the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from 
which employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity 
betwern the composition of a work force and that of the general popula-
tion thus may be significant even though § 703 (j) makes clear that Title 
VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general popula-
tion. Sre, e. g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local36, 416 F . 2d 
123, 127 n. 7. Considerations such as small sample size may, of course, 
drtract from the value of such evidence, see, e. g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. 
Rducational }]quality League, 415 U. S. 605, 620-621, and evidence showing 
that the figures for the general population might not accurately reflect the 
pool of qualified job applica nts would also ·be relevant. Ibid. See gen-
erally Srhlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, 1161-1193 
(1976) . 
"Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have 
frrqurntly relied upon statistical evidence to proVle a violation. . . . In 
]llany caseF> the only available avenue of proof ·is the ·use of -.racial statistics; 
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We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come 
in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they 
may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on all of 
the surrounding facts and circumstances. See, e. g., Hester v. 
Southern R. Co., 497 F. 2d 1374, 1379-1381 (CA5). 
In addition to its general protest against the use of statistics 
in Title VII cases, the company claims that in this case the 
statistics revealing racial imbalance are misleading because 
they fail to take into account the company's particular busi-
ness situation as of the effective date of Title VII. The com-
pany concedes that its line drivers were virtually all white in 
July 1965, but it claims that thereafter business conditions 
were such that its work force dropped. Its argument is that 
low personnel turnover, rather than post-Act discrimination, 
accounts for more recent statistical disparities. It points to 
substantial minority hiring in later years, especially after 1971, 
as showing that any pre-Act patterns of discrimination were 
broken. 
The argument would be a forceful one if this were an em-
ployer who, at the time of suit, had done virtually no new 
hiring since the effective date of Title VII. But it is not. 
Although the company's total number of employees apparently 
dropped somewhat during the late 1960's, the record shows 
that many line drivers continued to be hired throughout this 
period, and that almost all of them were white. 21 To be sure, 
to uncover clandestine and covert discrimLn-a.tion by the employer or union 
involved .... " United States v. Ironwork.rs Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544, 551 
(CA9). See also, e. g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F. 2d 
211, 225 n. 34 (CAS); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 
F. 2d 1377, 1382 (CA4); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 
F. 2d 418, 442 (CA5) ; Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F. 2d 
421, 426 (CA8) ; Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F . 2d 245, 
247 (CAlO) . 
21 Between July 2, 1965, and January 1, 1969, hundreds of line driverS' 
were hired systemwide, either from the outside or from the ranks of 
employees filling other jobs within the company. None was a, Negro. 
Government Exh. 204. 
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there were improvements in the company's hiring practices. 
The Court of Appeals commented that HT. I. M. E.-D. C.'s 
recent minority hiring progress stands as a laudable good faith 
effort to eradicate the effects of past discrimination in the area 
of hiring and initial assignment." 22 517 F. 2d, at 316. But 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals found upon sub-
stantial evidence that the company had engaged in a course 
of discrimination that continued well after the effective date 
of Title VII. The company's later changes in its hiring and 
promotion policies could be little comfort to the victims of 
the earlier post-Act discrimination, and could not erase its 
previous illegal conduct or its obligation to a.fford relief to those 
who suffered because of it. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, supra, at 413-423.28 
22 For example, in 1971 the company hired 116 new line drivers, of 
whom 16 were Negro or Spanish-surnamed Americans. Minority em-
ployees composed 7.1% of the company's systemwide work force in 1967 
and 10.5% in 1972. Minority hiring increased greatly in 1972 and 1973, 
presumably due at least in part to the existence of the consent decree. 
See 517 F. 2d, at 316 n. 31. 
23 The company's narrower attacks upon the statistical evidence-that 
there was no precise delineation of the areas referred to in the general 
population statistics, that tbe Government did not demonstrate that 
minority populations were located close to terminals or that transportation 
was available, that the statistics failed to show what portion of the 
minority population was suited by age, health, or other qualifications to 
hold trucking jobs, etc.-are equally lacking in force. At best, these 
attacks go only to the accuracy of the comparison between the composition 
of the company's work force at various terminals and the general popula-
tion of the surrounding communities. They detract little from the Govern-
ment's further showing that Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans who 
were hired were overwhelmingly excluded from line-driver jobs. Such 
employees were willing to work, had access to the terminal, were healthy 
and of working age, and often were at least sufficiently qualified to hold 
-city-driver jobs. Yet they became line drivers with far less frequency 
than whites. See, e. g., Pre-trial Stipulation 14, summarized at 517 F. 2d, 
at 312 n. 24 (of 2,919 whites who held driving jobs in 1971, 1,802 (62%) 
were line drivers and 1,117 (38%) were city driversi of 180 Negroes and 
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals. on thP hasis 
of substantial evidence, held that the Government had proved 
a prima facie case of systematic and purposeful employment 
discrimination, continuing well beyond the etlect.i ve daLe of 
Title VII. The company's attempts to rebut that conclusion 
were held to be inadequate. 24 For the reasons we have sum-
marized, there is no warrant for this Court to disturb the find-
ings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals on this 
basic issue. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 408-409; 
Faulkner v. _Gibbs, 338 U. S. 26~, 268; United States v. Dick-
inson, 331 U. S. 745, 751; United States v. Commercial Credit 
Co., 286 U. S. 63, 67; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 
Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14; Baker v. Schofield, 243 U. S. 114, 118; 
Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 24. 
Spanish-surnamed Americans who held driving jobs; 13 (7%) were line 
drivers and 167 (93%) were city drivers). 
In any event, fine tuning of the statistics could not have obscured the 
~lnring absrnce of minority line. drivers . As ·the Court of Appeals re-
marked, the company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination 
l'ame not from a misuse of statistics· but from "the inexorable zero." 517 
F . 2d, at 315. 
24 The company's evidence, apart from the showing of recent changes in 
hiring and promotion policies, consisted mainly of general statements that 
it hired only the· best qualified applicants. But "affirmations of good 
faith in making individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie 
case of systt>ma.tic exclusion'." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632. 
The rompany also attempted to show that all of the witnesses Who 
testified to specific instances of discrimination either were not discriminated 
against or suffered no injury. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that 
the trial judge was not bound to accept this testimony and that it com-
mitted no error by relying inst•ead on the other overpowering evidence in 
the case. 517 F. 2d, at 31'5. The Court of Appeals was also correct in 
·the view that proof that specific individuals were not harmed by the 
company's discriminatory conduct was appropriately left to proceedings to 
determine individual relief. In a suit brought by the Government under 
§ 707 (a) of thr Art, the District Court's initial concern is in deciding 
whether the Government has proved that the defendant has engaged in fl. 
J ntttern or practice of dif'criminatory conduct. Sec infra , at 32-35, 
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B 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals also found 
that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargain-
ing agreements between the company and the union operated 
to violate Title VII of the Act. 
For purposes of calculating benefits, such as vacations, pen-
sions, and other fringe benefits, an employee's seniority under 
this system runs from the date he joins the company, and 
takes into account his total service in aU jobs and bargaining 
units. For competitive purposes, however, such as deter-
mining the order in which employees may bid for particular 
jobs, are laid off, or are recalled from layoff, it is bargaining-
unit seniority that controls. Thus, a line driver's seniority, 
for purposes of bidding for particular runs 25 and protection 
against layoff, takes into account only the length of time he 
has been a line driver at a particular terminal.26 The prac-
tical effect is that a city driver or serviceman who transfers 
to a line-driver job must forfeit all the competitive seniority 
he has accumulated in his previous bargaining unit and start 
at the bottom of the line-drivers' "board." 
The vice of this arrangement, as found by the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals, was that it "locked" minority 
workers into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior discrimina-
tion by discouraging transfers to jobs as line drivers. While 
the disincentive applied to all workers, including whites, it 
was Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who, those courts 
found , suffered the most because many of them had been 
denied the equal opportunity to become line drivers when they 
25 Certain long-distance runs, for a variety of reasons, are more desirable 
than others. The best runs are chosen by the line drivers at the top of 
thr "board"-a list of drivers arranged in order of their bargaining-unit 
~C'niority . 
~,;Both bargaining-unit seniority and company seniority rights are 
~Pnrrally limit('d to service at one particular terminal, except as modified 
,,~· the Southern Conference Area Over-the-Road Supplemental A~eement. 
~c ·e supra, at 6-7, n. 10. 
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were initially hired, whereas whites either had not sought or 
were refused line-driver positions for reasons unrelated to their 
race or national origin. 
The linchpin of the theory embraced by the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals was that a discriminatee who must 
·forfeit his competitive seniority in order finally to obtain a 
line-driver job will never be able to "catch up" to the seniority 
level of his contemporary who was not subject to discrimina-
tion.27 Accordingly, this continued, built-in disadvantage to 
the prior discriminatee who transfers to a line-driver job was 
held to constitute a continuing violation of Title VII, for 
which both the employer and the union who jointly created 
and maintain the seniority system were liable. 
The union, while acknowledging tha.t the seniority sys-
tem may in some sense perpetuate the effects of prior discrim-
ination, asserts that the system is immunized from a finding 
of illegality by reason of § 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (h), which provides in part: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchap-
ter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to apply different standards of compensation, 
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system, . . . 
provided that such differences are not the result of an in-
tention to discriminate because of race ... or national 
origin ... . " 
2r An example would be a Negro who was qualified to be a line driver 
in 1958 but who, because of his race, was assigned instead a job as a city 
driver, and is allowed to become a line driver only in 1971. Because he 
loses his competitive seniority when he transfers jobs, he is forever junior 
to white line drivers hired between 1958 and 1970. The whites, rather 
than the Negro, will henceforth enjoy the preferable runs and the greater 
protection against layoff. Although the original discrimination occurred 
in 1958---before the effective date of Title VII-the seniority system 
operates to carry the effects Qf the e<ulier discrimination into the present, 
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It argues that the seniority system in this case is 11bona 
fide" within the meaning of § 703 (h) when judged in light 
of its history, intent, application, and all of the circumstances 
under which it was created and is maintained. More spe-
cifically, the union claims that the central purpose of 
§ 703 (h) is to ensure that mere perpetuation of pre-Act dis-
crimination is not unlawful under Title VII. And, whether 
or not § 703 (h) immunizes the perpetuation of post-Act dis-
crimination, the union claims that the seniority system in 
this case has no sucb effect. Its position in this Court, 
as has been its position throughout this litigation, is that 
the seniority system presents no hurdle to post-Act discrim-
inatees who seek retroactive seniority to the date they would 
have become line drivers but for the company's discrimina-
tion. Indeed, the union asserts that under its collective-bar-
gaining agreements the union will itself take up the cause of 
the post-Act victim and attempt, through grievance procedures, 
to gain for him full 11make whole" relief, including appropri~ 
ate seniority. 
'The Government responds that a seniority system that per-
petuates the effects of prior discrimination-pre- or post-Act--
can never be 11bona fide" under § 703 (h); at a minimum Title 
VII prohibits those applications of a seniority system that 
perpetuate the effects on incumbent employees of prior dis-
'criminatory job assignments. 
The issues thus joined are open ones in this Court.28 We 
2s Concededly, the view that § 703 (h) does not immunize seniority 
'systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination ·has much 
support. It was apparently first adopt€d in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 
'279 F. Supp. 505 (ED Va.) . The court there held that "a departmental 
seniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona 
fide seniority system." !d., at 517 (first emphasis added). The Quarles 
view has since enjoyed wholesale adoption in the Courts of Appeals. See, 
e. g., Local 189, United Paperworkers v. ·United States, 416 F. "2d 980, 
'987-988 (CA5) ; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 
F . 2d 123; 133-134, n. 20 (CAS) ; · United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
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considered§ 703 (h) in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
424 U. S. 747, but there decided only that § 703 (h) does not 
bar the award of retroactive seniority to job applicants who 
seek relief from an employer's post-Act hiring discrimination. 
We stated that "the thrust of [ § 703 (h)] is directed toward 
defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory prac-
tice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority 
Bystem is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimina--
tion occurring prior to the effective date of the Act." 424 
U. S., at 761. Beyond noting the general purpose of the 
statute, however, we did not undertake the task of statutory 
~onstruction required in this case. 
(1) 
Because the company discriminated both before and after 
the enactment of Title VII, the seniority system is said to 
have operated to perpetuate the effects of both pre- and post-
Act discrimination. Post-Act discrimina.tees, however, may 
obtain full "make whole" relief, including retroactive seniority 
under Franks v. Bowman, supra, without attacking the legal· 
ity of the seniority system as applied to them. Franks made 
clear and the union acknowledges that retroactive seniority 
may be awarded as relief from an employer's discriminatory 
hiring and assignment policies even if the seniority system 
agreement itself makes no provision for such relief. 211 424 
446 F. 2d 652, 658-659 (CA2); United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. 
Co., 471 F. 2d ' 582, 587=-588 (GA4). Insofar as the result in Quarles and 
in the cases that foUowed it depended upon findings that the seniority 
systems were themselves "racially discriminatory"· or had their "genesis in 
racial discrimination," 279 F. Supp., at 517, the decisions can be viewed 
as resting upon the proposition that a seniority system that perpetuates 
the effects of pre-Act discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to 
discriminate entered into its very adoption. 
29 Article 38 of the National Master Freight Agreement between 
T . I. M. E.-D. C. and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in effect 
ns of the date of the systemwide lawsuit provided: 
" The Employer and the Union agree not to discriminate against any 
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U. S., at 778-779. Here the Government has proved that the 
company engaged in a post-Act pattern of discriminatory 
hiring, assignment, transfer, and promotion policies. Any 
Negro or Spanish-surnamed American injured by those policies 
may receive all appropriate relief as a direct remedy for this 
discrimination. 30 
(2) 
What remains for review is the judgment that the seniority 
system unlawfully perpetuated the effects of pre-Act discrim-
ination. We must decide, in short, whether § 703 (h) vali-
dates otherwise bona fide seniority systems that afford no con-
structive seniority to victims discriminated against prior to 
the effective date of Title VII, and it is to that issue that we 
now turn. 
individual with respect to his hiring, compensation, terms or conditions of 
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, ol' 
national origin, nor will they limit, segregate or classify employees in any 
way to deprive any individual employee of employment opporturuties 
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
Any discrimina.tion by the company would apparently be a grievable 
breach of this provision of the contract. 
30 The legality of the seniority system insofar as it perpetuates post~ Act 
discrimination still remains at issue in this case, in light of the injunctjon 
entered aga inst the union. See supra, at. 4. Our decision today in United 
Air Lines v. Evans. post . at - , is large!~· dispositive of this issue. Evans 
l10ld:; that the opera tion of n seniority s~·stem is not unlawful under Title 
VII even though it perpetuates po;;t-Act di~crimimttion that hm; not been 
the subject of a t imely charge by the discriminatee. Herr , of course, the 
Government has sued to remedy the post-Act discrimination directly, and 
there i::; no claim that any rr lief would be time-barred . But. that is simply 
an addi t ional reason not to hold the seniority system unlawful, since such 
a holding would in no way enlarge thr relief to be awarded. Section 
703 (h ) on it ~:~ face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not. 
di~tinguish between the perpetual ion of pre- and post-Act discrimination . 
Moreover, if a K<> niority ~ystem that pNpetuates pre-Act or timr-barred 
discrimination for which the employee is currently without recourse is 
lawfu l, then Hurrly such <t ::;ystem is lawful where the original discrimirk'lr-
t ion may ::>Lill be remedied. 
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The primary purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality 
of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrim-
inatory practices and devices which have fostered racially 
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority 
citizens." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 800.31 
See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417-418; 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44; Griggs. v. 
Duke Power Co., supra, at 429-431. To achieve this purpose, 
Congress "proscribe[d] not only overt discrimination but alsp 
practices that are fair · in 'form but discriminatory in opera-
tion." Griggs, 401 U. ·s., at 431. Thus, the Court has -re-
pea.tedly held that a prima facie · Title VII violation may· be 
established by policies or practices that are neutral on their 
face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect 
against a particular group. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
-U.S.-,-; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-
247; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 422, 425; 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 802 n. 14; 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra. 
One species of practices 'rfair in form but discriminatory 
in operation" are those that perpetuate the effects of prior 
discrimination.32 As the Court held in Griggs, supra: "Under 
31 We also noted in McDonnell DouglCl8 that: I 
"There are societal as well as personal interests on both sides of the 
[employer-employee] equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared by 
employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workman-
ship assurli'd through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel 
decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it. is abundantly clear 
that Title VII tolerate:> no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." 411 
U. S., at 801. 
32 Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5), provides 
an apt illustration. There a union had a p<>licy of excluding persons not 
related to present members bY blood or marriage. When· in 1966 suit. was 
brought to challenge this policy, all of the · union's members were white, 
largely as a result of pre-Act, intentional racial discrimination. The court 
observed: "While the nepotism requirement is applicable to · bla{)k and 
white Ill~ and is not on its fa,ce 'discrimina.tory, in .a completely white 
• 
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the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if 
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices." 401 U. S., at 430. 
Were it not for § 703 (h), the seniority system in this case 
would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale. The heart of 
the system is its allocation of the choicest jobs, the greatest 
protection against layoffs, and other advantages to those 
employees who have been line drivers for the longest time. 
Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrim-
ination, the line drivers with the longest tenure are without 
exception white, the advantages of the seniority system flow 
disproportionately to them and away from Negro and Span-
ish-surnamed employees who might by now have enjoyed 
those advantages had not the employer discriminated before 
the passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution of 
advantages does in a very rea] sense "operate to 'freeze' the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices:'' 
Ibid. But both the literal terms of § 703 (h) and the legisla· 
tive history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered 
this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a 
measure of immunity to them. 
Throughout the initial consideration of H. R. 7152, later 
enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, critics of the bill 
charged that it would destroy existing seniority rights.33 The 
consistent response of Title VII's congressional proponents 
and of the Justice Department was that seniority rights would 
not be affected, even where the employer had discriminated 
union the present effect of its continued application is to forever deny to 
Negroes and Mexican-Americans any real opportunity for membership:" 
407 F. 2d, at 1054. 
33 E. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., 65-66, 71 (1963) 
(minority report) ; 110 Cong. Rec. 486-488 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill); 
id., at 2726 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id.1 at 7091 (remarks of Sen. 
'Stennis). 
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prior to the Act. 34 An interpretative memorandum placed in. 
the Congressional Record by Senators Clark and Case stated: 
uTitle VII would have no effect on established seniority 
rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective. 
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating 
in the past and as a result has an all-white working 
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's ob-
ligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non~ 
discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or in-
deed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, 
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes 
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the 
expense of the white workers hired earlier." 110 Cong. 
Rec. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added.).35 
A Justice Department statement concerning Title VII, placed 
in the Congressional Record by Senator Clark, voiced the same 
conclusion: 
uTitle VII would have no effect on seniority rights exist-
ing at the time it takes effect. If, for example, a collec-
tive bargaining contract provides that in the event of 
layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, 
such a provision would not be affected in the least by 
Title VII. This would be true even in the case where 
owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the 
34 In addition to the material cited in Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., at 
759-762, see 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., 
at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6564 (remarks of Sen, 
Kuchel). 
35 Senators Clark and Case were the "bipartisan ca.ptajns" responsible 
for Title VII during the Senate debate. Bipartisan captains were selected 
for each title of the Civil Rights Act by the leading proponents of the Act 
in both parties. They were responsible for explaining their title in detail, 
defending it, and leading discussion on it. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6528 (1964) 
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Vass, Title VII: Legislative llistocy, 1 
D .. C .. Ind. & Com.. L. Rev. ~3t,, 444-445 (1966.) .. 
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title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes." 
ld., at 7207 (emphasis added).36 
While these statements were made before § 703 (h) was 
added to Title VII, they are authoritative indicators of that 
section's purpose. Section 703 (h) was enacted as part of the 
Mansfield-Dirksen compromise substitute bill that cleared the 
way for the passage of Title VII.37 The drafters of the com-
promise bill stated that one of its principal goals was to resolve 
the ambiguities in the House-passed version of H. R. 7152. 
See, e. g., id., at 11935-11937 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); id., 
at 12707 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). As the debates in-
dicate, one of those ambiguities concerned Title VII's impact 
on existing collectively bargained seniority rights. It is ap-
parent that § 703 (h) was drafted with an eye toward meet-
ing the earlier criticism on this issue with an explicit provision 
embodying the understanding and assurances of the Act's pro-
ponents: namely, that Title VII would not outlaw such 
differences in treatment among employees as flowed from a 
bona fide seniority system that allowed for full exercise of 
seniority accumulated before the effective date of the Act. 
ao The full tex-t of the statement is set out. in Franks v. Bowman, 424 
U. S., at 760 n. 16. Senator Clark also introduced a set of answers to 
fJUestions propounded by Senator Dirksen, which included the following 
exchange: 
"Qurf:tion. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, 
when that management function is governed by a. labor contract calling for 
promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, 
labor contracts call for 'last hired, first fired.' If the last hired are Negroes, 
i~ the employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired 
and the remaining employees are white? 
"Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under 
a 'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired,' 
he can sti ll be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last 
hired' and not because of his race." 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964). See 
Franks, supra, at 760 n . 16. 
:H See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S., at 761; Vass, Title VII: Legislative 
History, 7 B. C . Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431,435 (1966). 
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It is inconceivable that § 703 (h), as part of a compromise bill, 
was intended to vitiate the earlier representations of the Act's 
supporters by increasing Title VII's impact on seniority sys-
tems. The statement of Senator Humphrey, noted in Franks, 
supra, at 761, confirms that the addition of § 703 (h) "merely 
clarifies [Title VII's] present intent and effect." 110 Cong. 
Rec. 12723 (1964). 
In sum, the unmistakable purpose of§ 703 (h) was to make 
clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority 
system would not be unlawful under Title VII. As the legis-
lative history shows, this was the intended result even where 
the employer's pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites hav-
ing greater existing seniority rights than Negroes. Although 
a seniority system inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of 
pre-Act discrimination in such cases, the congressional j udg-
ment was that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing 
seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested 
seniority rights of employees simply because their employer 
had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act. 
To be sure, § 703 (h) does not immunize all seniority sys-
tems. It refers only to "bona fide" systems, and a proviso 
requires that any differences in treatment not be "the result 
of an intention to discriminate because of race ... or national 
origin .... " But our reading of the legislative history com-
pels us to reject the Government's broad argument that no 
seniority system that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimina-
tion can be "bona fide." To accept the argument would re-
quire us to hold that a seniority system becomes illegal simply 
because it allows the full exercise of the pre-Act seniority 
rights of employees of a company that discriminated before 
Title VII was enacted. It would place an affirmative obliga-
tion on the parties to the seniority agreement to subordinate 
those rights in favor of the claims of pre-Act discriminatees 
without seniority. The consequence would be a perversion of 
the congressional purpose. We cannot accept the invitation to 
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disembowel § 703 (h) by reading the words "bona fide" as the 
Government would have us do.38 Accordingly, we hold that 
an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not be-
come unlawful under Title VII simply because it may per-
petuate pre-Act discrimination. Congress did not intend to 
make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to 
continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of pre-
Act discriminatees. 
That conclusion is inescapable even in a case, such as this 
one, where the pre-Act discriminatees are incumbent employ-
ees who accumulated seniority in other bargaining units. Al-
though there seems to be no explicit reference in the legislative 
history to pre-Act discriminatees already employed in less 
desirable jobs, there can be no rational basis for distinguishing 
their claims from those of persons initially denied any job but 
hired later with less seniority than they might have had in the 
absence of pre-Act discrimination.80 We rejected any such 
aH For the same reason, we reject the content ion that the proviso in 
§ 703 (h), which bars differences in treatment resulting from "an intention 
to discriminate," applies to any application of a. seniority system that may 
perpetuate pa8t discrimination . In this regard the language of the Justice 
Dcpartmrnt mrmorandum introduced at the legislative hearings, see supra, 
at 24, is e8pccially pertinent: "It is perfectly clear that when a worker is 
laid off or denied a. chance for promotion because he is 'low man on the 
to1em pole' h<' is not being discriminated against ·because of his race .... 
Any differC'nces in treatment ·based on established seniority rights would 
not br ba.~ed on race and would not ·be folibidden ·by the title.~' 110 CoiJg. 
Rec. 7207 (1964). 
3u That Title VII clid not proscribe the denial of fictional seniority to 
pre-Act discriminatees who got no job was recognized even .in Quar.les v. 
Phillip Morris. Jnc. , 279 F. Supp. 505 (ED Va.), and its progeny. 
Quarles st r!:'f'sed the fact that the references in the legislative history were 
to employment seniority rather than departmental seniority. 279 F. 
::iupp., at 516. In [-ocal 189, .United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 
F . 2d 980 (CA5), another leading case in this area, th~ co~rt observed: 
"No doubt, Congress, to prevent 'reverse dis~riminatio~' meant to protect 
certain sC'niority rights that could not hav~ existedbut.for previous racial 
discrimi11<1tion. For example a Negro who had .been r~jected by an 
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distinction m Franks, finding that it had "no support any-
where in Title VII or its legislative history," 424 U. S., at 
768. As discussed above, Congress in 1964 made clear that 
a seniority system is not unlawful because it honors em-
ployees' existing rights, even where the employer has en-
gaged in pre-Act discriminatory hiring or promotion practices. 
It would be as contrary to that mandate to forbid the exercise 
of seniority rights with respect to discriminatees who held 
inferior jobs as with respect to later-hired minority employees 
who previously were denied any job. If anything, the latter 
group is the more disadvantaged. As in Franks," '[i]t would 
indeed be surprising if Congress gave a remedy for the one 
[group] which it denied for the other.'" !d., quoting Phelp8 
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187."0 
(3) 
The seniority system in this case is entirely bona fide. It 
applies equally to all races and ethnic groups. To the ex-
tent that it "locks" employees into nonline-driver jobs, it 
·does so for all. The city drivers and servicemen who are dis-
couraged from transferring to line-driver jobs are not all 
Negroes or Spanish-surnamed Americans; to the contrary, the 
employer on racial grounds before passage of the Act could not, after being 
hired, claim to outrank whites who had been hired before him but after 
his original rejection, even though the Negro might have had senior status 
but for the past discrimination." 416 F. 2d, at 994. 
40 In addition, there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended in 
1964 to extend less protection to legitimate departmental seniority systems 
than to plant-wide seniority systems. Then as now, seniority was measured 
in a number of ways, including length of time with the employer, in a 
particular plant, in a department, i·n a job, or in a line of progression. 
See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and· Enforceability of Seniority 
Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1534 (1962); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority 
and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to 
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1602 
(1969). The legislative history contains no suggestion· that• any one' system. 
was preferred. 
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overwhelming majority are white. The plabing of lihe driver& 
in a separate bargaining unit from other employees is rational, 
in accord with the industry practice, and consist~nt with 
NLRB precedents.u It is conceded that the seniority system 
did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and that it 
was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal 
purpose. In these circumstances, the single fact that the 
system extends no retroactive seniority to pre-Act discrimi-
natees does not make it unlawful. 
Because the seniority system was protected by § 703 (h), 
the union's conduct in agreeing to and maintaining the system 
did not violate Title VII. On remand, the District Court's 
injunction against the union must be vacated.42 
III 
Our conclusion that the seniority system does not violate 
Title . VII will necessarily affect the remedy granted to 
individual employees on remand of this litiga.tion to the 
bistrict Court. Those employees who suffered only pre-Act 
discrimination are not entitled to relief, and no person may 
be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than the effec-
tive date of the Act. · Several other questions relating to the 
appropriate measure of individual relief remain, however, for 
our consideration. 
41 Ser Georgia Highway Express, 150 N. L. R. B. 1649, 1651: "The 
l:loard has long held that local drivers and over-the-road drivers constitute 
separa.t.e appropriate units where they are shown to be cl-early defined, 
homogeneous, and functionally distinct groups with separate interests which 
can effectively be represented separately for bargaining purposes. . . . In 
view of the different duties and functions, separate supervision, and different 
bases of payment, it is clear that the over-the-road drivers have divergent 
interests from those of the employees in the [city operations] unit . . . and 
should not. be included in t hat unit." 
42 Thr union will propr rly remain in this litigatjon as a defendant so 
that full relief may be awarded the victims of the employer's post-Act 
discrimination. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19 (a) . See EEOC v. Mac-
Millan Bloedel Containers1 lnc.1 503 F. 2d 10861 1095 (CA6) . 
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The petitioner~ afgJle generally that th~ triaJ court diq 
not err in tailoring the remedy to the "qegree of injury" suf: 
fered by each individual employee, and that the Court of 
Appeals' "qualification d~te" formula sweeps with too broad 
a brush by granting a remedy to employees who were no~ 
shown to be actual victims of unlawful discrimination. Spe .. 
cifically, the petitioners assert that no employee should be en .. 
titled to relief until the Government demonstrates that he wa:s 
an actual victim or the company's discriminatory practices; 
that no employee who did not apply for a line-driver job 
!Should be granted retroactive competitive seniority; and that 
no employee should be elevated to a line-driver job ahead, 
of any current line driver on layoff status. We consider each 
of these contentions separately. 
A 
The petitioners' first contention is in substance that the 
Government's burden of proof in a pattern or practice case 
must be equivalent to that outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green, supra. Since the Government introduced specific evi-
dence of company discrimination against only some 40 employ-
ees, they argue that the District Court properly refused to 
award retroactive seniority to the remainder of the class of 
minority incumbent employees. 
In McDonnell Douglas the Court considered "the order 
and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challeng-
ing employment discrimination." 411 U. S., at 800. We 
held that an individual Title VII complainant must carry the 
initial burden of proof by establishing a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination. On the specific facts there involved, 
we concluded that this burden was . met by showing that a 
qualified applicant, who was a member of a racial minority 
group , had unsuccessfully sought a job for which there was 
a vacancy and for which the employer continued thereafter 
to se~k applicants with similar qualificationS; This initia:i 
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showing _justified the inference that the minority applicant 
was denied an employment opportunity for reasons prohibited 
by Title VII. and therefore shifted the burden to the employer 
to rebut that inference by offering some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the rejectiot1. !d., at 802. 
The company and union seize upon the McDonnell Douglas 
pattern as the only means of establishing a prima facie case of 
individual discrimination. Our decision in that case, how-
ever, did not purport to create an inflexible formulation. We 
expressly noted that " [ t] he facts necessarily will va.ry in Title 
VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof 
required from ·[a plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in 
every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U. S., at 
802 n. 13. The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies not ill 
its specification of the discrete elements of proof there re-
quired, but in its recognition of the general principle that any 
Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering 
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment 
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under 
the Act.4 '~ 
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. the Court applied 
this principle in the context of a class action. The Franks 
plaintiffs proved , to the satisfaction of a district court, that 
Bowman Transportation Company "had engaged in a pattern 
43 The McDonnell Dour/las case involved an individual complainant 
seeking to prove one instance of unlawful discrimination. An employer's 
isolated decision to reject an applicant who belongs to a racial minority 
does not show that the rejection was racially based. Although the 
McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimina-
tion, it. does demand that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least 
that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitima.te 
reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an 
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in 
the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is 
sufficient , ab~en t other €xplanation, to create an inference that the d,ecisiOlll 
wa~ a d,isCJ·iminatory one. 
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of racial discrimination in various company policies, including 
the hiring, transfer, and discharge of employees." 424 U. S., 
at 751. Despite this showing, the trial court denied seniority 
relief to certain members of the class of discriminatees because 
not every individual had shown that he was qualified for the 
job he sought and that a vacancy had been available. We held 
that the trial court had erred in placing this burden on the 
individual plaintiffs. By "demonstrating the existence of a 
discriminatory hiring pa.ttern and practice" the plaintiffs had 
made out a pr;ima facie case of discrimination against the 
individual class members; the burden therefore shifted to the 
employer "to prove that individuals who reapply were not in 
fact victims of previous hiring discrimina.tion." 424 U. S., at 
772. The Franks case thus illustrates another means by which 
a Title VII pla.intiff's initial burden of proof can be met. The 
class there alleged a broad-based policy of employment dis-
crimination; upon proof of that a.Uega.tion there were reason-
able grounds to infer that individual hiring decisions were 
made in pursuit of the discrimina.tory policy and to require the 
employer to come forth with evidence dispelling that 
inference:14 
"'"{The holding in Franks that proof of a discriminatory pattern and pra.c-
tice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief is consist-
ent with the manner in which presumptions are created generally. Pre-
sumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect ·judicial 
evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access 
to the proof. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 
§§ 337, 343 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) ; James, Burdens of Proof, 47 Va. L. Rev. 
51, 61 ( 1961). See also K eyes v. School Dist. No. 1. 41a U.S. 189, 208-209, 
These factors were present in Franks. Although the prima facie case did 
not conclusively demonstrate that all of the employer's decisions were part 
of the proven discriminatory pa.ttern and practice, it did create a greater 
likelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall pattern. 
Moreover, the finding of a patt.ern or practice changed the position of the 
('mployer to that. of a proven wrongdoer. Finally, the employer was in the 
bf'St position to show why any individual employee was denied an employ-
mrnt opportunity. Insofa r a.~ the reawns related to available vacancies 
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Although not all class actions will necessarily follow the 
Franks model, the nature of a pattern or practice suit brings 
it squarely within our holding in Franks. The plaintiff in a 
pattern or practice action is the Government, and its initial 
burden is to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has 
been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer 
br group of employers. See pp. 9-10, and n. 16, supra. At the 
initial, "liability" stage of a pattern or practice suit the Gov-
ernment is not required to offer evidence that each person for 
whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the em-
ployer's discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a 
prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden then 
shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a 
pattern or practice by demonstrating that the Governmenes 
proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. An employer might 
show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern is 
a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act 
discrimination, ot' that during the period it is alleged to have 
pursued a discriminatory policy it made too few employment 
decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in a 
regular practice of discrimination.45 
or the employer's evaluation of the applicant's qualifications, t.he com-
pany's records were the most relevant items of proof. If the refusa.J to 
hire was based on other factors, the employer and its agents knew best 
what those factors were and the extent to which they iniluenced the 
decision-making process. 
45 The employer's defense must, of course, be designed to meet the prima, 
facie case of the Government. We do not mean to suggest tha.t there are 
any pa.rticular limits on the type of evidence an employer may use. The 
point is that at the liability stage of a pattern or practice trial the focus 
often wilt not be on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of 
discriminatory decisionmaking. While a pattern might be demonstrated 
by examining the discrete decisions of which it is composed, the Govern-
ment's stlits have more commonly involved proof of the expected result 
of a regula.rly followed discriminatory policy. In such cases the employer's 
burden is to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation ior the apparently 
d iscriminatory result. See n. 20, and cases cited therein , suprc. 
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If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises fro~ 
the Government's prima facie case, a trial court may then 
conclude that a violation has occurred and determine the ap~ 
propriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the 
Government, a court's finding of a pattern or practice justifies 
an award of prospective-relief. Such relief might take· the 
form of an injunctive order against continuation of the ·dis-
criminatory practice, an ·order that the employer keep records 
of its future employment · decisions and Q.le periodic reports 
with the court, o~ any other order "necessary to ensure the 
full enjoyment of the rights" protected by Title VII.~6 
When the Government seeks individual relief for the victims 
of the discriminatory practice, a district court must usually 
conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the 
trial to determine the scope Of individual relief. · The peti~ 
tioners' contention in this case is that if the Government has 
not, in the course of proving a pattern or practice, already 
· brought forth specific evidence tha.t each individual was die~ 
criminatorily denie·d an employment opportunity, ·it must 
carry that burden at the second, "remedial" stage of ttial. 
·That basic contention was rejected in the Franks case. As 
was true of the particular facts in Franks, and as is typical of 
·Title VII pattern or practice suits, the question of individual 
relief does not a.rise until it has been proved that the employer 
has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination. 
'The force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage 
of the trial. 'The employer cannot, therefore, claim that there 
is no reason to believe that its individual employment deci~ 
sions were discriminatorily based; it has already been shown to 
have maintained a policy of discriminatory decisionmaking. 
46 The federal courts have freely exercised their broad equitable discre~ 
tion to devise prospective relief designed to assure tha.t employers found 
to be in violation of § 707 (a) eliminate their discriminatory practices and 
the effects therefrom. See, e. g., cases cited in n. 48, infra. In this case 
prospective relief was incorporated in the parties' consent decree. See 
mpra, 1.\t 3-41 n, 4:. 
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The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference 
that any particula.r employment decision, during the period in 
which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in 
pursuit of that policy. The Government need only show that 
an alleged individual discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for 
a job H and therefore was a potential victim of the proven 
discrimination. As in Franks, thf' burden then rests on the 
employer to demonstrate that the individual applicant was 
denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons. See 
424 U.S., at 773 n. 32. 
In Part II-A, supra, we have held that the District Court 
and Court of Appeals were not in error in finding that the 
Government had proved a systemwide pattern and practice 
of racial and ethnic discrimination on the part of the company. 
On remand, therefore, every post-Act minority group appli-
cant "8 for a line-driver position will be presumptively entitled 
to relief, subject to a showing by the company that its earlier 
refusal to place the applicant in a line-driver job was not 
based on its policy of discrimination.40 
B 
The Court of Appeals' "qualification date" formula for re-
lief did not distinguish between incumbent employees who 
had applied for line-driver jobs and those who had not. The 
appellate court held that where there has been a showing of 
classwide discriminatory practices coupled with a seniority 
system that perpetuates the effects of that discrimination, an 
47 Nonapplicants are discussed in Part III-B, infra. 
48 Employees who initially applied for line-driver jobs and were hired in 
other jobs before the effective date of the Act, and who did not later apply 
for transfer to line-driver jobs, are part of the group of nonapplicants 
discussed infra. 
40 Any nondiscriminatory justification offered by the company will be 
'ubject to further evidence by the Government that the purported reason 
for an applicant's rejection was in fact a pretext for unlawful discrirnina~ 
tion . McDonnell Douglas v. Green, supra, at 804-806. 
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individual member of the class need not show that he unsuc-
cessfully applied for the position from which the class had 
been excluded. In support of its award of relief to all non-
applicants, the Court suggested that "as a practical matter ... 
a member of the affected class may well have concluded that 
an application for transfer to an all White position such as 
[line driver] was not worth the candle." 517 F. 2d, at 320. 
The company contends that a grant of retroactive seniority 
to these nonapplicants is inconsistent with the make-whole 
purpose of a Title VII remedy and impermissibly will require 
the company to give preferential treatment to employees 
solely because of their race. The thrust of the company's 
contention is that unless a minority-group employee actually 
applied for a line-driver job, either for initial hire or for 
transfer, he has suffered no injury from whatever discrimina-
tion might have been involved in the refusal of such jobs to 
those who actually applied for them. 
The Government argues in response that there should be 
no "immutable rule" that nonapplicants are nonvictims, and 
contends that a determination whether nonapplicants have 
suffered from unlawful discrimination will necessarily vary 
depending on the circumstances of each particular case. The 
Government further asserts that under the specific facts of 
this case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that all 
qualified nonapplicants were likely victims and were therefore 
presumptively entitled to relief. 
The question whether seniority relief may be awarded to 
nonapplica.nts was left open by our decision in Franks, since 
the class at issue in that case was limited to "identifiab1e 
applicants who were denied employment ... after the effec-
tive date ... of Title VII." 424 U. 8., at 750. We now 
decide that an incumbent employee's failure to apply for a job 
is not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive seniority. 
Individual nonapplicants must be given an opportunity to 
sustain their heavy burden of proving that 'they should be 
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treated as applicants and therefore are presumptively entitled 
to seniority relief. 
(1) 
Analysis of this problem must begin with the premise that 
the scope of a district court's remedial powers under Title VII 
is determined by the purposes of the Act. Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, supra, at 417. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
supra, and again in Albemarle, the Court noted that a primary 
objective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal em-
ployment opportunity and to remove the barriers that have 
operated to favor white male employees over other employees. 
401 U. S., at 429-430; 422 U. S., at 417. The prospect oi 
retroactive relief for victims of discrimination serves this 
purpose by providing the " 'spur or catalyst which causes 
employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate 
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, -so 
far as possible, the last vestiges' " of their discrimina.tory 
practices. Albemarle, supra, at 417-418. An equally impor-
tant purpose of the Act is "to make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employment 'discrimination:" 
1 d., at 418. In determining the specific remedies to be 
afforded, a district court is "to fashion such relief as 'the par-
ticular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitu-
tion." Franks, supra, at 764. 
Thus, the Court has held that the purpose of Congress in 
vesting broad equitable powers in Title VII courts was "to 
make possible the 'fashion [ing] [of] the most complete relief 
possible.' " and tha.t the district courts have " 'not merely the 
power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as 
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as 
well as bar like discrimination in the future.' " Albemarle, 
.supra, at 421, 418. More specifically, in Franks we decided 
that a court must ordinarily award a seniority remedy unless 
there exist reasons for denying relief "'which, if applied gen-
L'rally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes ·of 
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eradicating discriminfltion ... and making persons whole for 
injuries suffered.'" 4~4 U. S., at 771, quoting Albemarle, 
~upra, at 421. 
Measured against these stand~ds, the company's assertion 
that a person who has not actually applied for a job can 
never be awarded seniority relief cannot prevail. The effects 
of and the injuries suffered from discriminatory employment 
practices are not always confined to those who were expressly 
denied a requested employment opportunity. A consistently 
enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job applica-
tions from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to sub-
ject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain 
rejection. 
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimina-
tion by a sign reading "Whites Only'' on the hiring-office door, 
his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the 
sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. The same 
messa.ge can be communicated to potential applicants more 
subtly but just as clearly by an employer's actual practices-
by his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual appli-
cants, by the manner 'in which he publicizes vacancies, his re-
cruitment techniques, his responses to casual or tentative 
inquiries, and even by the racial or ethnic composition of that 
part of his workforce from which he has discriminatorily 
excluded members of minority groups. ~0 When a person's 
00 The far-ranging effects of subtle discriminatory practices have not 
escaped the scrutiny of the federal courts, which have provided relief 
from pra.rtices designed to discourage job applica.tions from minority-group 
members. See, e. g .. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F. 2d 
398, 418-419 (CA5) (public recruitment and advertising), rev'd on other 
ground;;, 424 U. S. 747; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 319 (CA8) 
(recruitment); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F . 2d 418, 
458 (CA5) (po:>ting of job vacancies and job qualification requirements); 
United States v. Local No.8, JAB, S, 0. & R . / ., 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1238, 
1245-1246 (WD Wash.) (dissemination of information), aff'd, 443 F . 2d 
544 (CA9). While thesr measures may be effective in preventing the 
deterrence of future applicants, ther a:ffotd no relief to those p.ersons w~ 
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desire for a job is not translated into a formal application 
solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture 
he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes 
through the motions of submitting an application. 
In cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act, 
the model for Title VII's remedial provisions, Albemarle, 
supra, at 419; Franks, supra, at 769, the National Labor Rela· 
tions Board, and the courts in enforcing its orders, have rec-
ognized that the fa.ilure to submit a futile application does 
not bar an award of relief to a person claiming that he was 
denied employment because of union affiliation or activity. 
In NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 
105, this Court enforced an order of the Board directing an 
employer to hire, with retroactive benefits, former employees 
who had not applied for newly available jobs because of the 
employer's well-known policy of refusing to hire union mem-
bers. See In re Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26 
N. L. R. B. 1182, 1208, 1231. Similarly, when an application 
would have been no more than a vain gesture in light of em-
ployer discrimination, the Courts of Appeals have enforced 
Board orders reinstating striking workers despite the failure 
of individual strikers to apply for reinstatement when the 
strike ended. E. g., NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, 
Inc., 323 F. 2d 956 (CA2); NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp., 
303 F. 2d 64 (CA6); Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., v. 
NLRB, 119 F. 2d 903 (CA8). See also Piasecki Aircraft Corp. 
v. NLRB, 280 F. 2d 575 (CA3); NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, 
228 F. 2d 775 (CA5); NLRB v. liummus Co., 210 F. 2d 377 
(CA5). Consistent with the NLRA model, several Courts of 
Appeals have held in Title VII cases that a nonapplicant can 
be a victim of unlawful discrimination entitled to make-whole 
relief when an application would have been a useless act serv-
ing only to confirm a discriminatee's knowledge that the job 
in til(' pa:,<t. desired jobs but were intimidated and discouraged by employ~ 
ment di~'<<·rimination. 
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he wanted was unavailable to him. Acha v. Beame, 531 F.-2d 
648, 656 (CA2); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F. 2d 
226, 231-233 (CA4); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F. 2d 
441, 451 (CA5); United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 
F. 2d 354, 369 (CA8). 
The denial of Title VII relief on the ground that the claim-
ant had not formally applied for the· job could exclude from 
the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms 
of discrimination. Victims of gross and pervasive discrimina-
tion could be denied relief precisely because the unlawful prac-
tices had been so successful as totally to deter job applica-
. tions from members of minority groups. A per se prohibition 
of relief to nonapplicants could thus put beyond the reach 
of equity the most invidious effects of employment discrimina-
tion-those that extend to the very hope of self-realization. 
Such a pe'r se limitation on the equitable powers granted to 
courts by Title VII would be manifestly inconsistent with the 
"historic purpose of equity to 'secur[e] complete justice''' and 
with the duty of courts in -Title VII cases "'to render a decree 
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory 
effects of the past.'" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody; supra, 
a.t 418. 
(2) 
To conclude that a person's failure to submit an application 
for a job does not inevitably and forever foreclose his entitle-
ment to seniority relief under Title VII is a far cry, however, 
from holding that nonapplicants are always entitled to such 
relief. A nonapplicant must show that he was a potential 
victim of unlawful discrimina.tion. Because he is necessarily 
claiming that he was deterred from applying for the job by the 
employer's discriminatory practices, his is the not always easy 
burden of proving that he would have applied for the job had 
it not been for those practices. Cf. Mt. Healthy City School 
District Board of Education v. Doyle, - U. S. -, -. 
When this burden is met, the nonapplicant is in a position 
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~nalogous to that of an applicant and is entitled to the 
presumption discussed in Part III-A, supra. 
The Government contends that the evidence it presented 
in this case at the liability stage of the trial identified all non-
applicants as victims of unlawful discrimination "with a fair 
degree of specificity," and that the Court of Appeals' deter-
mination that qualified nonapplicants are presumptively en-
'titled to an award of seniority should accordingly be affirmed. 
In support of this contention the Government cites its proot 
of an extended pattern and practice of discrimination as evi-
dence that an application from a minority employee for ·a 
line-driver job would have been a vain and useless act. It 
"further argues that since the class of nonapplicant discrimi-
natees is limited to incumbent employees, it is likely that 
every class member was aware of the futility of seeking a liM-
driver job and was therefore deterred from filing both an ini• 
tial and a followup application.51 
•51 The limitation to incumbent employees is also said to serve the sali'l'h 
function that actua.I job applications served in Franks: providing a mean 
of distinguishing members of the excluded minority group from minority 
members of the public at large. While it is true that. incumbency in 
this ca,o;e and actual applications in Franks both serve to narrow wha.t 
might otherwise be an impossible task, the status of nonincumbent 
applicant and nona.pplicant incumbent differ substantially. The refused 
applicants in Franks had been denied an opportunity they clearly sought, 
and the only issue to be resolved was whether the denial was pursuant ·to 
a proven discriminatory practice. Resolution of the nonapplicant's claim, 
however, requires two distinct determinations: that he would have a.pplied 
but for discrimination and that he would have been discriminaturily 
rejected had he applied. The mere fact of incumbency does not resolve 
the first issue, although it may tend to support a nonapplicant's clajm to 
t.he extent. that it. ~hows he was willing and competent to work as a driver, 
t hat he was familiar with the tnsks of line drivers, etc. An incumbent's 
claim that he would ha.ve applied for a line-driver job would certainly be 
more superficially plausible than a similar claim by a member of the general 
public who may nrver have worked in the trucking industry or hea.'td of 
'1'. I. .M. E.-D. C. prior to suit. 
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We cannot agree. While the scope and duration of the 
company's qiscriminatory policy can leave little doubt that 
the futility of seeking line-driver jobs was communicated to 
the company's minority employees, that in itself is insufficient. 
The known prospect of discriminatory rejection shows only 
that employees who wanted line-driving jobs may ha.ve been 
deterred from applying for them. It does not show which of 
the nonapplicants actually wanted such jobs, or which pos-
sessed the requisite qualifications.~2 There are differences 
between city and line-driving jobs, 53 for example, but · the 
rlesirfability of the latter is not so self-evident as to warrant 
a co~lusion that all employees would prefer to be line drivers 
if given a free choice."' Indeed, a substantial number of white 
r." Inasmuch as the purpose of the nonapplicant!s burden of proof will h<' 
to establish that his status is similar to that of the applicant, he mu:;t brar 
thr burden of coming forward with the basic information about his quali-
ficat.ion:; that he would ha.ve presented in an application. As in Franks, 
and in accord with Part III-A, supra, the burden then will be on the 
employer to show that. the nonapplicant was neverthele:;s not a victim of 
discrimin,ntion. For example, the employer might show that there were 
ot.her, more qualified persons who would have been chosen for a particular 
vacancy, or that the nonapplicant's stated qunlifica.tions were insufficirnt. 
See Franks, supra, at 773 n. 32. 
5a Of the employees for whom the Government sought transfer to line-
driving jobs, nearly one-third held city-driver positions. 
~' The company's line drivers generally earned more annually than its 
city drivrrs, but the difference varied from under $1,000 to more than $5,000 
depending on the terminal and the year. In 1971 city drivers at two 
California terminals, "LOS" and San Francisco, earned substantially more 
f han the line drivers at those terminals. In addition to earnings, line 
drivers have the advantage of not being required to load and unload their 
truc·ks. City drivers, however, have regular working hours, are not 
rrquirrd to spend extended periods away from home and family, and do 
not face the haza rds of long-distnnce driving at high speeds. As the Gov-
f'rnmrnt acknowledged at argumrnt, the jobs are in some sense "pa.rallel"-
~ome may prefer one job and some may prefer Mother. 
The District Court found generally that line-driver jobs "are considered 
~he mo;st desirable of the driving jobs." That finding is not challenged 
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city drivers who were not subjected to the company's dis--
criminatory practices were apparently content to retain their 
city jobs.55 
In order to fill this evidentiary gap, the Government argues 
that a nonapplicant's current willingness to transfer into a 
line-driver position confirms his past desire for the job. An 
employee's response to the court-ordered notice of his entitle-
ment to relief 50 demonstrates, according to this argument, that 
the employee would have sought a line-driver job when he 
first became qualified to fill one, but for his knowledge of the 
company's discriminatory policy. 
here, and we see no reason to disturb it. We observe only that the 
differences between city and line driving were not suc·h that it can be said 
With confidence that all minority employees free from the threat of dis-
criminatory treatment. would have chosen to give up city for line driving. 
MIn addition to the futility of applicat,ion, the Court. of Appeals seem;; to' 
ha.ve relied on the minority employees' accumulated seniority in nonline-
driver positions in concluding that nonapplicants had been unlawfully de-
terred from applying. See 517 F. 2d, at 318,320. The Government adopts 
that theory here, arguing that a nonapplicant who has a.ccrued time a.t fhe 
company would be unlikely to ha.ve applied for transfer because he would 
have had to forfeit all of his competitive seniority and the job security-
that went with it. In view of our conclusion in 'Part II_;B, supra, this· 
argument detracts from rather than supports a nonapplicant's entitlement· 
to relief. To fhe extent that a.n incumbent was deterred from applying ·by 
his desire to retain his competitive seniority, he simply did not want a 
line-driver job requiring him to start at t.he bottom of the "board." Those· 
nonapplicants who did not apply for tnmsfer because t.hey were unwilling 
to give up their previously acquired seniority suffered only from a lawful 
deterrent imposed on all employees regardless of raoe or ethnicity. The 
nonapplicant's remedy in such cases is limited solely to the relief, if any, 
to which he may be entitled because of the discrimina.tion he encountered 
at a time when he wanted to take a starting line-driver job. 
50 The District Court's final order required that the company notify each 
minority employee of the relief he was entitled to claim. The employee was 
then required to indicate, within 60 days, his willingness to accept the relief. 
Under the decision of the Court of Appeals, the tcl.ief would. be ctuali.t\c.;a..~ 
~io:t~ d~w .~eniorit.y. 
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This assumption falls short of satisfying the appropriate 
burden of proof. An employee who transfers into a line-
driver unit is normally placed a.t the bottom of the seniority 
"board." He is thus in jeopardy of being laid off and must, 
at best, suffer through an initial period of bidding on only the 
least desirable runs. See supra, at 15-16, and n. 25. Non-
applicants who chose to accept the appellate court's post hoc 
invitation, however, would enter the line-driving unit with 
retroactive seniority dating from the time they were first 
qualified. A willingness to accept the job security and bid-
ding power afforded by retroactive seniority says little about 
what choice an employee would have made had he previously 
been given the opportunity freely to choose a starting line-
driver job. While it may be true that many of the nonappli-
cant employees desired and would have applied for line-driver 
jobs but for their knowledge of the company's policy of dis-
crimination, the Government must carry its burden of proof, 
with respect to each specific individual, at the remedial hear-
ings to be conducted by the District Court on remand.r.7 
c 
The task remaining for the District Court on remand 
will not be a simple one. Initially, the court will have to 
make a substantial number of individual determinations in 
deciding which of the minority employees were actual victims 
of the company's discriminatory practices. After the victims 
have been identified, the cour.t must, as nearly as possible, 
" 'recreate the conditions and relationships that would have 
been had there been no' " unlawful discrimination. Franks, 
supra, 424 U. S., at 769. This process of recrea.ting the 
~7 WhilP the mo::;t convincing proof would be some overt act such as a 
pre-Act application for a line-driver job, the District Court may find 
evidence of an E'mployee's informal inquiry, expression of interest, or even 
unexpressed desire credible and convincing. The question is a factual one 
for determination by the trial judge. 
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past will necessarily involve a degree of approxima.tion and 
impreciSIOn. Because the class of victims may include some 
who did not apply for line-driver jobs as well as those who 
did, and because more than one minority employee ma,y have 
been denied each line-driver vacancy, the court will be required 
to balance the equities of each minority employee's situation 
in allocating the limited number of vacancies that were 
discriminatorily refused to class members. 
Moreover, after the victims have been identified and their 
rightful place determined, the District Court will again be 
faced with the delicate task of adjusting the remedial interests 
of discriminatees and the legitimate expectations of other 
employees innocent of any wrongdoing. In the prejudgment 
consen.t decree, see supra, at 3-4, n. 4, the company and the 
Government agreed that minority employees would assume 
line-driver positions that had been discriminatorily denied to 
them by exercising a first-priority right to job vacancies at the 
company's terminals. The decree did not determine what 
constituted a vacancy, but in its final order the trial court 
defined "vacancy" to exclude a.ny position that became avail-
able while there were laid-off employees awaiting an oppor-
tunity to return to work. Employees on layoff were given a 
preference to fill whatever openings might occur at their ter-
minals during a three-year period after they were laid. off.~ 8 
68 Paragraph 9 (a) of the trial court's final order provided: 
"A 'vacancy' as used in this Order, shall include any opening which is 
caused by the transfer or promotion to a position outside the bargaining 
unit, death, resignation or final discharge of an incumbent, or by an 
increase in operations or business where, ordinarily, additional employees 
would be put to work. A vacancy shall not exist where there are laid 
off employres on the seniority roster where the opening occurs. Such laid 
off employ€es shall have a preference to fill such laid off positions when 
tl1ese again become open without competition from the individuals granted 
relief in t.his ca.~e . 
''However, if such layoff continues for three consecutive years the position 
, ... ill bP dermed as 'vacant' with the right of all concerned to compete for 
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The Court of Appeals rejected the preference and held that all 
but "purely temporary" vacancies were to be filled according 
to an employee's seniority, whether as a member of the class 
.. 
the position, using their respective seniority dates, including those provided 
for in tills Order." · 
' The trial court's use of a. three-year recall right is apparently derived 
from provisions in t.he collective-bargaining agreements. Article 5 of the, 
~ationa.l Master Freight Agreement ("Nl\t1FA'1) establishes the seniority 
fights of employees covefed by the Agreement. Under Art. 5, "[s]eniority 
rights for employees shall prevail . . . . Seniority shall be broken bY. 
dischargr, voluntary quit, [or] more than a. three (3) yea.r layoff." §f. 
A;; is evident, the three-year layoff provision in the Master Agreeme;t 
determines only when an .employee shall lose dll of his accumulated , ,. . 
·eniority; it does not determine either the order of layoff or t.he order of 
, , l i 
recall. Subject to other terms of t.he Master Agreement, NMFA Art. 2, 
§ 2, " the extent to which seniority shall be applied as well as t.he method~ 
and procedures of such application" are left to the Supplemental AgreeM 
ments. /d., § 1. The Southern Conference Area .pver-the-Road Supple-
mental Agreement, covering line drivel-s in the Southern Conference, also 
provides for a complete loss of seniority rights after a three~year layoff, 
Art. 42, § 1, and further provides that in the event of a reduction in force 
"tlw last employee hired shall be llljd off first imd when the force is agajn 
Increased, the employees are to be returned to work in the reverse order 
in which they were laid off," id., § 3. 
This order of layoff and recall, however, is limited by the Master Agree-
ment in at least. two ;;ituat.ion;; involving an influx of employees from out-
side [~ terJll.inal. NMFA Art. 5, §3 (a)(1) (merger with a solvent 
company), § 5 (b) (2) (branch closing with transfer of operation;; to 
another branch). In these <:.'lses the Master Agreement provides for 
' 'doveta iling" the seniority rights of active and laid-off employees at the 
two f:tcilitie::; involved. Ibid .; see also NMFA Art. 15 (honoring Military 
Selrrtive SPrvice Act of 1967). The Master Agreement also recognize:; that 
''que:;tion::; of •tcerual, interpretation or application of seniority rights ma.y 
ari::;e which arc not covered by the general rules set forth," and provides a 
procrdure for rr:;olution of unforeseen seniority problems. NMFA Art. 5, 
§ 7. Presumably § 7 applies to persons claiming discriminatory denial of 
job::; and seniori ty in violation of Art. 38, which prohibits discrimination in 
hiring a.s well as classification of employees so as to deprive them of 
employment opportunities on account of race or national origin. See 
.wpra, at 21 n. 29. The Dist rict Court apparently c;lid not consider these 
l>rovi~ion · when it determined the recall rights of employees on la.yoff, 
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discriminated against or as an incumbent line driver on layoff. 
517 F. 2d, at 322-323. 
As their final contention concerning the remedy, the com-
pany and the union argue that the trial court correctly made 
the adjustment between the competing interests of discrim-
inatees and other employees by granting a preference to laid-
off employees, and that the Court of Appeals erred in disturb-
ing it. The petitioners therefore urge the reinstatement of 
that part of the trial court's final order pertaining to the rate 
at which victims will assume their rightful places in the line-
driver hierarchy."0 
Although not directly controlled by the Act,00 the extent to 
which the legitimate expectations of nonvictim employees 
should determine when victims a.re restored to their rightful 
place is limited by basic principles of equity. In devising and 
implementing remedies under Title VII, no less than in for-
:;u In their briefs the petitioners also challenge the trial court's modifica-
tion of the interterminal transfer rights of line drivers in the Southern 
Conference. See supra, at 6-7, n. 10. This question was not presented in 
either petition for certiorari and therefore is not properly before us. 
Rules of the Supreme Court 23.1 (c). Our disposition of the claim that 
is presented, however, will permit the trial court to reconsider any part 
of the bala.nce it struck in dealing with this issue. 
60 The petitioners argue that to permit a victim of discrimination to use 
his rightful place seniority to bid on a line-driver job before the recall of 
all employees on layoff would amount to a racial or ethnic preference in 
violation of § 703 (j) of the Act. Section 703 (j) provides no support for 
t his a.rgument.. It. provides only that Title VII does not require an 
employer to gra nt preferential treatment to any group in order to rectify 
an imbalance between the composition of the employer's workforce and the 
rru1ke-up of the population at, large. See supra, at 13 n. 20. To allow 
identifiable victims of unlawful discrimination to participate in a layoff 
recall is not· t.he kind of "preference" prohibited by § 703 (j) . If a 
discriminatee i;; ultimately allowed to secure a position before a laid-off line 
driver, a, question we do noi, now decide, he will do so because of the 
bidding power inherent in his rightful place seniority, and not because of a 
preference based on race. See Franks, supra, at 792 (PowELL, J., concur-
rin"" in vart and dissenting in part). 
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mulating any equitable decree, a court must draw on the 
''qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity 
the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between 
the public interest and private needs as well as between com-
peting private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 
329-330. Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 
195-196, modifying and remanding In re Phelps Dodge Corp., 
19 N. L. R. B. 547, 600; Franks, supra, at 798-799. Especi-
ally when immediate implementation of an equitable remedy 
threatens to impinge upon the expectations of innocent 
parties, the courts must "look to the practical realities and 
necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing 
interests.'a in order to determine the "special blend of what is 
necessary~ what is fair, and what is workable.'' Lemon v. 
Kurtzmarj,, 411 U.S. 192, 201, 200 (opinion of BuRGER. C. J.). 
Because of the limited facts now in the record, we decline 
to strike the baJance in this Court. 'The District Court did 
not explain why it subordinated the interests of class members 
to the contractual recall expectations of other employees on 
layoff. When it made that determination, however, it was 
considering a class of more than 400 minority employees, all 
of whom had been granted some preference in filling line-
driver vaca.ncies. The overwhelming majority of these were 
in the District Court's subclass three. composed of those 
employees with respect to whom neither the Government nor 
the company had presented any specific evidence on the ques-
tion of unlawful discrimination. Thus, when the court consid-
ered the problem of what constituted a line-driver "vacancy" 
to be offered to class members, it ma.y have been influenced 
by the relatively small number of proven victims and the 
large number of minority employees about whom it had no 
information. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals rede-
fined "vacancy" in the context of what it believed to be a class 
of more than 400 employees who had actually suffered from 
cliscfimination at the behest of both the company and the 
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union, and its determination may well ha.ve been influenced 
by that understanding. For the reasons discussed in this 
opinion, neither court's concept was completely valid. 
After the evidentiary hearings to be conducted on remand, 
both the size and the composition of the class of minority 
employees entitled to relief will be altered substantially. 
Until those hearings have been conducted and both the num-
ber of identifiable victims and the consequent extent of neces-
sary relief have been determined, it is not possible to evaluate 
abstract claims concerning the equitable balance that should 
be struck between the statutory rights of victims and the 
contractual rights of nonvictim employees. That determina-
tion is best left, in the first instance, to the sound equitable 
discretion of the trial court.0 1 See Franks v. Bowman, supra, 
at 779; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 416. We 
observe only that when the court exercises its discretion in 
dealing with the problem of laid-off employees in light of the 
facts developed at the hearings on remand, it should clearly 
state its reasons so that meaningful review may be had on 
appeal. See Fra.nks, supra, at 774; Albemarle Paper Co. v.. 
Moody , supra, at 421 n. 14. 
For all the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the 
Court of Appea.ls is vacated, and the case is remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
0 1 Other factors, such as the number of victims, the number of non-
virtim employees affected and the alternatives available to them, and the 
economic circumstance:; of the industry may also be relevant in the exer-
cise of the District Court 's discretion. See Franks, supra, 424 U. S., at 
796 n, 17 (PowELL, J ., concurring and dissenting) . 
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